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Abstract 
 
The cultural forms of modernity become truly modern only when specific experience, as 
opposed to tradition or faith, is made the basis of epistemological authority. By taking the 
primary examples of law and literature, this thesis argues that the criminal trial and realist novel 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries perfectly conform to this statement. But by the early 
twentieth-century, experience had, as Walter Benjamin put it, ‘fallen in value’. As such, the 
modernist novel and trial come to have foundations in a non-experience which nullifies identity, 
subverts repetition and supplants presence with absence. The philosophical basis of experience, 
its fundamental basis within the novel and trial, and the theoretical manifestations of its 
dissolving, are outlined in the substantial Introduction to this thesis. Chapter One then 
specifically examines E.M. Forster’s A Passage to India (1924) within the context of the 
administration of justice in British India. Adela Quested’s supposed assault within the Marabar 
cave is argued to be a non-event which in no way conforms to the modern sense of experience 
outlined in the Introduction. This resonates with the state of the trial in British India, in which 
many magistrates became convinced of the rampant perjury of the natives, turning their 
decisions into a matter of deciding between the less untrue of two false accounts. Like the non-
event in the Marabar cave, the crime that was supposedly at the heart of the trial, the experience 
at its core, was thus slipping from view. In the second part of Chapter One, it is argued that in 
his theoretical work, Aspects of the Novel (1927), Forster, responding to anxieties about the novel’s 
experiential loss, attempted to codify the laws of the realism. This project had much in common 
with the Acts of legal codification that took place in British India in the 1860s and ‘70s, 
particularly that of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s Indian Evidence Act 1872, which sought to 
retain a form of representation that was congruent with a traditional conception of experience, 
thus safeguarding judgment. In Chapter Two, Ford Madox Ford’s The Good Soldier (1915) is 
analysed in the light of legal developments in expert witnessing and criminal identification. One 
of the specific issues of Ford’s novel is the kind of identity it portrays. Without commensurable 
experiences that can be reasonably assimilated and communicated, the identities of The Good 
Soldier resist the common recognition of a realist character. Legal developments in the attribution 
of responsibility and the identification of criminals are argued to parallel the methods by which 
Ford’s ‘Literary Impressionism’, by contrast, provides the image of his actors. In many ways, these 
issues were matters for expert witnesses, a growing number of whom were taking the stand in 
British courts. By taking judgment out of the hand of the layman, expertise was supplanting 
  
experience. But this was not limited to the legal forum – in the final part of Chapter Two it is 
suggested that Ford’s novel, itself, responds to a sense of expert reading. Chapter Three 
discusses Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time (1913-1927) in connection to two points of legal 
interest. Firstly, the Dreyfus case, which, in its reliance upon absent evidence parallels the 
denigration of presence that exists in Proust’s novel. Secondly, Dreyfus’ supporters, in calling for 
a re-trial, asked for a certain form of repetition to take place. The repetitious legal forms of 
review, appeal, and precedent are then examined in relation to the various forms of repetition 
that exist within Proust’s work. By utilising Platonic, Nietzschean, and Freudian theories of 
repetition, it is argued that experience has truly fallen in value when the origins of repetition can 
be only obliquely discerned. In the Conclusion, the continuity of a realist tradition, and a 
modernist impulse of non-experience, will be traced in contemporary works – Ian McEwan’s 
Atonement (2001) and The Staircase (2005), a documentary film by Jean-Xavier De Lestrade about a 
real murder trial in North Carolina. Finally, a view is offered of the future of experience in the 
novel and courtroom: one which, based upon John D. Caputo’s reading of Jacques Derrida’s 
work, stresses the ethical nature of doing truth and making reality in the very act of allowing 
experience to slip away. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE TRIALS OF EXPERIENCE 
 
 The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. 
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law1 
 
There's something the matter with people. It seems they're unable to take in their 
experiences or else to wholly enter into them, so they have to pass along what's left. 
Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities2 
 
Between these quotations from Oliver Wendell Holmes and Robert Musil there lies a gulf. For 
Holmes, experience is everything; for Musil it is nothing. Holmes sees the history of law as being 
identical to the history of experience. Musil declares experience to be resistant to intellectual 
assimilation. Most emphatically, for Holmes, law is alive – the history of the law is a history of its 
life precisely because it is based in experience. But, for Musil, experience is exactly what life no 
longer contains, refers to, or enters into. This chasm cannot be bridged by any simple notion that 
it indicates the irreducible difference between the disciplines of law and literature. Nor does it 
exist because Holmes is writing in an American context, while Musil’s novel is firmly set within 
the borders of Austrian culture. Rather, these towering figures are separated only by the time in 
which they wrote. Holmes’ treatise, published in 1881, is in many ways a modern classic of legal 
thought – but it is also the product of a century which believed in experience. Musil’s novel, the 
first volume of which was published in 1930, and which is set on the eve of the First World War, 
forms a perfect expression of its dissolution and fragmentation. What happened in the period 
between these figures? What were the various formations in which the loss of experience 
manifested itself? What did the life of the law, and the life of individual consciousness, look like, 
when their basis in experience was being relentlessly undermined? 
 To ask these questions is to read legal and literary history in a way that goes against much 
recent criticism. In his 1992 study, Strong Representations, Alexander Welsh claims that from the 
late eighteenth-century to the end of the nineteenth-century a certain form of narrative 
dominated the discourses of law, literature, science, philosophy and religion. These narratives, 
described as ‘very much of the Enlightenment’ are ‘strong representations’: collections of 
                                                           
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1881) 1. 
2 Robert Musil, The Man without Qualities, trans. Sophie Wilkins (London: Picador, 1997) 158-59. 
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circumstances connected in such a way as to prove the existence of unseen events.3 Welsh’s 
theory allows him to group, amongst others, Fielding’s Tom Jones and Tennyson’s In Memoriam 
with the Shakespearean criticism of A. C. Bradley, and the legal theory of Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen. In his final chapter Welsh suggests that in its literary form ‘strong representations’ were 
weakened by texts such as Browning’s ‘The Ring and the Book’, Collins’ The Moonstone, and 
James’ The Golden Bowl – texts which he terms ‘stories of experience’. Indeed, the pivotal scene 
from James’ novel in which the supposed ‘proof’ that the golden bowl forms is smashed by 
Fanny Assingham is interpreted as the symbolic destruction of ‘strong representations’ hold on 
narrative construction. The advent of modernism marks the end of circumstantial evidence’s 
hallowed position in the novel. Welsh’s final words make this plain: 'James's novel is not so 
different, in this way, from Woolf's Orlando or Joyce's Ulysses; and in its entertainment and 
rejection of proof from circumstantial evidence, it is quite like Forster's A Passage to India. But no 
one even begins to study those works as strong representations'.4 
Welsh’s analysis is both wide ranging and incisive, and Strong Representations has proven to 
be a hugely influential contribution to studies of law and literature. The connecting of narrative 
formations within novels, poetry, and literary criticism to legal theory, legislation, and the specific 
unfolding of court cases has, in particular, shown itself to be a fruitful combination for cultural 
study. But subsequent work which has utilised a similar method and operated within a 
comparable time frame has suggested important qualifications to Welsh’s theory. In Testimony and 
Advocacy (2000), Jan-Melissa Schramm argues that Welsh, although being aware of the issue, fails 
fully to contend with the fact that there is no such thing as neutral circumstances. That is to say, 
her focus is on testimony, and she rightly argues that what are taken for circumstances, especially 
in a court of law, have always had to enter discourse via a particular testimony.5 It is not, 
therefore, simply the collection of circumstances that matters but the weight that each one is 
given dependent on the authority and trustworthiness of the witness who has brought it into 
being. Likewise, Lisa Rodensky, in The Crime in Mind (2003), suggests that there is a central 
weakness in Welsh’s argument. Rodensky argues that Welsh ignores crucial differences between 
novelistic and trial narratives in the Victorian period. In particular, the conceptions of mind 
                                                           
3 Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1992) 8. 
4 Ibid.  256. 
5 Barbara Shapiro makes a similar point. She writes that 'during the eighteenth-century we also begin to hear maxims 
such as "Facts don't lie" being used to support a preference for circumstantial evidence over the direct testimony of 
witnesses. Only in the early nineteenth-century did legal thinkers begin to suggest that "circumstances" did not speak 
for themselves and that circumstantial evidence too had to be established by witnesses’. Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture 
of Fact: England, 1550-1720 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000) 196. 
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evinced by the third-person novel, in which the thoughts of the characters are directly available 
to the reader, and the inferential method by which the mind of the criminal has to be ascertained 
in court present serious discrepancies between supposedly alike ‘strong representations’. 
 These are indeed both important and useful qualifications to Strong Representations: and it 
is testament to the originality of Welsh’s argument that they, in many ways, serve to enrich rather 
than dilute his work. However, it is the intention of this thesis to suggest an alternative view to 
all three approaches. That is, while taking Welsh’s position as a starting point, it is not the 
particulars of the argument that will be questioned but the terms of the historical reading. Welsh 
writes that no one begins to read modernist novels as strong representations – this is quite right. 
But the nature of his final chapter suggests that while these texts move away from ‘strong 
representations’, towards what he terms ‘stories of experience’, the law remains firmly emplaced 
within them. Likewise, the legal and literary connections evinced by Schramm and Rodensky are 
seen to cease with the advent of modernism. Rodensky, in particular, claims that modernist 
conceptions of character do not allow for the attribution of guilt required by the law. Again, this 
is a valid argument. The common law trial continues to utilise, to this day, notions of character 
that do seem more congruent with the realist novel, just as circumstantial evidence remains 
prominent in modern day criminal trials.6  
In contrast to these claims, the initial argument of this thesis is that significant 
connections continue to exist between novels and trials in the modernist period. The issue is, in 
this sense, a question of degree. It is not the intention to suggest that novels and trials are, in the 
modernist period, identical. Nor is the purpose to argue that trials in the early twentieth-century 
cease to have anything in common with realist novels. Rather, the argument is intended to 
indicate that the early twentieth-century trial is more like a modernist novel than has thus far been 
presumed.7 But, to understand how this is the case involves not a question of degree but an 
active reconfiguration of Welsh’s basic historical terms. Modernist novels, and those that 
prefigure them, are not ‘stories of experience’ as opposed to ‘strong representations’ precisely 
because this is not a true opposition. ‘Strong representations’ though they may claim evidence of 
‘things unseen’ are actually ‘very much of the Enlightenment’ precisely because they rely on 
Enlightenment conceptions of experience for their authority. Realist novels are therefore both 
‘strong representations’ and ‘stories of experience’ at one and the same time. 
                                                           
6 Nicola Lacey argues that while the notion of ‘capacity’ has become the dominant concept in the attribution of 
responsibility the law still utilises ‘character’ to a certain degree. Nicola Lacey, "Responsibility and Modernity in 
Criminal Law," The Journal of Political Philosophy 9, no. 3 (2001). 
7 A notable exception to this is Melanie Williams work on Woolf and Joyce: see Melanie Williams, Empty Justice: One 
Hundred Years of Law, Literature and Philosophy (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2002). 
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Modernist novels, on the other hand, venture into a different realm of in- or non-
experience. The three texts that will form the basis of this study – E M Forster’s A Passage to 
India, Ford Madox Ford’s The Good Soldier, and Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time – all thus 
display a marked turn away from experience as the subject matter of their writing. From the 
blank space of Adela Quested’s experience in the Marabar cave, to the duplicity and absence from 
his own story of Ford’s narrator Dowell, to the ‘crepuscular states’ of Marcel, a common link is 
formed.8 As they are no longer of experience, these novels, in ways that mirror developments in 
the law, build narratives on new foundations. Without an authoritative and neutral experience to 
rely on, judgment becomes an issue of prejudice or of subservience to an expert authority, 
identity becomes fragmented into traces and abstract images, and repetition, as a reliable site of 
experimental method and judicial review becomes an unstable compulsion to repeat a trauma 
that never took place.  
The period of study, in terms of the novels’ publication dates (Ford, 1915; Forster, 1924; 
Proust, 1913-1927) is fairly compact. The legal context, however, stretches this timeframe 
considerably. The analysis of colonial rule in British India, in particular, involves the use of 
sources from as early as the 1870s. In the other direction, certain works of legal theory, most 
significantly the work of Jerome Frank, will move the field of study into the 1930s and ‘40s. The 
fact that the novels under consideration lie in the middle of this elongated time scheme should 
suggest a central feature of this thesis: it is not a study in influence. Certain developments in the 
law, such as the anxiety over perjury in British India, or the rise of fingerprinting as a system of 
identification, while preceding the novels in question, are thus not to be thought of as directly 
influencing the authorial process. Likewise, legal texts written post 1930 are not to be seen as 
responding to the work of Ford, Forster, or Proust. The position cannot be stated more 
concisely than it is by Rodensky, who writes of her own work that ‘the legal texts are neither 
subordinate or superordinate to the literary, and the literary functions neither as supplement to 
nor master of the legal’.9 This is not to deny that Forster was influenced by his knowledge of 
colonial trials (which he probably was) or that Jerome Frank was interested in modernist fiction 
                                                           
8 The phrase ‘crepuscular states’ comes from Giorgio Agamben. Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: Essays on the 
Destruction of Experience (London: Verso, 1993) 42. 
9 Lisa Rodensky, The Crime in Mind: Criminal Responsibility and the Victorian Novel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003) 8. This methodology is in contrast to Schramm, who argues for the primacy of the legal: 'I conclude that the 
rise of the third-person realist novel is simultaneously in imitation of, and in reaction against, the increasing 
prominence of the activities of defence counsel’. Jan-Melissa Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, 
Literature and Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 23. Jonathan Grossman makes similar claims, 
while it is the law-making power of literature that is the focus for Maria Aristodemou: see Maria Aristodemou, Law 
and Literature: Journeys from Her to Eternity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Jonathan H. Grossman, The Art of 
Alibi: English Law Courts and the Novel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). 
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(which he may well have been). It is, rather, to avoid the infinite regression that can befall the 
investigation of influence. The aim is not to determine what came first but, rather, to elucidate 
with as much clarity as possible, the way in which an experiential loss manifested itself in the 
narratives utilised by law and literature at this time. Welsh identified the use of ‘strong 
representations’ in the domains of law, literature, philosophy, science, and religion. This thesis 
will operate in a more restricted fashion, not because non-experience is not evident in these 
other discourses (indeed it is particularly apparent in the natural sciences) but because literature 
and law are taken to be exemplary of its cultural impact. The novel and the trial are the primary 
examples of the way in which, from the late nineteenth century onwards, experience was put on 
trial.  
To undertake such a project involves making certain assumptions about the 
commensurability between the legal and the literary. These are, however, not assumptions 
without academic precedent. The literary quality of the law has been well noted, in terms both of 
its formal structures in statute and prior judgments, and in the narrative construction involved in 
‘cases’ presented in court. Peter Goodrich’s comment that ‘the law is a literature that denies its 
literary qualities’ is suggestive of much of the scholarly work undertaken in the last twenty years 
designed to undeceive the law of this conceit.10 In some cases, this has led to a more subtle form 
of studies in influence. For Kieran Dolin, the linguistic play of judicial law-making institutes a 
normative legal world (or nomos).11 Literature is always in some way expressive of the nomos from 
which it comes, but literary texts also contribute to that legal world by locating it and giving it 
meaning.12 But the literary, in both its legal guise and in terms of literature itself, forms a 
relationship with something beyond the nomos. As Robert Ferguson puts it, 'the struggle of 
attorneys to find the best accounts for their clients turns courtroom transcripts into excellent 
barometers of what is said and thought in a culture at any given moment of time'.13 This is quite 
obviously the case with novels. The methods by which narratives are formed in both novels and 
law (taken in the widest sense to include case construction, the development of rules of evidence, 
                                                           
10 Peter Goodrich, Law in the Courts of Love: Literature and Other Minor Jurisprudences (London: Routledge, 1996) 112. 
11 Kieran Dolin, Fiction and the Law: Legal Discourse in Victorian and Modernist Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
12 James Boyd White argues that the law is best understood as a literary activity with its own language. The language 
of the law 'is not just a set of special-sounding words, but a set of intellectual and social activities, and these 
constitute both a culture [...] And a community’. James Boyd White, Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of 
the Law (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) 11.    
13 Robert A. Ferguson, "Untold Stories in the Law," in Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, ed. Peter Brooks 
and Paul Gewirtz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 87. For a full length study that makes similar claims see 
Ann M. Algeo, The Courtroom as Forum: Homicide Trials by Dreiser, Wright, Capote and Mailer (New York: Peter Lang, 
1996). 
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and statutory legislation) indicate how literary activity must operate in the given time and place of 
its appearance. As this thesis is concerned with the parallels and connections between these two 
sets of narratives, the examination of specific literary representations of the trial is not essential. 
A Passage to India, of course, includes a very prominent court case, and the ‘Kilsyte Case’ is one of 
Edward Ashburnham’s many misdemeanours in The Good Soldier, but the way the law is depicted 
in this sense is not the crucial matter. What is essential, rather, is the way that the legal and the 
literary partake of similar forms, produce similar features, and create similar effects. 
 These forms, features, and effects have been noted by another recent publication, albeit 
within a more strictly literary setting and with a still different set of terminological tools. In his 
Unknowing, Philip Weinstein characterises the modern West since Descartes as being concerned 
with knowing.14 Modernity strives for knowledge and believes in the human capacity to attain it, 
even if imperfectly. The modernism that springs up at the turn of the twentieth-century, by 
contrast, is characterised by such deep doubts as to the possibility of knowledge that the age can 
only be described as one dominated by opposing principles - those of unknowing. Weinstein’s 
argument holds numerous parallels with this thesis and will be referred to repeatedly. Unlike 
Welsh, the difference in terminology here is indicative only of a difference in the terms used to 
describe historical developments rather than differences which alter the conception of that 
history itself. Weinstein’s ‘knowing’ and ‘unknowing’ are, therefore, very closely connected to the 
terms of ‘experience’ and ‘inexperience’ that will be utilised in this thesis. This is perfectly logical, 
as it was precisely in modernity that experience became the matter of epistemology and 
knowledge became a matter for experience to judge. But what exactly is meant by experience 
here? What precisely does it mean to have an experience?   
 
The Emergence of Experience 
 
In the 1930s the British philosopher Michael Oakeshott noted that '"Experience", of all the 
words in the philosophic vocabulary, is the most difficult to manage’.15 Some thirty years later 
Hans-Georg Gadamer commented that ‘the concept of experience seems to me one of the most 
obscure we have'.16 However, if Welsh’s claim about ‘stories of experience’ is to be modified 
then an attempt to manage experience’s obscurity must be made. A brief examination of some 
                                                           
14 Philip Weinstein, Unknowing: The Work of Modernist Fiction (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
15 Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933) 9. 
16 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Continuum, 2004) 341. 
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semantic roots can be of assistance here. ‘Experience’, as derived from the Indo-European root 
‘*per-’, emphasises ‘attempt’, ‘venture’, and ‘risk’.17 The immediate sense is thus created of an 
activity that is somehow perilous – experience is always a venture into the unknown realm of an 
outer world which cannot be wholly controlled. The English word ‘experience’ is, however, more 
immediately, derived from the Latin experientia, meaning ‘trial, proof, or experiment’.18 Again, the 
connection is made to something that is ‘tried’, but now an important link is suggested between 
experience and the modern traditions of jurisprudence and science. A case is heard at ‘trial’ while 
the outer world is subject to controlled and repeated ‘experimentation’. Martin Jay goes further 
back, tracing the Latin word to its Greek antecedent empeiria, which also serves as the root for 
the English ‘empirical’. As Jay writes: ‘here a crucial link between experience and raw, unreflected 
sensation or unmediated observation (as opposed to reason, theory, or speculation) is already 
evident’.19 Finally, Emile Benveniste charts a connection between ‘*per-’ and Greek terms for 
selling – ‘to cause to pass, to transfer’.20 Experience is thus a valuable good; and one that can be 
both passed on and exchanged. All of these meanings are important in terms of the way that 
trials and novels will be seen to operate. But they are also partly responsible for the vexed history 
of the word itself. Experience holds an excess of meaning that make its definition as 
troublesome as it is rich. This excess is hinted at by the German language, in which there are two 
alternative words – Erfahrung, which will be the subject of discussion later in this introduction, 
and Erlebnis, which will be taken as it is defined by Gadamer.  
Gadamer begins his analysis of Erlebnis by noting that, as a noun, it is derived from the 
verb erleben which he translates as ‘to be still alive when something happens’. He writes: ‘thus the 
word suggests the immediacy with which something real is grasped – unlike something which 
one presumes to know but which is unattested by one’s own experience, whether because it is 
taken over from others or comes from hearsay, or whether it is inferred, surmised, or imagined. 
What is experienced is always what one has experienced oneself’.21 The dual nature of experience 
is thus emphasised – that it involves an ‘experience of’ and an ‘experienced by’. More 
importantly, the individual brute fact of immediacy is stressed. Experience is neither heard about 
from another, nor conjured up from within the mind. However, Gadamer goes on to note that 
                                                           
17 Victor W. Turner, "Dewey, Dilthey, and Drama: An Essay in the Anthropology of Experience," in The 
Anthropology of Experience, ed. Victor W. Turner and Edward M. Bruner (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 
35. 
18 Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006) 10. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Emile Benveniste, Indo-European Language and Society, trans. Elizabeth Palmer (London: Faber, 1973) 109. 
21 Gadamer, Truth and Method  53. 
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the form ‘das Erlebte’ means the permanent content of what is experienced – the significant form 
that is made from transient experiencing: ‘both meanings obviously lie behind the coinage 
Erlebnis: both the immediacy, which precedes all interpretation, reworking, and communication, 
and merely offers a starting point for interpretation – material to be shaped – and its discovered 
yield, its lasting result’.22 The point implicitly made is that the discovered yield of experience is 
something which, by contrast, can be interpreted, reworked and communicated. Experience, 
denoting its connection to financial transactions, can be exchanged. It is the currency of a world 
shared with others.  
It is the interplay between these two conceptualisations of experience that, in the modern 
period, makes knowledge possible. Indeed, the connection between experience and knowledge 
has so dominated modern thought it is hard to imagine a different configuration. As Giorgio 
Agamben comments, ‘the idea of experience as separate from knowledge has become so alien to 
us that we have forgotten that until the birth of modern science experience and science each had 
their own place'.23 In the premodern world, experience was that which could be translated into 
maxims and proverbs.24 The order of knowledge, by contrast, was pre-established by a divine 
positing that the authoritative tradition of the scholastics maintained.25 But, in modernity, the 
ideal and eternal were substituted by the world of experience and the transience of the 
everyday.26 Knowledge now had to rest on the experience man had of his world. This new 
paradigm meant that 'legitimate new experience must not be rejected because it conflicted with 
existing plausibility schemes; instead, those plausibility schemes must be set aside or rejected 
because they conflicted with legitimate new experience'.27 But what modern science and 
philosophy relied on in this endeavour was the ability to subject the immediacy of experience to 
collection and consideration.28  It is the discovered yield of experience that is the object of 
                                                           
22 Ibid. 
23 Agamben, Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience  18. 
24 Ibid.  17. 
25 Jay writes that the legacy of Plato and Aristotle in medieval philosophy meant that 'the ephemeral happenings of 
everyday life were rendered marginal in the search for universal truths’. Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and 
European Variations on a Universal Theme  17. Weinstein give this understanding of pre-modern knowledge a literary 
interpretation when he writes that 'Seen through Cervantes's early modern eyes, Don Quixote reveals the madness 
of this premodern procedure. Quixote is incapable, precisely, of learning from experience’. Weinstein, Unknowing: 
The Work of Modernist Fiction  25. 
26 See Peter Dear, "Miracles, Experiments, and the Ordinary Course of Nature," Isis 81, no. 4 (1990). 
27 Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994) 198. 
28 Jay writes that ‘with the erosion of trust in Scholastic rationalism, the loss of the Catholic Church's corner on 
spiritual power, and the reversal of the hierarchy of the Ancients and the Moderns, modernity sought a new ground 
of legitimacy’. Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme  19. 
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reflection in modernity. As Charles Taylor comments on the founder of modern philosophy, 
'what Descartes calls on us to do is to stop living "in" or "through" the experience, to treat it 
itself as an object’.29 Experience becomes an object, the matter of knowledge, but only gains this 
authoritative status because of the self-evident truth of lived immediacy. British Empiricism and 
Continental Idealism, though beset by many differences, shared this fundamental premise. Both 
were ‘united in their refusal to privilege deductive reason, dogmatic revelation, or textual 
authority as the foundation of knowledge, putting experience in their place’.30  
The double sided nature of experience – that it was always an experience of something 
had by someone - dictated that its yield contained knowledge of more than the external world. 
The emergence of modern subjectivity was the necessary correlate of experience’s elevation in 
epistemological matters. According to Weinstein, 'in coming to know the object as an other 
reducible to the terms of one's own measure and scale, one comes, reflexively, to know oneself 
as oneself'.31 Individuality became a matter of ‘knowing who you are’. Or rather, a matter of 
discovering who, as the subject of the early modern period emerged through an experiential 
interaction with the object – one’s place in society, one’s reason, one’s spirituality, were all now 
given in the experience of the external world. Modern individuality, since the Renaissance, was 
formed – was self-fashioned – in a creative act of experiential manipulation: the world could 
make an individual, and the individual could make their world. The classic emanations of this in 
literature were Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Milton’s Satan. Yet what these figures perfectly attuned 
themselves to was the tension between will and contingency that made for modern experience. 
Hamlet wants to choose his experience, he wants to decide upon his fate, and Satan wants to live 
his assertion that 'The mind is its own place, and in itself/Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of 
Heav'n'.32 But in both cases the project is only partially successful. Hamlet’s indecisiveness and 
Satan’s misery are testament to the conundrum of modern experience. The individual can be 
what he wants, and the world will be what he makes it – yet he is also tied to brute facts which 
run against a complete freedom of existential choice.33  
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One of modernity’s many paradoxes now becomes apparent. As Martin Jay notes, the 
‘democratization of the subject of experience also meant its implicit reduction to a single 
universal model, which was the disembodied, spectatorial Cartesian cogito, assumed to be 
normative for all humans'.34 Individual experience thus became, at one and the same time, the 
site of knowledge of the external world, oneself, and mankind in general. Descartes’ major work 
was an instruction on ‘method’. It necessarily followed that 'because the right method could be 
learned by others, experience must be communicable, not merely intelligible. It must, in fact, be 
potentially available to anyone willing to follow the prescribed procedures, which, unlike the 
secret devices of magicians (or the special exercises of religious virtuosi) were to be fully 
accessible'.35 Individual experience was thus ‘experience which could just as well have been 
someone else's'.36  
This universality of experience gained credence because the object of study had been 
reduced to its most fundamental level. Lived immediacy was brute fact given in its most basic 
form of sensory perception. In British empiricism, but also in continental sensationism, ‘sense-
impressions’, imprinting themselves on the tabula rasa of the mind, were the object of study.37 
Experience was passive: it inevitably occurred rather than being wilfully created. As Koselleck 
puts it '"Experience" is "reality" and enters into opposition to "mere thought”’.38 The neutrality 
of the subject’s position was thus natural, though the correct method was still required to 
guarantee it. Bacon’s method was similar to Descartes’ in this respect. The knowledge gleaned 
from the inductive method is ‘objective in the sense, not that it captures the object as it is in 
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itself, but that local subjective distortion is expunged from the human "sighting"’.39 Experience 
also had to be recorded, tabulated, and subjected to rigorous analysis for its yield to be 
considered ‘proof’ of anything. This was a search for consistency in the world, a quest for 
repetition in the laws of nature: ‘the ideal of generalization from replicable experiences, which 
then sought to explain what had been observed according to the workings of natural laws, 
became enthroned as the "scientific method"'.40 Repetition within experience thus brought about 
universal knowledge. Jay writes that ‘to be worth taking seriously, experience had to be public, 
replicable, and verified by objective instruments'.41 But the importance of repetition was not 
limited to scientific inquiry. Reinhart Koselleck, writing of historical method, argues that 
experiences are initially unique moments of immediacy. But this is not all they are: ‘experiences 
are also collected; they are the result of a process of accumulation, insofar as they confirm or 
correct one another'.42 These ‘confirmations and reinforcements of experiences are tied to the 
similar experiences of one's contemporaries’ – thus the public sense of a shared world and a 
shared history can be an entity of study. Historical knowledge, in quantifying experiences or even 
in attributing weight to dominant forms of experience, has to grasp these repetitions as accurate 
copies of something with singular meaning. As Koselleck comments, 'the method that 
reconstructs a case and asks how it was possible in the first place, always relies on temporal 
multilayeredness, namely that experiences are uniquely made and yet accumulate'.43 The 
methodologies of modern science and history (with the hint of judicial ‘case’ construction) thus 
rely on the identification of true repetition. This similarity of method comes as no surprise to 
Gadamer, who sees them as simply proceeding ‘further toward a goal that experience has always 
striven after. Experience is valid only if it is confirmed; hence its dignity depends on its being in 
principle repeatable'.44 
What has so far been described is the ethos of experience that permeated a range of 
discourses in the West from the seventeenth-century, and on throughout the Enlightenment. 
But, just as Gadamer stresses the importance of the ‘principle’ of repetition, so too knowledge 
claims were given validity by the ‘principle’ of experience. The certainty that was the aim of the 
Enlightenment was something that could only be obtained by direct experience. But, even in 
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science, direct experience of all the phenomena one wanted to study was impossible. There was 
simply too much experience for one subject. Steven Shapin has clearly shown that the concept of 
direct experience which acted as the authority for all scientific discovery in the early modern 
period was forced to include the testimony of others, accepted after weighing up various factors 
including trustworthiness and expertise. But, Shapin also notes that:  
 
the category of "experience” customarily and justifiably encompassed not just what 
individuals had by way of their own senses but also the reliable testimony they had of 
others' sensory engagements with the world. In the case of phenomena removed from 
one in space and time, it was freely conceded that one's knowledge which came to one 
through these routes, and to say that such knowledge was not part of an individual's 
"experience" was either pedantic or solipsistic.45  
 
For this reason, a rhetoric of undiluted experience as the authoritative source of knowledge 
remained intact despite being filtered through testimony. Paradoxically, experience had become 
an ideal.  
With full knowledge and absolute certainty now a holy grail, the ‘likelihood’ of truth was 
something that had to be weighed. For the first time in history, probability theory came into 
being as the means of weighing evidence in a variety of disciplines.46 But despite its concern with 
chance, probability theory relied on the existence of a reality that could be said to have a degree 
of stability, measurability, and common character: the reality that was experienced by the subject 
of knowledge.47 Enlightenment valorizations of rationality were based on the conceptualisation 
of reason as a faculty which could discern such reality. As Thomas M. Kavanagh points out, ‘the 
validity claimed for the constructs of Enlightenment lay in their effort to enunciate a reality 
already there and already at work independent of human reason'.48 This independence was 
precisely what was ‘perilous’ about experience: its openness to rational understanding combined 
with its rejection of rational control. The reason of the Enlightenment then, the project of which 
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Welsh claims ‘strong representations’ were ‘very much of’, was fundamentally reliant on the 
authoritative notion of experience.  
Barbara Shapiro has, in several works, shown the inherent connections that existed 
between the intellectual endeavours of scientists, philosophers, novelists and lawyers in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. She writes that 'ultimately, what allowed both ideas and 
investigators to migrate freely between these various learned endeavours was the reorientation of 
all of them in the direction of empirical inquiry to establish matters of fact'.49 The experience that 
was utilised in these endeavours always resembled itself, but was never quite identical. 
Philosophy reduced experience to sense-data, while Science, when possible, attempted to 
construct knowledge of distinct phenomena out of a direct experimentation in the world. In the 
trial and novel by contrast, experience was either precisely that which required reconstruction or 
the object of fictitious representation. The way a court went about ‘finding the facts’ and the 
factuality of the early novel, however, had much in common; a similarity which lay in the 
experiential qualities of each. 
  
The Novel of Experience 
 
Literary forms have not always been grounded in individual experience. Mikhail Bakhtin, in 
contrasting the novel with epic, argues that this earlier form of literature is based on an absolute 
past of national tradition ‘inaccessible to personal experience’.50 Bakhtin notes that 'to portray an 
event on the same time-and-value plane as oneself and one's contemporaries (and an event that 
is therefore based on personal experience and thought) is to undertake a radical revolution, and 
to step out of the world of epic into the world of the novel'.51 The novel, as it appeared 
throughout Europe in the eighteenth-century, instituted a literary art form in which the world of 
current and recognizable experience was the object of depiction. The philosophical and scientific 
underpinning of this institution has been noted by many. Lydia Ginzburg, for instance, in writing 
of the novel as it developed into the nineteenth-century argues that ‘in conformity with the 
dominant scientific, philosophical, and sociological ideas of the nineteenth-century, realism 
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opened up to artistic cognition a concrete, unified, and monistically conceived reality’.52 Most 
notably, in what still remains a vital and influential work, Ian Watt stresses the philosophical 
basis of ‘formal realism’ (his term for the characteristic features of the novel). Watt writes that 
'from the Renaissance onwards, there was a growing tendency for individual experience to 
replace collective tradition as the ultimate arbiter of reality; and this transition would seem to 
constitute an important part of the general cultural background of the rise of the novel’.53 The 
novel is seen to diverge from earlier forms of literature precisely because its formal qualities 
assert that its ‘primary criterion was truth to individual experience’.54  
Apart from its consistency with the modes of other disciplines, the literary style of 
realism has been argued to have unique sources. Thomas M. Kavanagh, who entitles a chapter of 
his study of literature and gambling in eighteenth-century France ‘Toward a Novel of 
Experience’, cites the overt didacticism of the novel as determining its defining style:  
 
Realism became a paramount value within the novel, because it was only to the extent 
that its characters and situations were perceived as pertaining to the same world as the 
reader's that they could become the vehicle of a moral lesson. In his preface to Manon 
Lescaut, Prevost claims for the novel a didactic value equal to, if not surpassing that of life 
itself. The story we are about to read will supplement the reader's limited experience 
through narrations so well drawn that they will teach lessons equally as vivid and equally 
as valid as those the reader has learned from life itself.55 
 
Michael Lund and Linda Hughes, on the other hand, see realism as being particularly linked to 
the serial system of publication. They argue that ‘a work's extended duration meant that serials 
could become entwined with readers' own sense of lived experience and passing time’. They 
continue: 'the interruptions inherent in serials naturally encouraged writers to work in the 
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primary mode of the Victorian age, realism. Reading one instalment, then pausing in that story, 
the Victorian audience turned to their own world with much the same set of critical faculties they 
had used to understand the literature’.56 The reading of a novel was thus to be grasped in much 
the same way as an individual would discern their world. No specialist knowledge was required in 
order to decipher the theme, plot, or meaning: common experience was enough. 
As the novel depicted particular experiences, the individual experience of the particular 
author was also often theorised as the source of literary production. In poetry, the cult of the 
Romantic genius had created a figure who transformed a unique experience into a communicable 
and uplifting expression.57 The same ideal was applied to novelists of the nineteenth-century. 
Lydia Ginzburg writes of Tolstoi that 'the vast system of the Tolstoi novel was set in motion by 
the inclusion in it of the author's personal experience, the experience of addressing the problems 
that had accumulated at that point in his life'.58 It was precisely this connection that formed the 
focal point of Wilhelm Dilthey’s work in the 1890s and early 1900s. Dilthey was one of a group 
of thinkers who were, at that time, altering the terms in which experience was to be reflected 
upon and his conception of ‘lived experience’ will be discussed later in this introductory chapter. 
For the moment it is sufficient to say that the new complexity with which experience was 
imbued made a project like Poetry and Experience an almost impossible task. But, taken in a more 
simplistic form, Dilthey was only articulating the predominant thought of the nineteenth-century. 
For instance, he writes of the French authors Balzac, Taine, and Zola that ‘whatever is alive and 
dynamic in human and social terms, whatever each of us experiences in his own life and in his 
own soul - if it has not already fallen under the knife of science - is placed under the dissecting 
knife of these new poets [...] Their aim is to know’.59 Dilthey claims a wider canvas for this work 
than is the subject of this thesis. In his argument he cites Dante, Shakespeare and Cervantes 
while reserving his most adamant claims for the poetry of Goethe: 'surely the primary and most 
decisive feature of Goethe's poetic work is that it grows out of an extraordinary energy of lived 
experience'.60 Indeed, his theory at times suggests a form of genius in all great authors that is 
reminiscent of Romantic conceptions. So his thoughts on Goethe are mirrored when he writes 
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of Dickens as a writer whose ‘whole life is spent experiencing reality in the most detailed, 
spontaneous observation of that which new spheres of experience continually offered him'.61  
Wherever it came from, recognizable experience was to be the outcome of a realist 
reading process. This meant a very precise emplacement of characters with believable proper 
names in identifiable space and time. The novel was the construction of credible people, places, 
and moments. In The Rise of the Novel, Watt is especially careful to emphasise the way that the 
novel threw off the constraints of mythological and legendary stories to offer new plots: 
narratives which literally ‘plotted’ a character’s course through space and time, presenting the 
reader with ‘a developing but unplanned aggregate of particular individuals having particular 
experiences at particular times and at particular places'.62 He writes:  
 
The novel's mode of imitating reality may therefore be equally well summarised in terms 
of the procedures of another group of specialists in epistemology, the jury in a court of 
law. Their expectations, and those of the novel reader coincide in many ways: both want 
to know "all the particulars" of a given case - the time and place of the occurrence; both 
must be satisfied as to the identities of the parties concerned, and will refuse to accept 
evidence about anyone called Sir Toby Belch or Mr. Badman - still less about a Chloe 
who has no surname and is "common as the air"; and they also expect the witnesses to 
tell the story "in his own words".63 
 
 A good example of the convergence of these procedures, themselves contained in literary 
form, is found in Walter Scott’s short story ‘The Two Drovers’. This tale, first published in 1827, 
begins with a prophetic vision: Janet of Tomahourich, referred to as ‘an auld Highland witch and 
spaewife’ by the locals, sees the blood of an Englishman on the blade of Robin Oig 
McCombich’s skene-dhu.64 Despite taking the precaution of depositing his knife with a friend, 
the prophecy is fulfilled, as Robin murders his fellow drover Harry Wakefield after a fist-fight in 
which he considers himself to have been dishonoured. The story culminates with Robin’s trial, in 
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which the judge summarises his motives and offers his interpretation of the event’s tragic 
significance. The narrator, Chrystal Croftangry reports that: 
 
My story is nearly ended. The unfortunate Highlander stood his trial at Carlisle. I was 
myself present, and as a young Scottish lawyer, or barrister at least, and reputed a man of 
some quality, the politeness of the Sheriff of Cumberland offered me a place on the 
bench. The facts of the case were proved in the manner I have related them.65 
 
Scott’s story thus begins with supernatural, pagan, belief and ends with the rationality of the 
Enlightenment (the historical juncture in which all Scott’s work is situated). It charts the 
movement from pre-modern beliefs, which act on both faith and fate, to modern thought, which 
is seen to collects facts, based on prior experiences, and subject them to analysis. This ordering is 
crucial not only for the charting of Scotland’s uneasy transition into modernity but also for the 
implicit faith that it displays in both trial procedure and the method of the historical novel. The 
reader is told what has happened: the events in question are given in the form of an immediacy 
that cannot be doubted. The trial then hears the same story, and only then is it revealed that this 
is the narrator’s source of the narrative. Scott is, of course, famous for the establishment of 
historical sources for his novels and shorter fiction, and these are not always expected to provide 
absolute certainty. However, the importance of the forum in which Robin’s fate is decided rests 
upon the incongruous judgment made on him – incongruous because it attributes modern guilt 
to a pre-modern man of the Highlands who, it is suggested, could not have acted in any other 
way. That is to say, the court is a site of political and social tyranny (of English or Lowland 
morals over those of the Highlands) but decidedly not one of epistemological frailty. The facts of 
the case were true, and the judgment, given in the forum of a modern English court, inevitable. 
Likewise, Croftangry’s narrative itself is seen to unambiguously reflect concrete experiences. 
Both it, and the identical trial narrative, coincide with, or repeat, the actual event.    
This sense of neutrality – both in terms of the facts of experience and the representation 
of literature – is central to the realist novel’s connection to reality. John Bender argues that 'from 
the eighteenth-century onward, the realist novel has attempted the appearance of having 
removed all distance between itself and the processes of daily life: it pretends to be a transparent, 
unmediated form of knowledge about that life'.66 Bender is, broadly speaking, right, but the 
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‘transparency’ of which he speaks must be envisaged in somewhat cloudy terms.67 Firstly, the 
original life of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century subject was not given in a completely 
simple and coherent form. Realism, rather, took the loose ends of experience and found that 
they ‘could be made into answerable self-activity at the level of representation'.68 To put it another 
way, as Weinstein does, re-presentation was what the realist novelist never produced. It was, 
rather, built upon a concept of verisimilitude: a familiarity or likeness to an original reality.69 
Realism, then, was never a trivially simple form of representation. Words are not things, 
and the discrepancy between the two was not lost on realist authors. George Eliot exhorted her 
readers to 'examine your words well, and you will find that even when you have no motive to be 
false, it is a very hard thing to say the exact truth, even about your own immediate feelings - 
much harder than to say something fine about them which is not the exact truth'.70 Eliot’s 
comments, which come in Chapter Seventeen of Adam Bede, in which the narrator/author 
directly addresses the reader on the subject of novelistic method, do two things. They argue that 
truth about the immediacy of life is what an author should strive for while, at the same time, they 
also insist that complete truth is impossible. We have returned to the scene of modernity’s 
grappling with the desire for certainty and the settling for probability – and again it is ‘method’, 
this time in the guise of novelistic method, that will guide the reader. Not only this, earlier in the 
same chapter the narrator has claimed that:  
 
I aspire to give no more than a faithful account of men and things as they have mirrored 
themselves in my mind. The mirror is doubtless defective; the outlines will sometimes be 
disturbed; the reflection faint or confused; but I feel as much bound to tell you, as 
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precisely as I can, what that reflection is, as if I were in the witness-box narrating my 
experience on oath.71  
  
Eliot wants to be envisaged as a witness here but, as Rodensky rightly points out, if taken 
literally, this bold statement of method is not adhered to in the rest of the novel. The narrator of 
Adam Bede, unlike a witness in court, is not constrained by the limits of ‘my experience’ at all. 
Even the citing of Adam Bede as a testimonial source cannot account for the omniscient access 
to other minds that is gained throughout the novel. Indeed, in terms of the courtroom actors, 
the practice of a realist author would also seem to have more in common with the lawyer than 
the witness. In writing on Tom Jones, Welsh claims that Fielding’s narrative is, in evidentiary 
terms, indirect. The narrator ‘is not an eyewitness but a manager of the evidence, analogous to a 
prosecutor or a judge and to later defense (sic) attorneys in a trial'.72 Welsh uses this idea to 
bolster his theory of ‘strong representations’, but it need not be tied to circumstantial evidence in 
this way. The legal manipulation of evidence, and the guiding hand of the author, take, as their 
base material, experiential reporting as much as circumstance. Jan-Melissa Schramm’s critique of 
Welsh is significant here, as, while writing in a context of testimonial, as opposed to 
circumstantial sources, she also writes that the 'emergence of the novel in the 18th century can 
be seen as an imaginative imitation of the lawyer’s skills in the manipulation of evidence’.73  
Rodensky takes Eliot’s statement too literally. Her aim is to challenge Welsh for failing to 
observe the difference between the representation of characters in a realist novel, in which direct 
access to the minds of others is given and the inferential accounts with which the law has to 
make do. There is undoubted truth and value in this insight, but the continuity and stability of 
realist characters serves to dilute its importance somewhat. Rodensky herself writes that 'Eliot 
offers a continuity of character over time'.74 This is not only true of the continuity of thought 
and action perceived in a single character but the continuity, or commensurability, between those 
thoughts and actions themselves. Thus, Rodensky comments that 'Dickens is not a novelist who 
generally imagines a difference between inner and outer: the characters perform who they are'.75 
Even if motivation is made mysterious for a time it will ultimately be revealed by the completion 
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of the text. It is, therefore, no great leap to see the thoughts of a realist character as placed in a 
relationship with their actions such that inferences could be drawn one from the other. More 
generally, Rodensky’s critique of Eliot is misplaced because Eliot is concerned not to produce a 
witness statement as such but to produce statements that are deemed as authentic as truthful 
witness testimony.76 Just as in older forms of narrative, like the epic that Bakhtin contrasted with 
the novel, Eliot attains to the appearance of general truth. But this is now to come in the form of 
particularised instances of common experience. Truth cannot appear other than through a 
committed portrayal of ‘the processes of daily life’.77 In other writers, this commitment was made 
even stronger, as the lines were blurred between fact and fiction.78 
 Of course, the lawyer is supposed to be dealing only with facts. But the manipulation of 
evidence that Welsh and Schramm rightly connect to the activity of lawyers in court is dependent 
upon another feature of realist fiction. This is that the facts of novelistic experience exist in a 
state of completion. The realist novel is written from the point of its conclusion – for the 
narrator, the story is finished and now just requires telling. So, prior to the reader approaching 
the book, the experiences have all been accumulated, ordered, and manipulated in a way that 
serves for a simple communication. As Roland Barthes suggests, the realist author’s infallibility is 
based on 'the authority of his competence; it is he who knows the code, the origin, the basis, and 
thus he becomes the guarantor, the witness, the author (auctor) of reality'.79 Witnessing is 
therefore invoked as a position from which authority is gleaned. The author may proceed like a 
lawyer, but she is witness to a concrete reality and, in truthfully accounting for this world, makes 
witnesses of her readers. This is precisely because, following the etymology of Benveniste, 
experience is the currency of modernity and so precisely what the novel deals in. Eliot can thus 
situate her work in such a way that she never has to write of ‘heroes whom I shall never know 
except by hearsay’.80 She can envisage herself, rather, as an impartial witness to ‘things as they 
are’.81  
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 A novel in which the author ingeniously combines the skills of a lawyer with a stricter 
sense of witnessing is Wilkie Collins’ The Moonstone (1868). It is also a particularly telling example 
of the parallels between novel writing and trial procedure of the time. Collins hit upon the form 
of his narrative, in which several contributors narrate their own knowledge of the case, while at 
the trial of William Palmer in 1856.82 Each contributor is to relate what they know 'as far as our 
own personal experience extends, and no farther'.83 The narrative is thus built upon witness 
statements, prompting Welsh to call it a ‘story of experience’, but a guiding hand is also present 
in the shape of the author who has collated the individual statements and placed them in a way 
which enhances the drama. A long first part is taken up by the account of the faithful butler 
Gabriel Betteredge, who comically delves randomly into the pages of Robinson Crusoe whenever 
faced with a problem. Defoe’s status as an early proponent of ‘factual fictions’ is significant here, 
as his novel is used by Betteredge like a bible and, thus, an adherence to experiential facts (even 
though given in a fictional setting) is seen to usurp metaphysical faith.84 Betteredge comments 
that 'things must be put down in their places, as things actually happened'.85 This adherence to 
‘fact’ is instilled in the procedures for relating testimony. Betteredge writes that ‘I am forbidden 
to tell more in this narrative than I knew myself at the time. Or, to put it plainer, I am to keep 
strictly within the limits of my own experience, and am not to inform you of what other persons 
told me'. He continues: 
 
In this matter of the Moonstone the plan is, not to present reports, but to produce 
witnesses. I picture to myself a member of the family reading these pages fifty years 
hence. Lord! what a compliment he will feel it, to be asked to take nothing on hearsay, 
and to be treated in all respects like a Judge on the bench.86 
 
 The member of the family that Betteredge envisages is none other than any reader of the 
text. Collins, like a skilful lawyer, is producing witnesses to present a story in such a way that its 
truth appears self evident. The reader, thus, becomes the equivalent of a juror (according to 
Watt, precisely the position in which all readers of ‘formal realism’ are placed). Welsh claims that 
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the prevalence of testimony in the novel indicates a move towards a modernist aesthetic in which 
‘the need to establish the facts and draw the appropriate conclusions - the very atmosphere of 
proof and trial and sanctions - gives way to a renewed interest in experience that can be captured 
only from testimony'.87 Experience is therefore seen as authentic, but not necessarily productive 
of truth. However, the fact that truth is so forcefully expressed by the novel leads to Welsh 
assuming a position in which he states that 'The Moonstone, I believe, shows how difficult it is to 
shake off the habit of making strong representation of innocence in the English novel after 
Fielding and Scott. In his attention to testimony and use of multiple narratives, Collins thought 
to represent the process and thereby the experience of discovering the truth'.88 But, rather than 
with the later modernists who would elevate experience above truth, Collins ‘let the "discovery 
of the truth" wag the dog once again'.89 
 This is not a true opposition. Collins is not an early figure of a modernism that denies 
truth in favour of experience, but a particularly strong example of the Victorian who places truth 
and experience in indissoluble conjunction. In Collins’ novel, the truth will out precisely because 
the experience can be reconstructed. The central narrative of who stole the Moonstone is a 
mystery that can, and will, be solved. This logic extends to any seeming enigma in the text.90 For 
instance, Franklin Blake is visited by a strange figure early in the novel. The nature of this visit 
and the identity of the gentleman are not immediately revealed. But a novel like this cannot allow 
such loose ends to remain loose – the man is later identified as a moneylender to whom Blake 
was in debt. Consequences are never left without causes in this novel and this tightness of plot 
makes it exemplary of a realist tradition. As Watt writes of the genre in general:  
 
the novel's plot is also distinguished from most previous fiction by its use of past 
experience as the cause of present action: a causal connection operating through time 
replaces the reliance of earlier narratives on disguises and coincidences, and this tends to 
give the novel a much more cohesive structure.91  
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The whole of the present action in The Moonstone is governed by what happened on the night the 
stone was stolen (in fact, it can even be traced back to the day the stone was plundered from 
Seringapatam). The precise mapping of who was where and when becomes the crucial concern 
of Sergeant Cuff’s investigation and his part-solving of the mystery is a triumph of causal 
connection. A smudge of paint is spotted on Rachel Verinder’s door, thus enabling Cuff to 
calculate the time of the theft. A consultation of the house laundry records then enables him to 
ascertain what garment had the paint stain on it. As Welsh points out 'around the tiny smear of 
paint - apparently the only physical trace of the crime - must be reconstructed all the other facts 
of the case, including the movements of everyone in the house'.92 But in order for this 
explanation to work it is 'essential to assume a closed universe of tidy cause and effect'.93 In 
addition to Welsh’s point, this world of cause and effect is tabulated – it is the very record of 
past actions in the laundry book that allows Cuff’s investigation to progress. 
 The fact that this mystery is solved by the novel’s conclusion is testament to the very 
method by which the narration is made. The production of witnesses allows for the 
multiplication of experiences all pointing in the same direction: the solving of the mystery. But 
these multiple perspectives can only unambiguously aid the discovery of truth if they are both 
truthful and accurate. There is an implicit trust in the experiential reports provided by the 
testimony in the novel. This does not mean that there is no filtering of interpretation. Miss 
Clack’s contribution, for instance, is comically rendered in the tone of a devout Christian whose 
religious fervour borders on the delusional. She completely fails to see Godfrey Ablewhite’s 
intentions towards Rachel Verinder until the moment she becomes surreptitiously witness to his 
marriage proposal. The reader can thus read against the grain of a narrator’s account to a certain 
extent, but this is limited. Crucially, what is never doubted is the experiential elements of a report 
like Miss Clack’s. So the reader may doubt her interpretation of events but never that the events 
actually took place – there is never any question mark over whether Ablewhite really did propose 
to Rachel. 
The passivity and neutrality of experience are thus retained. In addition, the multiple 
perspectives work to discover the truth because they all refer to the same reality. Shapin writes of 
the use of testimony in modern science’s gathering of data that 'the very idea of multiple sources 
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which might warrantably induce assent presupposed a judgment that these were reports of the 
same thing' (his emphasis).94 This is the case in relation to events, times, and places but also to the 
identity of individuals. The fluid identity of a self both choosing and created by his experience 
that emerged in the modern period retained a relative fixity. The eighteenth-century novel of 
personal journey and development thus speaks not only of progression but of consistency: as 
Welsh points out, in Defoe's novels 'we have a sense of personal identity subsisting through 
duration and yet being changed by the flow of experience'.95 Novels of the nineteenth-century 
rest absolutely on this point. Character exists: identity, which may be hidden or obscured, will 
eventually be revealed. In The Moonstone not only is Godfrey Ablewhite ultimately revealed as the 
thief, he is also, literally, unmasked in his identity (his disguise being posthumously removed).96 
This dénouement, exposes Ablewhite in his true self: an act that receives its authority from being 
given in the form of the undoubted immediate experience of Franklin Blake. But, in reading the 
novel the reader ‘gets’ the identity of not only a villain like Ablewhite but, in a much more basic 
sense, heroes like Franklin Blake and Gabriel Betteredge. It is these characters who more 
accurately evince the belief in identity and narration in the mid-Victorian era: Blake and 
Betteredge, whether narrating or narrated about, are always the same. A sense of identity 
therefore overrides the narrative positions from, and in, which it is observed. 
The reconstruction that takes place in the novel, like in Scott’s short story, seeks, in some 
way, to repeat the central event in question. But repetition is itself given textual realisation in 
Collins’ novel. Following the discovery of Blake’s nightgown, the evidence against him is 
compelling. It is only the intervention of Ezra Jennings that saves him. Jennings, while tending 
Dr Candy prior to his death, is struck by what initially seem to be the disconnected ramblings of 
a diseased mind. But, upon taking notes, Jennings discerns a logic to Candy’s words – that is, he 
discerns the connected thoughts behind the disconnected speech. In so doing, Jennings comes to 
form a picture of what occurred on the night the Moonstone was stolen. Candy played a trick on 
Blake by spiking his drink with opium, thus bringing about a disturbed sleep in which Blake took 
the stone whilst sleepwalking. To prove this, and therefore Blake’s innocence, both he and 
Jennings plan a recreation of the previous year’s circumstances. According to Jennings, if they 
can repeat the prior conditions exactly 'it is physiologically certain that we should arrive at exactly 
the same result’.97 This ‘experiment’ relies on precisely the same faith in a world of discoverable 
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laws and genuine repetition that was discussed in relation to modern science. In fact, the 
repetition is only partially created. It is proved that Blake took the diamond while under the 
influence of opium but what happened to it after that remains a mystery. But the repetition has 
served its purpose and the limited success of the experiment only serves to prolong the drama of 
the novel. Reflection on the partial failure of the experiment is also couched in terms which 
retain the rationally causal structure of experience. Jennings claims that ‘we have only partially 
reproduced the conditions, and the experiment has been only partially successful in 
consequence’.98 A complete repetition is therefore still thought to be, in principle, possible, as on 
another occasion the exact conditions could be reproduced. 
While modernism radically undermined the terms of novelistic representation, realism 
was not entirely killed off by the literature that appeared in the early twentieth-century. The 
majority of books for sale in booksellers are, to this day, broadly speaking, realist. Realism lives 
on in a theoretical sense also. For Ian Watt, the characteristics of ‘formal realism’ are the guiding 
principles for all novels, including those of the modernist era. Likewise, Phillip Weinstein takes 
care not to condemn realism as something that modernism ‘got over’. Rather, Weinstein argues 
that 'no fiction can succeed without a minimal assumption (however modified and self-
conscious) of the value of linguistic representation as an engagement with something more than 
words'.99 When it comes to the novel then, realism is never completely dead. But the 
concentration of particular experiences, the close mapping of a character’s trajectory through 
space and time, the clear and unambiguous account of causation, and the attempted transparency 
of language were all features of the novel that were questioned by modernist authors. Taken as a 
whole, this interrogation formed a significant challenge to the novel and cast doubt on its 
fundamental basis in modern experience. Can a similar history be traced in the development of 
the criminal trial? 
 
The Reconstruction of Experience 
 
Criminal procedure has not always sought to reconstruct an experience. According to Michel 
Foucault, the pre-modern ‘test’ gained its authority to judge by four separable means. Firstly, 
‘when a person was accused of murder, he could completely establish his innocence by gathering 
about him twelve witnesses who swore that he had not committed the murder. The oath was not 
based, for example, on the fact that they had seen the alleged victim alive, or on an alibi for the 
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alleged murder’.100 These were witnesses, rather, to the accused’s strength and importance in the 
community. Secondly, there were verbal tests in which an individual had to repeat a set formula 
of words attesting to their innocence. In this form, guilt could be attached not just to falsehood 
but to incorrect repetition: ‘a grammatical error, a word alteration would invalidate the formula, 
regardless of the truth of what one asserted’.101 Third in Foucault’s list are religious tests of oath, 
clearly based on the power of the divine. Finally, the most pervasive form of pre-modern testing 
was that of the physical trial. Ordeals of the body, such as walking on hot coals, were not 
designed as the tortuous means of extracting truthful confessions but as tests which betrayed the 
physicality of guilt. This idea of physical confrontation extended to include combat between the 
parties involved – again, tests of strength but also imbued with a religious overtone as God 
would never allow the guilty to prevail.102  
These archaic forms were condemned by the Lateran Council in 1215 and jurisdictions 
throughout Europe were forced to approach the issue of judicial decision making in altered 
terms.103 In England, it led to trial by jury, but not as it is known in its contemporary form. Jurors 
in this early period were selected as men of the neighbourhood who knew the facts of the case 
and/or the individuals involved.104 Their task was to pass judgment upon what they supposedly 
already knew. But, as communities grew and society became more mobile, jurors could no longer 
always be expected to be familiar with the facts of the case. Juries thus ‘increasingly came to rely 
on the testimony of witnesses for information'.105 
As Barbara Shapiro has shown, the production of ‘facts’ in early modern courts was 
mirrored by epistemological activity in other major disciplines. She writes: 
 
a number of assumptions underlay the modes of inquiry of early modern courts. The first 
was that it was possible to gain adequate if not perfect knowledge of events that could 
not be seen, heard, or repeated in court. Neither judges, jurors, nor lawyers would 
actually "see" the killing or the land transaction at issue. The law dealt with "transient 
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things" of no "constant being." Firsthand sensory experience might provide "best 
evidence" for "matters of fact," but it was unattainable by courts.106 
 
This is self-evidently true. During the course of a trial, the event in question does not magically 
come into being to be seen, heard, and touched. But, just like Rodensky’s critique of Eliot’s 
claims to be a ‘witness’, this is to take things too literally. The ability to see and hear the crime is 
brought up by Shapiro because this is the benchmark of certainty throughout the modern period. 
The crime could not be literally ‘sensed’ by the court, but a judgment matching the level of 
certainty attained by such brute experience was what a trial could and should strive for. In the 
eighteenth-century, Geoffrey Gilbert, following the likes of Locke and Boyle, wrote of the 
primacy of sensory experience in matters of evidence. As this was unattainable by courts, 
probabilities had to be weighted in relation to testimony and circumstances. But, crucially, 
Gilbert claimed that this course of action produced statements of fact that could be accepted 
without ‘any more reason to be doubted than if we ourselves had heard and seen it’.107 Foucault’s 
analysis of the ‘inquiry’ which succeeded the ‘test’ makes a similar claim:  
 
This was a new way of extending actuality, of transferring it from one time period to 
another and of offering it to the gaze, to knowledge, as if it were still present. This 
integration of the inquiry procedure, reactualizing what had transpired, making it present, 
tangible, immediate, and true, as if one had witnessed it, constituted a major discovery.108   
 
Here we see the sense of ‘witnessing’ extended, just as in Adam Bede. Actuality is to be 
transferred to the gaze of knowledge in a certainty that equates to the sensory experience of 
witnessing. But to make the court a witness to fact involved not just an openness to, but also a 
control of, actual witness statements. Shapiro writes that 'although hearsay was a familiar concept 
and hearsay evidence was clearly viewed as inferior, it does not appear to have been rigorously 
excluded until the mid-eighteenth-century'.109 This dating places the exclusion of hearsay, which 
was what George Eliot was so keen to avoid, in neat correlation with the rise of the novel. In 
legal terms, it is usually argued that the impossibility of a rigorous cross-examination of the 
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testimonial source is the reason for the hearsay exclusion. But this argument only makes sense 
because the witness who is in court has not had the experience in question. In other words, it is 
only experience that can be interrogated, and thus verified.  
The trial developed in the nineteenth-century in a way that culminated in its 
transformation into a recognizable form for twenty-first century observers. The Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act 1836 gave all those accused of felonies the right to defence counsel and, thus, the 
fully adversarial trial was born. John Langbein has written at length on how the subsequent 
development of the trial was dependent on the increased power of lawyers and the silencing of 
the accused.110 The trial became a contest in which the prosecution’s efforts to portray reality 
were contested by defence counsel (either through the offering of a conflicting version of events 
or by the undermining of the prosecution’s account). The trial, as it developed to full fruition at 
the turn of the twentieth-century, has also been termed the ‘reconstructive trial’ – a format 
which:  
 
relied on the development of techniques for interrogating witnesses and collecting 
information in the attempt to extend the actuality of the past into the present, to make 
the court ‘witnesses’ to the truth of the event, judging an accused on the basis of what 
was seen in the courtroom.  This was not, of course, an exact reproduction of the event, 
reflecting the fact that the purpose of the trial is not only to investigate/establish the 
truth, but also to dramatize it.111  
 
Courts thus produced a realist verisimilitude rather than a re-presentation of events. Trials also, 
like novels, became witness to the truth because of, and not despite, its dramatic nature. Earlier 
courts were well aware of this. David Taylor writes that 'eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
justice was intended to be a theatrical experience’ and this was not simply intended to display the 
majesty of the law.112 Trials were public occasions, attended by the society at large in a way more 
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commonly associated with the theatre.113 Truth was a matter of drama, but drama was also a 
matter of truth. Experience was still the currency in both domains. As Gadamer put it: ‘the 
significance of that whose being consists in expressing an experience cannot be grasped except 
through an experience’.114 Just like the realist novel, the reception of the experience that it was 
the court’s objective to find had to be grasped, to be undergone, as a form of experience itself. 
The commensurability produced – the fact that the criminal, the juror, the crime, and the trial, all 
dealt in experience – was what allowed for justified verdicts to be made and responsibility 
recognized.  
This dramatization, like the drama of the novel, was developed in part from the very 
precise and detailed mapping of an individual’s progress through time and space. It was the 
human ability to recreate the past experience rather than a divine sign of inherent guilt that was 
now the ultimate arbiter of truth. As Weinstein comments: 
 
Trials, like realist novels, specialize in producing narratives of individuals travelling in 
highly specified ways through uniform spaces and times. The uniformity is key, for it 
guarantees space and time as reliable conditions, thus rendering subject-behaviour within 
them consequential - in both senses of that term. Like realist novels but more drastically, 
trials edit the messiness of life histories into the selective clarity of a developmental line. 
Both the protagonist of such novels and their readers engage in a jurylike trying out of 
materials encountered, sifting through appearance, zeroing in on the shape of the real.115 
 
In both forms, trial and novel, the ability to discern this reality lay within the domain of ordinary 
experience. While the judge was in charge of an abstruse and obscure law, the jury of laymen 
were in charge of the facts.116 No special training or knowledge was required to form a judgment 
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– common experience was enough. As Weinstein rightly points out, ‘plotting’ allowed for a 
guarantee of consequential behaviour in which both a recognizable chain of cause and effect was 
presented to the jury and in which a subject’s actions could be held to account.  
Having said that, it should be noted that the experience which was spoken to was 
restrictive: juries were limited to male citizens of a certain level of means and between a specified 
age range. David Bentley argues that 'the hallmark of trial juries in the nineteenth-century was 
their wholly unrepresentative character. The only persons eligible to serve were men aged 
between twenty-one and sixty, and possessed of the requisite property qualification'.117 The men 
who sat on juries were placed in a position of power – both legally and epistemologically. But 
though the experience of the poor, or of women, or of other races, was thought of insufficient 
standing to perform as a juror, access to the experience of these others was assumed to be 
possible. Mens rea could be attributed to all manner of criminals by recourse to such conceptions 
as the ‘reasonable man’ or the ‘responsible individual’ – formulations which assisted in 
determining attributable guilt in relation to the consequences that could naturally be expected to 
follow certain acts.118 The fact that the experience of jurors was in many respects limited was 
simply not something that was contemplated in this period. The middle-aged white male could 
extrapolate from his own experience and gain insight into the life of anyone, just as the realist 
novel could take in life in all its guises, from the poorest peasant to the richest nobleman. 
In this thesis, it will be claimed that certain elements of the early twentieth-century trial 
made it less ‘reconstructive’ than its development throughout the nineteenth-century would 
suggest. Having said that, we do not live without realism, or without reconstruction, today – just 
as we still cling to a certain form of experience in the modern form so far discussed.119 The trial, 
in its contemporary form, continues to operate largely in the fashion described. Trials continue 
to gesture towards a coincidence with real experience. They continue to form the experiential 
expression of an original event – understood as the discovered yield of a brute immediacy. As 
such, many of the features most typical of the trial as a reconstruction can be seen in cases 
covering a wide period of time. For instance an exemplary use of witnesses to build up a 
connected narrative of an accused’s movements in space and time can be seen from the 1862 
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Scottish case of Jessie McLachlan. Mrs. McLachlan was charged with the murder of her friend 
Jessie McPherson in the house where she, the victim, worked as a servant. The other inhabitant 
of the house at the time of her death was James Fleming, the owner’s father. The case was 
untypical in that the defence took the unusual step of naming an alternative individual as the 
murderer: Mr. Fleming. What was typical was the way that much of the defence case then 
circulated around tracing Fleming’s movements over the course of the weekend in which Mrs. 
McPherson was killed.120 When he opened the door to the milkboy on Saturday morning and 
why (given the fact that this was a task usually undertaken by the servant) became central 
questions in the defence’s cross-examination. Fleming’s behaviour was thus reconstructed as the 
rational response to a given set of circumstances: the fact that he knew Jessie McPherson was 
dead. It was later claimed by Mrs. McLachlan, in a suspiciously obtained confession, that she had 
opened the door to the milkboy but the fact that Fleming had done so had been attested to by 
him, the milkboy, and the milkman. As the editor of the Notable Trials publication of the case 
put it, 'if any reliance whatever is to be placed in human testimony, this fact must be accepted as 
proved'.121 At this time, the oath still had a degree of weight. Testimony, therefore, was relied on 
to be predominantly truthful and accurate and it was through these sources that the facts of the 
past could be reconstructed. 
A trial that was referred to earlier as an inspiration for Wilkie Collins, that of William 
Palmer, also relied on such a close mapping of movements. Palmer was accused of poisoning an 
associate of his, John Parsons Cook, with strychnine. The remarkable thing about this case was 
that, despite the accusation of poisoning, medical and scientific experts could find no trace of 
strychnine in the victim’s body.122 It was, rather, the piecing together of witness statements 
placing Palmer in the position to be able to poison Cook, and the clear motivation of financial 
gain, that formed the strength of the prosecution case.123 Palmer prepared, or served, food to 
Cook on several occasions; on each occasion Cook was subsequently stricken with violent bouts 
of sickness. Several other circumstances also pointed to Palmer’s involvement in other murders. 
                                                           
120 More predictably, the same efforts to reconstruct Mrs McLachlan’s actions were undertaken by the prosecution: 
‘her movements during Saturday, 5th July, may be traced with much minuteness in the evidence of the various 
witnesses'. William Roughhead, ed., Trial of Mrs Mclachlan (Glasgow: William Hodge & Company, 1911) 35. 
121 Ibid. 89. 
122 Ian Burney writes that ‘this had resulted in a gap at the centre of the case against him: although strychnine was 
named as the poison that had killed Cook, none was detected in his body’. Ian Burney, Poison, Detection, and the 
Victorian Imagination (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006) 1. 
123 In an account sympathetic to Palmer’s fate, Robert Graves writes that, following the verdict, the prevalent view 
of most medical authorities was that if Palmer must be hung ’it must be on the circumstantial evidence alone, not on 
the medical evidence; because that has broken down, horse, foot, and guns’. Robert Graves, They Hanged My Saintly 
Billy (London: Xanadu, 1990) 254. 
32 
 
The judge in the case, Lord Campbell, referred to these on sentencing: 'whether it is the first and 
only offense of this sort which you have committed is certainly known only to God and your 
own conscience. It is seldom that such a familiarity with the means of death should be shown 
without long experience; but for this offense of which you have been found guilty your life is 
forfeited'.124 The trial had thus produced knowledge of another that, without its process, could 
only be obtained by an omniscient being: the figure who, more often than not, narrated a realist 
novel. 
In many respects the trial developed in a way that simply extended these mid-nineteenth-
century forms. As such, a trial that took place in the midst of the modernist period – the trial of 
George Joseph Smith in 1915 – was, in fact, a fine example of a trial of experience. This 
infamous trial, known as ‘The Brides in the Bath’ case, was noteworthy for being one of the first 
cases to utilise ‘similar fact evidence’ in order to establish system or method on the part of the 
accused. Smith had been married to three different women all of whom had drowned in their 
own baths. The use of ‘similar fact evidence’ allowed him to be tried for the murder of one of 
them, Beatrice Mundy, with the case against him being corroborated by evidence of what had 
happened in the other two instances. It also utilised expert opinion in a controversial and, as will 
later be claimed, undermining fashion. But in certain of its other particulars it was a classic trial 
of reconstructive realism. For instance, one hundred and twelve witnesses were called to trial – 
all of them contributing to a detailed and precise mapping of Smith’s actions in various settings 
throughout England over a lengthy period of time. The expansion of police forces and greater 
communication between them thus only served more accurately to accrue the kind of 
information that could allow for such reconstructions of movements and actions. Secondly, the 
very concept of system and method relied upon a consistency of character which translated 
thought to action. Thirdly, the question of whether the deaths could all have been accidental was 
predominantly approached by way of common sense reasoning rather than specialist expertise. It 
was Detective Arthur Neill’s experiments with a female swimmer, in which he tested the ease 
with which a healthy young woman could be drowned while bathing, that formed one of the 
most striking instances of witness testimony. Fourthly, absolutely clear motivation was produced 
in the form of significant financial gain for Smith in all cases. Finally, in sentencing, the Judge 
affirmed the judgment of the jury to the extent of suggesting an infallible certainty:  
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Gentleman of the jury, I thank you for the great attention you have paid to this case. As I 
have said, I thoroughly concur in your verdict. It may interest you to know, and it may 
show the fairness of an English trial, that there was evidence before the magistrates 
which has not been given before you [...] The fairness of the English law has not put 
those facts before you on the trial, and it may help to satisfy you that your verdict is the 
right one.125 
 
In contrast to the Palmer trial, the certainty of the verdict in the Smith case was validated by 
evidence that had not been seen in court. But the coincidence of the jury’s judgment, made on 
the basis of permitted evidence, with that of the judge, made by recourse to supplementary 
proof, serves to illustrate the implicit faith that was placed in the ability of a fair trial to reach the 
truth. The prosecution cases against McLachlan, Palmer, and Smith also share a formal similarity 
which make them exemplary of the reconstructive trial: the fact that they are made from the 
point of their completion. Despite referring to the jury’s role in deciding the case, the prosecuting 
lawyer, in a way identical to that of the realist author, proceeds as if simply reporting prior events 
that undoubtedly took place. Much of the rhetorical skill of counsel is therefore employed in 
producing a narrative that treads a fine line: on the one hand it declares that judgment is still 
delicately hanging in the balance, while on the other it suggests that only one outcome is 
possible. A level of certainty was thus produced by the presentation of evidence in a trial even 
prior to the final judgment. 
The certainty established by such final judgments was, in fact, something that was not 
given a universal and formal possibility of challenge in England and Wales until the 
establishment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1907. In France, appeal had been instituted as 
a right following the Revolution but was excluded from the most serious cases, which were tried 
by jury. Changes to the possibility of review by the Cour de Cassation which made it much like the 
English Court of Criminal Appeal only came into place in 1895. Prior to the turn of the century, 
much more emphatically than today, the verdict of courts throughout Western Europe 
represented a finality, a completion of events. When the verdict was in, the story was finished 
and could be related exactly as a realist novel.126 
Barbara Shapiro claims that at least since the late seventeenth-century ‘determinations of 
fact in the courtroom should not be too far divorced from what are considered to be the 
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soundest means of evaluating factual evidence in the scientific disciplines'.127 The epistemological 
similarities with a tradition of empiricism will be duly noted. But, the common law also had close 
ties with the development of a Utilitarian approach - a philosophy which rests fundamentally on 
the commensurability of experiences as measurements of ‘the good’. Utilitarianism was the 
guiding philosophy for those reformers of the law in the nineteenth-century who sought to, 
amongst other things, provide a codified version of the common law for use in British India.128 
For K J M Smith, the fundamental attraction of Benthamism for these legislators was its 
"reverence for facts" - its belief that the source of knowledge was observation and the systematic 
appeal to experience'.129 Marianne Constable, likewise, claims that:  
 
the principle of utility provides the lawful measure of behaviour for human beings, who 
can rely on their experience of bodily sensations of pleasure and pain to calculate, as 
rational agents, how to behave. The Benthamite legislator extrapolates from experience 
to create the human positive law that is to improve society and its members in the future.130  
 
As Constable notes, many contemporary scholars and legal practitioners still believe in this stage: 
‘these philosophers take laws to be phenomena - and law to be a phenomenon - of a real 
empirical world of experience'.131 
 The common law, since the mid seventeenth-century and up until today, has also been 
considered as various formations of a rationalist tradition. But rather than a rationalism that, in 
philosophical terms, is often characterised as opposing an empirical approach, this view found 
‘its classic expression in English empirical philosophy in the writings of Bacon, Locke, and John 
Stuart Mill'.132 By the same token, the continental rationalist tradition which is thought to 
underpin civil law jurisdictions is fundamentally tied to the empirical approach of modern 
science. In J D Jackson’s analysis, this is an approach that assumes firstly:   
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that there is a world of fact which exists out there as part of reality, independent of the 
human observer, and the work of the scientist is to discover as much of it as he can by 
comparing this reality with his own theories and hypotheses, what has been called the 
correspondence theory of truth. Secondly, it is assumed that although many conclusions 
can only be stated with probability, given time the complete truth is in principle capable 
of being revealed, the principle of universal cognitive competence. Third, since 
knowledge of reality can be obtained by using as a foundation the empirical evidence of 
our sense-experiences which is value-free, science can be conducted in a value-free 
manner.133  
 
The correspondence theory of truth referred to here works precisely because of the perilous 
nature of experience. To experience the world is to take an adventure into that which cannot be 
wholly open to egoistic control. Experience, and reality, cannot simply be willed and what comes 
from within them is discovered rather than created. The terminology of trial procedure is indicative 
of this thought as 'the term "finding the facts" is located within a general conception of law 
where the judge, or jury, are regarded as finding a reality (and therefore that reality is "given")'.134 
The central concern of a trial is the central ‘fact’ of the crime, the ‘reactualizing’ of which has to 
be, in principle, possible. The certainty referred to by Gilbert, reached by the weighing of 
probabilities therefore has to somehow produce the same neutrality as value-free sense-
experience. To discern truth had to involve, as well as active deliberation, a certain passive 
reception. 
Part of the way that the trial established its credibility in this regard was through its 
trappings of impartiality. John Bender argues that the rules of evidence came to replace blatant 
authority in judicial matters: ‘rules are supposed to be passive, disinterested, objective, and 
transparent: their ideology is that they embody no ideology'.135 Rules thus provided the law with 
the capacity to produce passive, disinterested and objective observers (the ideal type of the 
modern subject of knowledge). The illusion created was of a group of individuals who would be 
able to transparently reflect reality. Bender then connects this insight to literary method: 'the 
reformulation of authority in terms of ostensibly autonomous rules finds it counterpart in the 
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convention of transparency that distinguishes the realist novel'.136 In stark contrast to Welsh’s 
analysis of Fielding, Bender argues that in Tom Jones 'this kind of justice is prospectively realized 
within the action itself by Tom Jones, an honest man who understands human nature through 
experience'.137 Just like the formal methods which governed scientific experimentation, the rules 
of evidence and the method of the novel sought to safeguard experience from its impersonators: 
hearsay, speculation and irrelevance. 
These rules, systematically formulated into the law of evidence from the eighteenth-
century onwards, gained their authority as the embodiment of prior decisions made in relation to 
particular cases. The law of evidence was thus made from specific decisions taken in relation to 
concrete experiences. The immediacy of a specific circumstance is discovered, held, and 
interpreted in a way which allows it to form a guide for future action. Just as in the experimental 
method, therefore, repetition is thought to be both possible and easily discernible. The system of 
stare decisis is, in one sense, then, all about the preserving and sharing of experience. On the other 
hand, and in what seems a paradoxical situation, common law as precedent is how law binds 
itself to a tradition that supposedly stretches back several centuries: and so the authority is based 
on a pre-modern sense of custom or convention. But the dating of this system of law, and how 
far back its tracing of decisions goes, is crucial to understanding its underlying sources. Shapiro 
argues that legal casebooks and court reports, often treated as a purely independent development 
‘began to flourish only after Bacon [...] emphasized the need for the careful and accurate 
collection and correlation of data from which generalizations might be drawn'.138 The institution 
of the materials required to chart precedents were, therefore, not in place until the modern era. 
Indeed, Peter Goodrich would say that this was not fully realised until some time later. He argues 
that 'the emergence of reliable law reports in the early 1800s, together with the somewhat earlier 
revival of the academic and literary expositions and sytematizations of the common law, 
provided the basic preconditions of the modern conception of common law as precedent’.139 
Precedent, as a system, though held to be a traditional tie to ancient law, is, thus, rooted in the 
modern conception of experience so far discussed, and came into being contemporaneously with 
the rise of the realist novel. As Holmes put it ‘the life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience’.140  
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The Experience of Experience 
 
The scientific method, one of the predominant manifestations of the modern concept of 
experience, was, in fact, partly responsible for its disintegration. As modernity developed, 
scientific disciplines multiplied, knowledge diversified, and an abundance of minute causes were 
discovered in relation to individual effects.141 The idea of experience which had been utilised in 
early modern science had involved a certain reliance on the testimony of learned individuals, but 
this trust had been predicated on an assumption that anyone else could have had the same 
experience. Descartes had even denied that individual sciences had differing goals and methods, 
instead claiming that 'the person who had trained his reason in a general way was more likely to 
make discoveries than the one who concentrated on some particular field of study.142 By the early 
twentieth-century, while technically this was still the case, the authority of specific expertise was 
far more prevalent. Odo Marquard, for instance, bemoans the fact that, in the contemporary 
world, knowledge has become an act of blind submission to a specialized authority. As Marquard 
puts it ‘we increasingly have to accept experience that we have not had ourselves but are only 
acquainted with through hearsay’.143 The treating of experience as an object, and its dissection 
into smaller and smaller mechanised elements had ultimately led many to question its continued 
connection to ‘lived experience’. What was being examined was no longer anything like 
experience as it was experienced. 
Returning to Gadamer’s definition of Erlebnis can help to illustrate how many sought to 
reject prevailing methods and reinvigorate the role of experience in philosophy. As a noun, the 
term had only come into use in the 1870s, subsequently being taken up by Dilthey, who sought 
to establish the human sciences upon the concept of ‘life’ – often taken to form a very similar 
meaning to Erlebnis. Dilthey wrote that: 
 
a lived experience is a distinctive and characteristic mode in which reality is there-for-me. 
A lived experience does not confront me as something perceived or represented; it is not 
given to me, but the reality of lived experience is there-for-me because I have a reflexive 
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awareness of it, because I possess it immediately as belonging to me in some sense. Only 
in thought does it become objective.144  
 
Dilthey’s work parallelled that of his contemporary, Henri Bergson, as well as the American 
Pragmatists, all of whom sought to ground philosophy on the multiplicitous experience of 
everyday life.145 As Agamben points out, ‘the inner sense which, for Kant, was without cognitive 
value and, with its "rhapsody of perceptions", expressed only the impossibility of the 
transcendental I knowing itself, now became the source of the most authentic experience’.146 
These thinkers proceeded as if experience had never before been at the centre of philosophical 
inquiry. Their project was as simple as it was ambitious: to revive ‘a common lifeworld that had 
relinquished its coherent meaning with the development of subcultures of expertise'.147 
 Confusingly, Erlebnis was supposed to contrast with ‘the notion of Erfahrung, or 
experience that entails taking an attitude toward an object and evaluating it, a kind of 
"secondhand" experience'.148 This sounds suspiciously like the second meaning of Erlebnis that 
Gadamer identifies from its semantic roots. Yet, it is this very confusion that indicates the crisis 
which was occurring in the late nineteenth-century. As Gadamer notes, the coinage of the word 
Erlebnis is intended to imply that lived immediacy is not lived as philosophy has so far envisaged 
it. In other words, the perception of sense-impressions does not happen in a vacuum but is 
inflected by will, feeling, and memory (the discovered yield of experience). But all of this is to be 
considered as ‘preconscious’ and as separate from another form of discovered yield – that of the 
cognitive judgments of Erfahrung. As Rudolf Makkreel writes:  
 
the words Erlebnis and Nacherleben, are not strictly defined, but they suggest various ideas: 
the idea that an experience can be a kind of unity with its own immanent teleology; the 
idea that such a unity can be communicated in such a way that we are able to re-
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experience and re-live to a certain degree what has been experienced and expressed by 
other people even generations ago; and, finally, the idea that the conception of a work of 
art is rooted in a particularly intense kind of contact with reality where a unification of 
outer and inner experiences take place.149  
 
Many of the features of an earlier form of experience thus continue to exist (Dilthey often 
described himself as an empiricist) but what has changed is the initial unit of immediacy. This 
‘lived experience’ is not an object in the modern sense in which Bacon, Descartes, or Locke took 
it. In fact, Dilthey wrote of his philosophical forefathers that, 'there is no real blood flowing in 
the veins of the knowing subject fabricated by Locke, Hume, and Kant’.150 In common with 
these earlier figures, Dilthey wanted to make experience the object of study: but it was an object 
that had to be considered in a much more subjective manner. Experience now had to be 
liberated from epistemology and considered in more complex terms which stressed what it was 
to be alive.151 As Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht puts it, there is an ‘untamedness’ to this new 
conception of experience.152 But in this act of freeing experience from its position as the matter 
of knowledge and envisaging it in more primal yet intricate terms, its explication became 
inherently difficult. Indeed this is perhaps one of the reasons why Dilthey’s work remained 
fragmentary and incomplete.153 
As described earlier, one of Dilthey’s many projects was the attempt to understand art as 
an expression of experience. This old idea was given fresh impetus with the new concept of 
Erlebnis, the reaching of which could only be achieved through an examination of its objective 
expression. But, paradoxically, the more experience was envisaged as it was actually lived, the 
more permanent became its disconnection from its discovered yield. In other words, as Erlebnis 
is considered in more complex terms, Erfahrung, rather than becoming closer to immediacy, 
recedes ever further into the distance. Erfahrung comes to denote something in excess of the 
discovered yield of Erlebnis. The most striking development of this thought is in Freud, as to 
recover the traumatic event that explained neuroses was precisely to reconstitute what had never 
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been an experience. As Freud wrote, memory ‘traces are often strongest and most enduring 
when the process that brought them into being never entered consciousness at all'.154 Strictly 
speaking, therefore, they were not forgotten experiences but unconscious psychic processes.155 
As if this were not enough of a blow to the pre-eminence of experience, Freud also soon came 
to the realisation that the traumas of infant sexual abuse that his patients began to recall could 
not all have been actual occurrences. Screen-memories which represented ‘the forgotten 
childhood years as completely as the manifest content of dreams represents the dream-thoughts' 
then came to form a prominent role in the constitution of psychic life.156 So, not only was what 
was remembered in analysis something that had not strictly speaking been forgotten, as it had 
never reached consciousness, but it had also never been unconsciously endured. The return of 
the repressed was, thus, the creation of an excess beyond Erlebnis that Erfahrung needed to make 
sense of a range of other psychic phenomenon. Erfahrung and Erlebnis were becoming stretched – 
lived immediacy and meaningful conceptualisation were no longer stages of the same thing but 
distinct entities.  
While the unconscious drives and fantasies discovered by psychoanalysis subvert the pre-
eminence of conscious experience, the configurations of unconscious life themselves reorient 
what had been experience’s main features. Weinstein argues that Freud’s theory alters 
conceptions of space and time. In Freud: 
 
Space here appears as no longer orientational but rather uncanny (reconfigured by the 
drivers of the subject immersed in it). Time shows itself as no longer progressive but 
rather traumatic ("now" deformed by "then", for the same reasons space is deformed). 
The subject emerges as no longer individual but plural, inhabited invisibly by other(s) 
encountered - and unknowingly interjected - in the past.157 
 
This radical reorientation of space and time is something that invades literary representation. In 
Ford Madox Ford’s Parade’s End the portrayal of a subject’s existence within a spatial and 
temporal scheme is so fluid it becomes difficult to place the concrete position from which they 
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speak, remember, and expect. And it is not only the shock of First World War trenches that 
causes this. Sylvia Tietjens, for instance, is as capable of temporal and spatial fragmentation as 
her husband: 'Sylvia had acquired also the habit of losing herself almost completely in reveries. 
Thus she was now vaguely conscious that a greyish lump, Tietjens, sat at the head of a whitish 
expanse: the lunch-table. There were also books [...] actually she was seeing quite a different 
figure and other books'.158 This dissolving of immediacy is prevalent in Ford’s other fiction, 
including The Good Soldier, and it is the defining state of Proust’s narrator, Marcel. Memory, both 
consciously recalled and at work in the sub-conscious activity of the psyche, was overloading the 
present moment, supplanting its claim to authority. Henri Bergson wrote that:  
 
in fact, there is no perception which is not full of memories. With the immediate and 
present data of our sense, we mingle a thousand details out of our past experience. In 
most cases these memories supplant our actual perceptions, of which we then retain only 
a few hints, thus using them merely as "signs" that recall to us former images.159  
 
Experience is always of a moment, but in modernism the moment is precisely what one cannot 
live through. 
For many thinkers of a slightly later period, the attempted enrichment of a ‘life 
philosophy’ undertaken by the likes of Dilthey, Bergson, and James was, after Marx and 
Nietzsche, a pointless exercise. Experience, like consciousness for Freud, was not a neutral unit 
of examination: it was, rather, the construct of ideological forces.160 To claim an authority for, or 
from, experience was therefore a form of false consciousness.161 The Frankfurt School of 
philosophy was a particularly prominent strand of this kind of thought. But for one of its 
members, Walter Benjamin, experience still came to play a fundamental role in his elliptical and 
elusive work. What made Benjamin’s thought so apt for his time was the way in which he wrote 
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only be approached by way of its cultural manifestation: expression. As Agamben puts it: ‘it is not accidental that 
Dilthey should arrive at a consideration of lived experience only in so far as it ceases to be "mute" and "obscure" to 
become "expression" in poetry and literature, thereby converting the "philosophy of life" into hermeneutics’. 
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of experience only in terms of its demise. His short essay ‘The Storyteller’, for instance, is 
nothing short of a lament to lost experience. He writes: 
 
It is as if something that seemed inalienable to us, the securest among our possessions, 
were taken from us: the ability to exchange experiences. One reason for this 
phenomenon is obvious: experience has fallen in value. And it looks as if it is continuing 
to fall into bottomlessness.162  
 
Benjamin’s main concern is that ‘the communicability of experience is decreasing'.163 Experience 
has ‘fallen in value’: its relation to the ‘goods’ of reality is no longer in step; it is a currency that 
has been beset by hyper-inflation. Benjamin argues that this is not a modern rupture but 
something which has been dying out gradually. The storyteller of archaic times is thus contrasted 
with the novelist. He writes that 'experience which is passed on from mouth to mouth is the 
source from which all storytellers have drawn'.164 His argument continues:  
 
The storyteller takes what he tells from experience - his own or that reported by others. 
And he in turn makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale. The novelist 
has isolated himself. The birthplace of the novel is the solitary individual, who is no 
longer able to express himself by giving examples of his most important concerns, is 
himself uncounselled, and cannot counsel others. To write a novel means to carry the 
incommensurable to extremes in the representation of human life.165  
 
The authority of these statements is weakened somewhat by obvious contradictions in 
Benjamin’s argument. For instance, one of the features that Benjamin associates with storytellers, 
the accounting of how they have come by the story, is identical to the ‘factual’ apparatus that 
surrounds many realist novels.166 The overt didacticism of many novels of the realist period also 
challenges Benjamin’s argument that novelists are ‘uncounselled, and cannot counsel others’. 
Benjamin’s argument is further diluted by the fact that the figure of the isolated author is, in fact, 
                                                           
162 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999) 83. 
163 Ibid. 86. 
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165 Ibid. 87. 
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much more reminiscent of the specifically modernist image of Proust working by night in his 
cork-lined room on Boulevard Hausmann.  
But to look for the value of this essay in its coherence of argument is to look in the 
wrong place. For though it may be weakened by inconsistency, what is not diluted in any degree 
is the palpable sense of loss that it expresses. It is also precisely because of this loss that his 
writing cannot proceed in the systematic fashion of earlier philosophers. The difficulty now 
faced in ‘communicating experience’ is why Benjamin’s work, even more than Dilthey’s, is 
produced as disconnected and unsystematic (something which culminates in the myriad of 
quotation and fragment that is his Arcades Project). 
Benjamin’s writing often displays a sincere admiration of Dilthey and Bergson, yet he 
also argues that Bergson’s duree is ‘the quintessence of a passing moment [Erlebnis] that struts 
about in the borrowed garb of experience'.167 For Benjamin, the brute sensation of the moment 
as felt by the solitary individual had been given precedence over the reflectively assimilated and 
collectively understood Erfahrung. Experience, throughout the Enlightenment, had been an entity 
that everyone had: its content could be agreed upon, its quality shared. But experience now 
became experiences: fragmented entities that had fallen in value precisely because they no longer 
made sense as a shared currency. As Gumbrecht puts it ‘we can communicate and "share 
experience" as that which is interpreted and cast into concepts, but lived experience, as that 
which precedes such interpretation, must remain individual’.168 Erlebnis was the individual’s true 
experience: but its singularity both isolated and silenced it. Even more than this, the problem of 
communicating experiences to another was mirrored by an internal struggle of translation: 
Erlebnis and Erfahrung no longer spoke the same language. 
Odo Marquard, a more recent philosopher from the school of German hermeneutics, 
has written on precisely this experiential lack in the twentieth-century. In a particular essay (‘The 
Age of Unworldliness’), Marquard claims that the modern world is characterised by the 
obsolescence of experience.169 This, in itself, is only one element of a wider malaise which he 
describes as ‘Tachogenic Unworldliness’ – the result of an accelerated speed in daily life (tachos 
meaning speed in Greek): something which is clearly evident in the shifting stimuli of the 
modernist metropolis.170 Everything in these urban landscapes changes at an increased rate:  
                                                           
167 ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ in Benjamin, Illuminations  181. 
168 Gumbrecht, The Powers of Philology: Dynamics of Textual Scholarship  84. 
169 In a nice contrast, Peter Brooks has stressed the ‘worldliness’ of the eighteenth-century novel. Brooks, The Novel 
of Worldliness: Crebillon, Marivaux, Laclos, Stendhal. 
170 In ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’, first published in 1903, Georg Simmel wrote that ‘the psychological basis of 
the metropolitan type of individuality consists in the intensification of nervous stimulation which results from the swift 
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This last observation also holds for our experience, because in our life-world the 
situations in which and for which we acquired our experience recur less and less 
frequently. Consequently, rather than becoming self-reliant, which is to say grown-up, 
through a continuous increase in our experience and our knowledge of the world, we 
more and more regularly fall back again into the situation of those for whom the world is 
predominantly unknown, new, alien, and enigmatic - that is, into the situation of 
children. Experience is the antidote, and probably the only antidote, for unwordliness; 
but now it no longer gets any grip. Since, nowadays, what is familiar becomes obsolete at 
a faster and faster rate, and the future world will increasingly be different from the world 
which we have experienced so far, the world becomes foreign to us (as modern human 
beings), and we become unworldly. Modern grown-ups become childlike.171 
 
A related element of modern unworldliness, according to Marquard, is the split that has arisen 
between experience and expectation. It has become ‘less possible to gauge one's own expectation 
of what is to come by one's experience up to the present'.172 Therefore a ‘willingness to accept 
illusion’ is brought into being and expectations can become boundless (as they clearly do in 
Proust). But a concomitant feature of this condition is that genuine repetition has evaporated. As 
seen earlier, both the scientific method and the possibility of historical inquiry had relied on the 
repeatability of experience. Even more than this, as Gadamer claims, ‘experience is valid only if it 
is confirmed; hence its dignity depends on its being in principle repeatable'.173 Memory may have 
helped with this potential for repetition – but it was now supplanting the present with past 
sensations rather than allowing for an accurate and unbiased comparison of facts. Repetition 
relied on both grasping the immediacy of the moment and accurately reflecting upon the one 
that was past, neither of which could now be done. As Max Weber wrote: 'reflective knowledge, 
even of one's own experience, is nowhere and never a literally "repeated experience" or a simple 
"photograph" of what was experienced; the "experience", when it is made into an "object" 
acquires perspectives and interrelationships which were not "known" in the experience itself'.174  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli’. Georg Simmel, Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings, eds. David 
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173 Gadamer, Truth and Method  342. 
174 Max Weber, "Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in Historical Explanation," in The Methodology of the 
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One way in which ‘lived experience’ and repetition were wholly congruent was suggested 
in the later work of Freud – but, typically, these terms had to be redefined by the 
psychoanalytical context in which they were used. Freud revised the theory of psychoanalysis 
when he claimed that his patients often did not remember what their ‘original’ trauma had been 
but, rather, repeated it: ‘he reproduces it not as a memory, but as an action; he repeats it, without 
of course being aware of the fact that he is repeating it'.175 Freud defined such repetition within 
analysis as ‘a real, lived experience', yet how different it is from the modern experience of a 
Descartes or Locke – or, for that matter, a George Eliot or Geoffrey Gilbert – and how strange 
this new form of repetition is also.176 For Freud, the analyst 'must necessarily make him (the 
patient) re-experience a certain portion of his past life, and must see to it that he remains to 
some degree above it all so that he remains cognizant at every turn that what appears to be 
reality is in truth the refracted image of a forgotten past'.177 But when combined with Freud’s 
other mature insight that there had, in many cases, never been an original experience, this 
repetition becomes ever more distanced from an experiential entity. It is now only the refracted 
image of a projected fantasy.  
 
Experience on Trial 
 
In the discourses of law and literature the disintegration of modern experience is something that 
is not expressed with a great degree of consistency. Experience, as a neutral, earlier, form of 
Erlebnis, does not become wholly absent or present in the trial and Erfahrung, as an excess of raw 
experience, does not come fully to dominate the novel. There are numerous and varied 
manifestations of the loss that is being felt. For instance, the attempt to reach a newly conceived 
Erlebnis with the minimum of reflective control could be said to be the project of the ‘stream of 
consciousness’ novel (given the fact that this phrase was coined by William James this 
connection to the narrative being charted here is unsurprising).178 However, the novels chosen as 
the focus of this thesis illustrate the demise of modern experience in a much more literal way. 
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The ensuing chapters will attempt to demonstrate this by focussing on specific elements of 
modern experience that are problematised by its splitting. Thus, the chapter on Forster, while in 
some ways serving as an introduction to the broader issues, will concentrate on the implications 
for judgment and representation when experience, in its modern form, is disappearing. The Good 
Soldier will be examined in relation to conceptions of identity and expertise. Finally, Proust’s 
novel will be analysed in the context of what, in experience, allowed for the experimental method 
and the accumulation of knowledge: genuine repetition. 
In an introduction to Parade’s End, Max Saunders writes that ‘Ford was always 
profoundly attuned to the poignancy of the transient, and to the fact that to describe experience 
is to write its elegy'.179 Saunders is referring to particular experiences and to a method of writing 
that, like the realist novel, is of experience. But, taken more generally, his statement is especially 
valuable. To describe experience, in general, is not to portray something that has died but to 
undertake a project that is, in itself, dead (or at least dying). Once again, Gadamer is a powerful 
voice in this regard:  
 
Only when it is no longer self-evident that a work of art consists in the transformation of 
experiences - and when it is no longer self-evident that this transformation is based on 
the experience of an inspired genius which, with the assuredness of a somnambulist, 
creates the work of art, which then becomes an experience for the person exposed to it - 
does one become conscious of the concept of Erlebniskunst in its outline. The century of 
Goethe seems remarkable to us for the self-evidence of these assumptions.180 
 
For Gadamer, the twentieth-century is no longer an age of art based on experience 
(Erlebniskunst). Certainly, the experiential quality of being in the world – of having an experience 
of a wholly other reality – is removed from the aims of many artistic endeavours. Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, referencing Alexander Kojeve, writes that with the work of Kandinsky ‘an objective and 
concrete type of painting is born which draws nothing from nature, which reproduces nothing. 
This type of painting is an object that possesses its own self-sufficiency and does not derive it 
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from its model'.181 There was now nothing before art, nothing which it reflected. The artist did 
not draw on their experience and attempt to reflect it in a given form. As Tzvetan Todorov puts 
it 'in the realm of art, there is nothing which is antecedent to the work, nothing which is its 
origin. The work of art itself is original; the secondary is the sole primary'.182  
The mantra of art for art’s sake was not, then, an elitist withdrawal from political activity 
but a perfectly rational response to a changing mode of consciousness. Realism had been based 
on verisimilitude and had sought to be lifelike. Modern art, by contrast, attempted to supplant 
life.183 Giorgio Agamben remarks that 'it is in the context of this crisis of experience that modern 
poetry finds its place. For, on close scrutiny, modern poetry from Baudelaire onwards is seen to 
be founded not on new experience, but on an unprecedented lack of experience'.184 The shock of 
the new, such a prominent motif of modernism, is, in fact, the result of this lack, as it is 
experience which would protect the individual from surprise. Marquard’s diagnosis is right: the 
twentieth-century makes children of adults. 
In legal theory, contemporary scholarship has tended to emphasise the importance of 
narrative in case construction at trial. Of course, cases were given narrative construction for 
many years and the introduction of lawyers into trial proceedings increased this element of 
representation. But the increasing length of trials, which, in serious cases had risen to as long as a 
week by the turn of the twentieth-century, allowed for a greater subtlety and complexity in both 
the narrative construction of the prosecution and its undermining by defence counsel. The stress 
upon narrative, in this sense, turns truth into a matter of coherence rather than correspondence. 
Monica Den Boer defines narrative coherence as ‘a test of truth or probability of fact and 
evidence upon which direct proof by immediate observation is unavailable'.185 In other words, 
narrative coherence performs the same role as Welsh’s strong representations but with a subtle 
difference. Narrative, used in this sense, is distinct from Welsh’s chain of circumstances because 
the narrative is made believable by recourse to certain ‘fictions’. Den Boer argues that in court 
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'the truth as a unified concept of "what really" happened does not exist; it is the argumentative-
pragmatic game with the story parts that decides what has to pass for "the truth"'.186 
 As such, what comes out of a trial is a truth but not one that corresponds to a prior 
reality of experience. Rather, truth is created by a trial, on its own terms and in its own right (just 
as art no longer refers to reality but subsists by itself). Jerome Frank, in the mid twentieth-
century, wrote that:  
 
the trial court's facts are not "data", not something that is "given"; they are not waiting 
somewhere, ready made, for the court to discover, to "find". More accurately, they are 
processed by the trial court - are, so to speak, "made" by it, on the basis of its subjective 
reactions to the witnesses' stories.187  
 
Frank was the first legal theorist to articulate the productive nature of trials in this sense, but it is 
something that can be seen in trial practice from much earlier in the century. Indeed, it first 
becomes prevalent in British India in the late nineteenth-century. As colonial rule had 
progressed, magistrates had become increasingly anxious about their ability to accurately judge 
the event under consideration. The belief in rampant perjury undermined the trial in British India 
to the extent that the supposed crime at the heart of the inquiry slipped from view and 
magistrates chose between the less false of two accounts rather than the true one. The uneasy 
balance supposedly made between the law of the colonizer and that of the indigenous population 
was also significant, as fictitious cases were constructed against individuals in order to place them 
within the common law’s conception of criminality.  
The fundamental faith that had been placed in the trial as a method of criminal 
procedure had been its ability to reach the event which had occurred. As Foucault claimed, the 
inquiry was about reactualizing what had happened, producing it as a tangible entity for the 
jurors in court. But the court could only be witness to the truth in this sense if there was at least 
some faith placed in experiential testimony. The widespread belief in the dishonesty of Indian 
witnesses therefore undermined the claims of the trial to be operating on a correspondence 
theory of truth and it was an anxiety that filtered through to British courts by the turn of the 
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century. In this new era ‘evidence was not what it seemed; confessions were unreliable; and the 
oath was no guarantee of truth'.188  
 In Chapter One, E. M. Forster’s A Passage to India will be examined within this context of 
judicial doubt. Indeed, the origination of many of the issues so far discussed in British colonial 
history is one of the reasons why this novel will be examined first. But it is not the only reason. 
Perhaps even more crucially, Forster comes first because his novel perfectly represents the 
movement from one novelistic epoch to another. Forster, though he wrote throughout the 
modernist period was, in the main, a producer of realist fiction.189 However, the incident in the 
Marabar caves from A Passage to India is precisely the moment when his writing becomes 
modernist. This turn away from realism is followed by his turn away from the novel form as he 
never wrote another line of fiction.190 What happened in the cave is the unresolved issue of the 
novel. It is an enigma that the hermeneutic code never accounts for. But the significance of this 
moment is actually that nothing happened. Far from the trivial claim that there was no crime 
committed, or the suggestion that Adela Quested found herself in a spiritually altered state, the 
point here is, rather, that nothing about this incident conforms to the modern concept of 
experience.  
In the second part of this chapter it will be argued that Aspects of the Novel and the 
Codification Acts (particularly Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s Evidence Act of 1872) are 
responses to A Passage to India and the problem of the trial in British India respectively. They are 
attempts to set rules to govern representation – the point being that rules are required because, 
unlike the realist novel and the earlier trial, experience cannot be assumed to be the governing 
authority for representation. Unlike the rules of evidence that Bender saw as producing a 
transparency of disinterested observers, in which certain evidence would be excluded, these rules 
attempted to define all that could be admitted as relevant. In so doing, experience could slip away 
while truth remained intact.  
Chapter Two extends this analysis by examining Ford Madox Ford’s The Good Soldier, in 
light of the way in which judgment, in the early twentieth-century, was becoming a matter of 
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expert knowledge rather than common experience. More than ever before, the evidence given at 
trial was appearing in the form of specialized testimony, offered by experts trained to see what 
the layman could not. This testimony, supposedly designed to educate the juror, in fact, often 
offered an authoritative pronouncement of judgment. The fact that it was normally based upon a 
body of scientific research undertaken and disseminated by many more people than the expert 
witness himself, also meant that this form of testimony had to be enshrined in law as a 
permissible form of hearsay. Expertise was thus supplanting the previously unquestionable 
authority of experience.  
Precisely the same phenomenon was occurring in the novel. What had not come to 
fruition as the result of experience could not be grasped in the form of an experience either. In 
the modernist period, apart from anything else, texts became more specialized: they required a 
knowledge of previous literature and classical myth. The theme, meaning and also plot of a 
modernist novel became factors not immediately discernible to the individual by recourse to 
their own common, everyday experience. In The Good Soldier, critical writing has offered wildly 
divergent readings, not just of what the novel is about in terms of meaning but simply on the 
basis of what has actually taken place. One interpretation in particular, that made by Roger 
Poole, will be analysed in some detail in Chapter Two. Poole’s evidence, based upon the 
expertise of the literary scholar versed in the psychoanalytical theory, deconstruction, and 
structural linguistics, is so forcefully presented it becomes difficult to doubt his case, despite the 
fact that it completely subverts the surface narrative of the novel. The reader is thus placed in the 
position of discounting his own experience in favour of the expert who interprets for him. 
Many of the varied interpretations which have been made of Ford’s novel have involved 
the issue of what kind of identity it portrays. Neither Dowell, the narrator, nor Ashburnham, the 
‘good soldier’ of the title, are given in the form of a realist character portrait. This is precisely 
because their experiences have resisted collection, manipulation and communication. As such, 
Dowell’s intentions become vague and Ashburnham’s responsibility unclear – notions the 
determining of which were also becoming problematic for the criminal law. Attributing 
responsibility and discerning intention were, themselves, becoming matters of expertise at this 
time, as was the act of criminal identification. In the late nineteenth-century new methods 
emerged in the identification of criminals. Firstly, anthropometry, in which precise 
measurements were taken of individual portions of the body and kept on file, fragmented the 
body into separable units that had to be reassembled to make an identification. This was a 
system that was superseded by that of fingerprinting, in which the identity of an individual lay in 
an abstract image that bore no relation to the subject’s physical appearance. In the fingerprint, 
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identity could be seen, but it was only the trained expert who had the vision to bear witness to it. 
In Chapter Two it will be argued that these forms of capturing identity can be seen to have 
parallels in the way that Ford provides his reader with the image of Edward Ashburnham. 
Proust’s In Search of Lost Time forms the basis of the final chapter for two reasons. To 
begin with, Proust’s work represents the supreme expression of the disintegrating experience 
which appears in A Passage to India, and permeates The Good Soldier. There are various examples of 
how this is so: from the denigration of lived immediacy in favour of expectation and memory, to 
the oblivion of the present that characterises the famous moments of involuntary memory; from 
the narrator, Marcel’s, seeming invisibility, not to say complete absence, from many scenes to 
Proust’s radical withdrawal from the world of experience that facilitated the writing of his novel. 
Giorgio Agamben, who has been quoted repeatedly in reference to lost experience, saves his 
greatest claims for In Search of Lost Time: 
 
the most peremptory objection against the modern concept of experience has been 
raised in the work of Proust. For the object of the Recherche is not a lived experience but, 
quite the contrary, something which has been neither lived nor experienced. And not 
even its sudden emergence in the intermittences du coeur constitutes an experience, from the 
point when the condition of this emergence is precisely a vaccilation of the Kantian 
conditions of experience: time and space. And it is not only the conditions of experience 
that are called into question, but also its subject, for the latter is undoubtedly not the 
modern subject of knowledge (Proust seems rather to have in mind certain crepuscular 
states, like drowsiness or a loss of consciousness: Je ne savais pas au premier instant qui j'étais 
- I did not know who I was at first - is his typical formula).191 
 
Despite writing from, and about, a state of non-experience, a central issue of the novel is a real 
life legal case – that of Captain Alfred Dreyfus. But far from drawing the narrator, or this novel, 
out of its solipsistic labyrinth, this fact actually serves to highlight the lack of experience in the 
real Dreyfus Case. In Chapter Three it will be argued that the Dreyfus Case is defined by its 
                                                           
191 Agamben, Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience  42. Adorno had already made a similar point. In 
his 1960 essay ‘Presuppositions’ he claimed that in the modernist writing of Joyce and Proust one could see ‘the 
dying out of experience, something that ultimately goes back to the atemporal technified process of the production 
of material goods'. Theodor Adorno, “Presuppositions: On the Occasion of a Reading by Hans G. Helms,” in 
Theodor Adorno, Notes to Literature, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, vol. 2 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992) 101. 
 
52 
 
reliance on absent evidence (hence paralleling the superiority of absence in Proust). But the 
Dreyfus Case is also notable for its continuous repetitions. These come in a variety of forms: 
from his own appeals, to the trials of Esterhazy and Zola, to written versions of the case. The 
discussion of appeals therefore forms a second reason for Proust coming last in the succession 
of chapters, as appeals themselves come after the original trials that formed the subject matter of 
the first two chapters.  
The growing uncertainty that was being produced by these original trials is what led to 
the institution of the Court of Criminal Appeal in England in 1907 and to changes to the Cour de 
Cassation in France at a similar time. But what was brought into being with these institutions was 
a facility for repetition – a testing of the test itself. The idea of repetition as guarantor, though it 
may be the law’s only option, was now out of date. Utilising distinctions made between a 
Platonic and a Nietzschean conception of repetition (following Deleuze) will allow for an 
analysis of the way that appeals operate, the functioning of stare decisis in legal thought, and the 
issues of re-writing and re-reading that are brought up by Proust’s texts (which include Jean 
Santeuil as well as In Search of Lost Time). It will be seen that repetition no longer involves a 
conception of the original which is being repeated. Freud’s ideas of screen memories, fantasy 
traumas, and repetition compulsion thus come into play, as human behaviour is envisaged as 
responding to unconscious fantasies and drives rather than concrete experiences. 192 The 
Nietzschean world of infinite difference has come into existence, in which all repetition is merely 
a ghostly repeat of something dis-similar. 
In Proust, Erlebnis has clearly lost its value. Erfahrung appears to be elevated – as it is 
Marcel’s ability to recover value from the past that is seen as such an important part of the text. 
As stated earlier, in modernism, the moment is precisely what one cannot live through: Marcel’s 
epiphanies perfectly illustrate this as they regain an immediacy that serves to occlude the present 
moment. The past of Combray, brought into being with the taste of a tea-soaked madeleine, is 
also a past which never really existed. The unified experience that Marcel is able to encounter, 
which appears to be an act of memory, thus, has as much to do with fantasy, imaginative 
projection, and artistic creation, as with an objective past of immediate experience. Experience is 
nowhere to be found in Proust’s masterpiece. The novel, rather than reflecting experience, has 
come to replace it.
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of tradition and deference to precedent, tips the scales imperceptibly toward continued adherence to the rule, 
toward what Nusbaum, an American, termed "repetition compulsion"’. Peter Goodrich, Oedipus Lex: Psychoanalysis, 
History, Law (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995) 201.  
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CHAPTER ONE: MYSTERIES AND MUDDLES IN A PASSAGE TO  
INDIA 
 
Because Balzac was a genius, and because every genius seems to bring to his art a 
final and conclusive solution, it has been decreed that the proper function of the 
novel is to rival the etat-civil. Balzac constructed his work; he never claimed to 
codify the novel; his article on Stendhal proves it. Rival the etat-civil! As if there 
weren’t enough fools and boors in the world as it is! What have I to do with the 
etat-civil? L’etat c’est moi! I, the artist; civil or not, my work doesn’t pretend to rival 
anything. 
Andre Gide, The Counterfeiters1 
 
On the face of it, E M Forster’s A Passage to India (1924) is a novel made from 
experience. It is thematically constructed around his own personal response to India, 
following two enriching visits, and is littered with the re-telling of events that either befell 
Forster or that he was witness to.2 This adherence to experience as the source of his 
fiction is perfectly consistent with the style of his writing which, throughout both the 
majority of this novel and in the rest of his work, is exclusively realist. Yet, A Passage to 
India is also a novel with a central incident, around which the narrative adheres, whose 
status as an experience dissolves into uncertainty. By the end of the novel the reader 
remains ignorant of what has occurred in the Marabar cave. But not only the reader – the 
inability to find the facts of this case extends to include the protagonist (the individual 
who supposedly had the experience), the purportedly omniscient narrator, and the author 
himself. No one knows what happened in A Passage to India because nothing happened: 
there was no experience.3  
In this chapter it will be argued that this feature of Forster’s novel resonates with 
the context of judicial decision-making in British India. During the course of colonial 
                                                           
1 Andre Gide, The Counterfeiters, trans. Dorothy Bussy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966) 167. Bussy defines 
the etat-civil as ‘the State records of each individual citizen, in which are noted the legal facts of his 
existence’. 
2For an autobiographical account of Forster’s time in India see The Hill of Devi (1953). E. M. Forster, The 
Hill of Devi: and other Indian Writings (London: Edward Arnold, 1983). 
3 It is this particular moment, allied to the realist style, that prompts Malcolm Bradbury to write that 'some 
have seen it [A Passage to India] as very much a novel of a traditional type, drawing on the techniques of 
Victorian fiction to establish a wide social panorama and a close relationship between author and reader; 
others have seen it as eminently a modernist or symbolist novel’. Malcolm Bradbury, ed., A Passage to India: 
Casebook Series (London: MacMillan Press, 1978) 12. 
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rule, the erosion of traditional methods of fact-finding and sentencing had progressed at 
some pace. An uneasy balance had, at times, therefore had to be made between 
competing conceptions of justice – a state that resulted in fictitious cases being 
constructed in order to achieve the desired outcomes. Of more pressing concern to 
working magistrates was the widespread belief in perjury. The lying native became a 
symbol of colonial anxiety, signifying the British inability to know their colonial subjects 
and the impossibility for courts consistently to make the correct decisions. Rather than 
coinciding with the event that had occurred – the prior experience in question – trials 
became a matter of choosing the less untrue of two accounts. This anxiety reached a 
peak following the Mutiny of 1857 and, in legal terms, the response was a series of 
codification Acts that sought to infuse a greater certainty into the judicial system. 
Forster, though more beset by a sense of collective guilt over British rule in India 
than fearful of native duplicity, was, however, subject to his own form of anxiety. A 
Passage to India, with its sudden delve into the world of modernist writing that eschewed 
modern experience, is the culmination of Forster’s literary career – but it is also the final 
act in his life as a purveyor of fiction. Rather than writing any more novels, the 
subsequent years of Forster’s life were taken up with factual writing such as documentary 
accounts of, amongst other things, his time in India. He also published Aspects of the 
Novel, in which he appeared to set certain limits to the novel. These restrictions sought to 
impose laws upon what novelistic representation could look like and, as such, had much 
in common with the legal codification undertaken in British India in the late nineteenth-
century. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s Indian Evidence Act of 1872, in particular, can be 
seen to have similar goals to Aspects of the Novel. Both are responses to specific anxieties 
about the state of law and literature respectively. They are attempts to govern the scope 
of representation, to limit what can be told: precisely what is required when experience 
can no longer be relied upon to perform such a role. 
 
Muddle or Mystery? 
 
What makes the episode in the Marabar cave a non-experience? In order to answer this 
question, and because this non-incident is so central both to Forster’s novel and the 
argument of this thesis, a detailed account of its narrative representation is a necessary 
introduction. Its setting is a day trip to the Marabar hills, planned by Dr Aziz and on 
which he invites his British friends Fielding and Mrs Moore and Mrs Moore’s 
55 
 
prospective daughter-in-law, Adela Quested. The optimistic idea behind the outing is that 
it will form a more informal, spontaneous, and warm-hearted version of the patronising 
‘bridge party’ thrown by the Collector, Turton. However, the day gets off to a bad start 
when Fielding is late, misses the train, and leaves Aziz with the two ladies to entertain. 
Forster’s artful depiction of social manners – so prevalent in this and his other novels – 
forms the basis of the subsequent narration, as a series of awkward scenes ensues. These 
are eventually to be dissipated by the focal point of the trip: a walk in the Marabar hills 
and an investigation of their numerous caves. But Mrs Moore, who suffers a bad reaction 
upon entering the first cave of their walk, ends up staying behind while Aziz and Adela, 
together with their guides, ascend the Kawa Dol (the main peak of the Marabar).4 Adela’s 
thoughts, at this time, are preoccupied with doubts about her impending marriage to Mrs 
Moore’s son, Ronny Heaslop, and she, tactlessly and abruptly, asks Aziz how many wives 
he has. Aziz, offended by her question, retreats into a cave by himself. Adela ‘followed at 
her leisure, quite unconscious that she had said the wrong thing, and not seeing him she 
also went into a cave’.5 The chapter concludes at this point, the narration being picked up 
in the next with Aziz still within his cave, smoking a cigarette. On emerging, he discovers 
that Adela has vanished. The guide reports that he saw her enter one of the caves, but is 
unable to say which one. Aziz’s state of panic soon increases as a brief search proves 
fruitless. But then he is provided with ‘the simple and sufficient explanation of the 
mystery’ as he observes Adela in a gully at the bottom of the Kawa Dol with Miss Derek, 
who has just arrived in her car (165). Relieved more than puzzled, he returns to camp, 
spotting and retrieving Adela’s field-glasses, which have been broken, on the way. When 
he gets to the bottom of the mountain he finds that Fielding has just arrived. Miss 
Derek’s servant also appears, having been dispatched with the message that Miss Derek 
and Adela have returned to Chandrapore by themselves. Fielding, perceiving this as a 
slight to his friend, questions Aziz about his and Adela’s expedition. But Aziz, keen to 
retain some atmosphere of success around the day, fends these off by fabricating a story 
in which he and Adela were together for the duration of their walk, omitting the fact that 
he was unaware of her whereabouts for a short while. The rest of the day passes without 
incident but, upon returning to Chandrapore, the party are met by the police who inform 
Aziz that he is under arrest. In a rash moment, Aziz attempts to run and is restrained by 
                                                           
4 Mrs Moore’s reaction to the cave will be referred to at greater length in due course. 
5 E. M. Forster, A Passage to India (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989) 164. All subsequent references to the 
novel will be given in brackets within the text. 
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Fielding, who warns him that he should ‘never act the criminal’ (172). Aziz is then taken 
into custody: he has been accused of assault by Adela.  
In a very basic sense, then, the supposed event in the cave has eluded an initial 
representation – it has failed to arise as a lived immediacy (Erlebnis) in the text. But this is 
often the case in fiction. Detective novels, for instance, proceed on the basis that the 
central event that has not been narrated will, through the process of what is narrated, be 
revealed.6 More significantly, though, it is resistant to recollection. Adela’s only 
description of what happened recounts that:  
 
there was this shadow, or sort of shadow, down the entrance tunnel, bottling me 
up. It seemed like an age, but I suppose the whole thing can’t have lasted thirty 
seconds really. I hit at him with the glasses, he pulled me round the cave by the 
strap, it broke, I escaped, that’s all. He never actually touched me once. It all 
seems such nonsense (199).  
What, if any, is the crime here? Who, if anyone, is the assailant? The ‘sort of 
shadow’ that bottles Adela up is an image designed to elude conceptualisation. During 
Aziz’s investigation Adela begins to have doubts as to his guilt. When she finally takes to 
the stand at his trial she is suddenly made aware of the fact that she cannot place Aziz 
within the cave. But this realisation does not come in the way of a normal recollection of 
a prior experience. It is, rather, a creative act: ‘her vision was of several caves. She saw 
herself in one, and she was also outside it, watching its entrance, for Aziz to pass in. She 
failed to locate him’ (231). This is not a memory, it is an out-of-the-body reconstruction 
of her doubt. She does not become certain that Aziz is innocent, much less certain of 
what actually happened, she has simply given in to uncertainty. As such, she refuses to 
name Aziz as her assailant, the trial collapses, and the text yields no further detail as to 
what, if anything, happened in the cave.7 
                                                           
6 Tzvetan Todorov argues that detective fiction thus produces two stories: ‘the first - the story of the crime 
- tells "what really happened", whereas the second - the story of the investigation - explains "how the 
reader (or the narrator) has come to know about it". ‘The Typology of Detective Fiction’ in Tzvetan 
Todorov, The Poetics of Prose, trans. Richard Howard (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977) 45. 
7 Many critis have ignored this and attempted to offer explanations of what happened to Adela. See David 
Shusterman: 'E M Forster, always reticent about his own work, has never stated publicly exactly what he 
meant by Mrs. Moore's experience in the cave. Naturally, however, his refusal has not prevented critics 
from having a heyday with this intriguing section of the novel’. Shusterman himself makes a particularly 
imaginative explanation in which Professor Godbole is culpable. David Shusterman, The Quest for Certitude 
in E. M. Forster's Fiction (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1965) 164 & 89-91. 
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Such uncertainty is already something that differentiates A Passage to India from a 
realist novel.8 However, what is really distinctive about the Marabar non-experience is the 
way in which its un-narrated quality functions within the text. Not only is what happened 
to Adela never revealed, its unknown quality does not, ultimately, open up a gap in 
experiential knowledge that can, or should, be filled. The first clue to this way of reading 
the novel can be found in a letter Forster wrote to his friend Goldsworthy Lowes 
Dickinson:  
 
In the cave it is either a man, or the supernatural, or an illusion. And even if I 
know! My writing mind therefore is a blur here – ie. I will it to remain a blur, and 
to be uncertain, as I am of many facts in daily life. This isn't a philosophy of 
aesthetics. It's a particular trick I felt justified in trying because my theme was 
India. It sprang straight from my subject matter. I wouldn't have attempted it in 
other countries, which though they contain mysteries or muddles, manage to 
draw rings round them.9 
 
Forster, though he employs the realist viewpoint of an omniscient narrator, thus claims 
to have a less than omniscient knowledge of the facts. That is, he is not aware of 
everything that occurs beneath the level of his own narration. Yet to retain this 
uncertainty requires a wilful act of resistance: Forster has to ‘will’ the scene in the caves 
to remain a blur. Why does he do this? If the event was to remain un-narrated then what 
would be the harm in him knowing what happened? Why did he resist not only a 
resolution in the plot but also a concrete event in the story?  
To use this language of story and plot is to invoke Forster’s own distinction from 
Aspects of the Novel (which will be discussed at length in due course). For the moment, it is 
sufficient to think about it in relation to a prevalent strain in critical theory which ran 
throughout the twentieth-century. Originally defined by the Russian Formalists in the 
early part of the century as fabula and sjuzhet, then taken up by proponents of narratology 
theory in the 1960s (most notably with Tzvetan Todorov’s work on ‘story’ and 
‘discourse’), the distinction between a narrative representation and the events it 
                                                           
8 In the previous chapter it was argued that Collins’ The Moonstone is exemplary of realism’s desire to tie up 
all the loose ends.  
9 Extract from letter quoted in P. N. Furbank, E. M. Forster: A Life, vol. 2 (London: Secker and Warburg, 
1978) 125. 
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represents has a rich and influential history. What the fabula/story and sjuzhet/discourse 
distinction postulates is that under every narration (sjuzhet/discourse) made in a particular 
language or set of images or collection of signs, there is a base structure of fabula or story. 
Story is essentially what every narrative is a representation of. Discourse is those 
representations as they appear to the reader.10  
By ‘willing’ the scene in the caves to remain a blur to his own mind, Forster is 
denying not only the representation of an event, but also the event itself. The scene in 
the caves exists neither on the plane of discourse nor story. Were the event to be only 
unrepresented an apt description would be to say that it remained shrouded in mystery, 
but Forster is careful, even in his letter to Dickinson, to describe it as either a mystery or 
a muddle. This phrasing is mirrored in the novel itself, most prominently in a scene in 
which Adela and Mrs Moore wonder why a carriage promised for them by the 
Battachyara family has failed to appear:  
 
‘I do so hate mysteries,’ Adela announced. 
‘We English do.’ 
‘I dislike them not because I’m English, but from my own personal point of 
view,’ she corrected. 
‘I like mysteries but I rather dislike muddles,’ said Mrs Moore. 
‘A mystery is a muddle.’ 
‘Oh, do you think so, Mr Fielding?’ 
‘A mystery is only a high-sounding term for a muddle. No advantage in stirring it 
up, in either case. Aziz and I know well that India’s a muddle.’ (86). 
  
Mystery is ‘high-sounding’ because, epistemologically, it implies the need for a discovery. 
Mysteries, in this sense, are essentially about the unknown but existent. A series of facts 
resists explanation because it cannot be connected in a satisfactory manner. This is 
because there is a gap in understanding, a missing piece in a chain of cause and effect. 
Solved mysteries are therefore the stuff of realist novels – they are enigmas that are 
                                                           
10See Jonathan Culler, "Fabula and Sjuzhet in the Analysis of Narrative: Some American Discussions," Poetics 
Today 1, no. 3 (1980), W. J. T. Mitchell, ed., On Narrative (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 
Todorov, The Poetics of Prose. 
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eventually solved by the conclusion of the text and the finding of the missing fact.11 In a 
muddle, on the other hand, nothing is missing. Everything that one would require to 
make a judgment is to hand, but the terms are being misread, or the known elements are 
entangled. Sorting out a muddle, as opposed to solving a mystery, is a case only of 
rearranging what is already apparent. The distinction between mysteries and muddles is 
thus paralleled by that made in philosophy following Wittgenstein and the linguistic turn. 
Whereas traditionally philosophy had dealt with problems, with a metaphysical realm, 
which could be striven towards via rational discourse, Wittgenstein declared that there 
were, in fact, only philosophical puzzles, the solutions to which were found in the 
analysis of the linguistic forms in which they were couched.12 In A Passage to India, 
Fielding’s claim that mysteries, in fact, always reduce into muddles, is Wittgensteinian in 
this sense.  
To ask whether the Marabar incident is a mystery or a muddle is therefore a 
question with some significance. As a mystery, it implies experience: if there was an 
experience in the cave then its lived immediacy is open to reconstruction in such a way 
that it can be grasped as the missing fact that completes the causal chain and solves the 
mystery. On the other hand, muddle indicates a non-experience as, by its terms, the 
reconstruction of a supposed immediacy is neither here nor there: all that matters is the 
way in which the known elements are arranged.   
Of course, the logic of the reconstructive trial, and the investigative work that 
precedes it, dictates that the court be envisaged as becoming a witness to the truth of 
what happened. Indeed McBryde, the District Superintendent of Police who investigates 
in A Passage to India, follows this logic when he declares that, in Aziz’s trial, ‘the facts will 
speak for themselves’ (226). He thus sets out to produce a ‘strong representation’ in 
which ‘the circumstances cannot lie’.13 In affiliating his court narrative to the continuing 
influence of ‘strong representation’ McBryde, in effect, promises to produce a sjuzhet 
indistinguishable from its fabula. But this can only be achieved if the correct arrangement 
of circumstantial facts is placed around Adela’s testimony. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, 
                                                           
11 See previous chapter for analysis of Collins’ The Moonstone in this regard. The idea of the ‘enigma’ comes 
from Roland Barthes. Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974). 
12 Judith Genova writes that 'repeatedly, Wittgenstein argues that philosophical problems, unlike scientific 
ones, are not "real" problems, but puzzles caused by misunderstanding the grammar of language'. Judith 
Genova, Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing (New York; London: Routledge, 1995) 38. 
13 Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1992) 7. 
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law member in India in the early 1870s, would have understood this. Stephen wrote on 
the difficulties of assessing testimony in isolation in his Introduction to the Indian Evidence 
Act 1872. In fact, a particular example used by him is strikingly similar to the case in 
Forster’s novel: 
 
For instance, a man and a woman are travelling alone in a railway carriage. The 
train stops at a station, and the woman charges the man with indecent conduct, 
which he denies. Nothing particular is known about the character or previous 
history of either. The woman is not betrayed on cross-examination into any 
inconsistency. There are no cases in which the difficulty of arriving at a 
satisfactory decision is anything like so great. It is easy to decide them as it is easy 
to make a bet, but it is easier to deal satisfactorily with the most complicated and 
lengthy chain of inference.14 
 
While it may be easier to deal with a complicated and lengthy chain of inference, Forster 
shows in A Passage to India, that the chain itself is never neutral. There must always be a 
starting point from which the collection of evidence is made. In McBryde’s case, the 
starting point is Aziz’s guilt. On searching Aziz after his arrest Adela’s field-glasses are 
found upon him. But the innocent explanation that the reader has been privy to is not 
given any credence. Rather, ‘the logic of evidence said “Guilty”’ (176). Evidence of 
‘character’ and ‘previous history’, such as that referred to by Stephen, also originates in a 
prior belief in Aziz’s guilt. During a search of his house the police find letters mentioning 
trips to a brothel which are interpreted as proof of Aziz’s perversion. Photographs of 
women are found, further adding to the weight of evidence proving his uncontrollable 
sensuality (when these are in fact perfectly innocent photographs of his deceased wife). 
As the authorities push for a degree of premeditation in the charge, the failure of 
Fielding and Professor Godbole to make the train on time is also developed into the 
fruition of a cunning plan made by Aziz. These circumstances, when taken together, do 
indeed amount to a ‘strong representation’.   
Of course, in Welsh’s argument, the authority of such ‘strong representations’ 
had been weakened by the late nineteenth-century. His analysis of Henry James’ The 
Golden Bowl attaches particular significance to the smashing of the bowl at the end of the 
                                                           
14 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, The Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872) With an Introduction On The Principles of 
Judicial Evidence (London: MacMillan and Co, 1872) 44. 
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novel. For Welsh ‘it is a memorable moment in James's fiction and, I would argue, a last 
rite of circumstantial evidence’.15 A similar action is at play in A Passage to India, only now 
the symbolic breaking of the evidence is made even before it is brought into a realm of 
such understanding: the field-glasses are broken before Aziz picks them up. McBryde’s 
‘the facts will speak for themselves’ is thus undermined by Forster’s depiction in the 
same way as ‘the circumstances cannot lie’ is destroyed by the smashing of James’ 
Golden Bowl. There is a certain privileging of testimony at play here, as the trial collapses 
once Adela refuses to name Aziz. Yet, while testimony may be elevated in terms of its 
authority by these moments, it is certainly not because of its epistemological benefits. 
The lack of testimony destroys the trial but, as is made clear by Stephen in his earlier 
comment, and by Welsh, testimony on its own is an extremely weak representation.  
More important, in the context of this discussion, is the precise way in which the 
weakening of ‘strong representations’ reduces mystery to muddle. Fielding’s defence of 
his friend, as his Wittgensteinian sense of the issue would suggest, relies on exactly this 
movement. From the first moment of the charge being made against Aziz, Fielding’s 
attitude is that the affair is based on a ‘mistake’ or a ‘blunder’: in other words a muddle. 
His attempts to save Aziz are then founded on methods designed to expose the case 
against him as just that. In ‘Periphrasis, Power and Rape in A Passage to India’, Brenda 
Silver attaches particular significance to the British refusal to name the charge, the victim 
or the accused following the accusation against Aziz. Adela’s ordeal is constantly referred 
to as ‘unspeakable’ while, when inquiring at the club as to Adela’s health, Fielding 
produces, ‘a bad effect, partly because he had pronounced her name; she, like Aziz, was 
always referred to by a periphrasis’ (189). Silver, whose article is a feminist reading 
predominantly concerned with the imposition of white male power over their female and 
colonised subjects, claims that the use of synecdoche reduces to an object the other 
referred to: 'rather than suggesting "relationship" or "connectedness", synecdochal 
representation opens up unbridgeable gaps’.16 Silver’s insight can also be fruitfully 
considered in relation to the synecdochal representation of the crime. For, it is precisely 
the gap created by such representation that the British require for their judicial 
investigation to retain its authority. In the gap remains the sense that a mystery is being 
uncovered, and in it can disappear the notion that all is simply muddle. Fielding’s refusal 
                                                           
15 Welsh, Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England  246. 
16 Brenda R. Silver, "Periphrasis, Power, and Rape in A Passage to India," in E. M. Forster New Casebook 
Series, ed. Jeremy Tambling (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1995), 176. 
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to play along with this is evident when he refers to Adela by name during a tense meeting 
at the club. Silver argues that, in doing so, Fielding attempts to ‘reach her directly’.17 It is 
an element of his more pressing desire, not to reach the crime directly, but to cut 
through its rhetoricity. For Fielding there are too many words, too much muddle. 
Indeed, when it is all over he remarks to Adela: 'my belief is that poor McBryde 
exorcised you. As soon as he asked you a straightforward question, you gave a 
straightforward answer’ (241).    
The fictional investigation of Aziz is a travesty of justice averted at the last 
minute. The reader feels this with acute sensitivity precisely because they have been given 
access to the consciousness of Aziz during the moments in which the assault supposedly 
took place. But Aziz contributes to his own, narrowly avoided, downfall by adding to the 
muddle that points towards his guilt. Upon seeing Adela with Miss Derek, he feels he has 
received the ‘simple and sufficient explanation of the mystery’, yet when he descends the 
Kawa Dol and meets Fielding he lies about the circumstances surrounding Adela’s 
departure:  
 
He did not like to remember Miss Quested’s remark about polygamy, because it 
was unworthy of a guest, so he put it from his mind, and with it the knowledge 
that he had bolted into a cave to get away from her. He was inaccurate because 
he desired to honour her, and – facts being entangles – he had to arrange them in 
her vicinity, as one tidies the ground after extricating a weed (168).  
 
As with his own investigation, the facts, in Aziz’s mind, are arranged around a central 
issue; in this case the rudeness of Adela. The facts themselves are simply ‘entangles’ until 
they are arranged by an organising mind in such a way. But both the arrangements that 
Aziz and McBryde make are organised around a central point that the reader is allowed 
to know is false. There is no mystery as to these matters: the known facts are simply 
muddled.18 
                                                           
17 Ibid., 180. 
18 Jan Melissa-Schramm diverges from Welsh by dating the loss of confidence in circumstantial evidence as 
beginning in the 1820s. She writes that ‘increasingly, jurists came to recognise that the interpretation and 
the arrangement of facts were not completely impartial or objective - that circumstance in fact can "lie"’. 
Schramm’s point here, though, is to emphasis other ways in which ‘credible testimonies’ were established 
in court. As shall be seen, the argument in this chapter is more to do with the significance of ‘incredible 
testimonies’. Jan-Melissa Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature and Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 61. 
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The official investigation of the incident and Aziz’s recounting of it are both 
mysteries which reduce to muddles. But these are only two of the ways in which Forster 
expresses this wide-ranging theme. Adela and Ronny’s relationship, for instance, is 
initially depicted in a way which suggests little in the way of personal compatibility. 
Adela, dimly aware of this, breaks their engagement but, on their journey home later that 
night, their car hits an unidentified animal and a mysterious spark of sexual union is 
hinted at. As they check for tracks of the animal ‘they forgot their abortive personal 
relationship, and felt adventurous as they muddled about in the dust’ (104). While Adela’s 
skirts obfuscate the very tracks they are attempting to view, the muddle of this adventure 
creates the false impression that there is some real connection between them. The fact 
that this is only an illusion is borne out by the pitiful wilting, and eventual death, of their 
relationship following Aziz’s trial.  
Forster wrote to Dickinson that he only attempted the particular trick in the 
caves because his setting was India. In the early part of the novel, this comment could 
easily refer to the enigmatic ‘mystery’ that India formed in the colonial imagination. The 
novel opens with both Mrs Moore and Adela expressing their desire to see the ‘real 
India’ as opposed to the Anglo-India of the club. As Weinstein points out:  
 
the desire "to see India" rehearses a classic premise of Western epistemology: 
that the centred subject - the British I/eye - can measure/comprehend/negotiate 
the object it beholds, even an object the size of India. No matter how foreign the 
object, the centred subject presumes a detached, and accurate, purchase on what 
it sees.19  
 
Despite this belief in the possibilities of experience, knowledge of ‘India’, as a singular 
entity, always remains suspended – the distant Marabar hills, visible from Chandrapore, 
becoming emblematic of a withheld mystery. But, as the novel progresses, the mysterious 
nature of the ‘real India’ is undermined. Ultimately, the novel indicates that there is no 
mystery to India at all. It is, rather, as Fielding characterises it, a muddle: a nebulous 
collection of histories, beliefs, religions and castes none of which can be ‘seen’ at the 
                                                           
19 Philip Weinstein, Unknowing: The Work of Modernist Fiction (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005) 
221. 
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same time.20 As Aziz points out, ‘Nothing embraces the whole of India, nothing, nothing’ 
(156). And the repetition of ‘nothing’ comes to echo throughout the text as every word 
uttered in a Marabar cave is distorted into the ‘ou-boum!’ of an indecipherable echo: ‘if 
one had spoken vileness in that place, or quoted lofty poetry, the comment would have 
been the same - 'ou-boum' (160). Indeed, the mystery of the Marabar, seen from the 
urban setting of Chandrapore, is soon seen to dissipate upon visiting them. For, after 
making a trip to these famed caves ‘the visitor returns to Chandrapore uncertain whether 
he has had an interesting experience or a dull one or any experience at all [...] nothing, 
nothing attaches to them’ (138).  
For Mrs Moore, this nothingness initially comes in the form of a sensory 
disorientation. Upon entering the first cave of their visit, she finds that: ‘crammed with 
villagers and servants, the circular chamber began to smell. She lost Aziz and Adela in the 
dark, didn’t know who touched her, couldn’t breathe [...] there was also a terrifying echo’ 
(158). The effect of the cave on Mrs Moore is instantaneous and dramatic, turning the 
kind-hearted and receptive figure of the early part of the novel into a crotchety and cruel 
old woman. It is the response to a huge disappointment. After visiting the Marabar, Mrs 
Moore finds that ‘the wonderful India of her opening weeks, with its cool nights and 
acceptable hints of infinity, had vanished’ (168). Hints of infinity, the possibility of 
mystery, the spiritual regeneration she had felt the stirrings of, all vanish when she visits 
the caves. This is precisely because the Marabar, which should represent such infinity and 
mystery are, in fact, composed of nothing. Far from unlocking the key to a mystery in the 
caves ‘she [Mrs Moore] had come to that state where the horror of the universe and its 
smallness are both visible at the same time – the twilight of the double vision in which so 
many elderly people are involved [...] But in the twilight of the double vision a spiritual 
muddledom is set up for which no high-sounding words can be found’ (212). The high-
sounding word which had previously sufficed was mystery, but this will no longer do. Mrs 
Moore’s realisation is that there is nothing beyond the muddle of her finite existence and 
that all attempts to commune with a withheld mystery are futile.21 
                                                           
20 This impossibility is mirrored in Howards End: 'It is impossible to see modern life steadily and see it 
whole, and she [Margaret] had chosen to see it whole. Mr Wilcox saw steadily. He never bothered over the 
mysterious or the private’. E. M. Forster, Howards End (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989) 165.  
21 David Shusterman makes a comparison in this respect between Forster’s novel and Ernest 
Hemmingway’s short story 'A Clean, Well-Lighted Place' in which there is a Spanish waiter for whom 
everything is nada. 'For E. M. Forster it was all "ou-boum" in 1924 as for Hemingway later it was all 
"nada”’. Shusterman thinks that Forster’s novel shows that life is either a mystery or muddle – he does not 
think it matters which term is used: 'within this mystery or muddle man is groping for clarity and lasting 
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 The depths of Indian spirituality are also undermined by the way that Mrs 
Moore, after her departure from Chandrapore, becomes a figure with the status of a 
deity. Having been referred to briefly at Aziz’s trial as a positive witness for the defence, 
a mispronunciation of her name, ‘Esmiss Esmoor’, is chanted by the gathered crowd for 
days afterwards. Indeed, even several years later she still retains her hallowed position in 
Aziz’s own mind. He remarks to her son Ralph that she was his ‘best friend in all the 
world’, subsequently pausing and wondering at this peculiar depth of feeling for a 
woman he hardly knew: ‘What did this eternal goodness of Mrs Moore amount to? To 
nothing, if brought to the test of thought’ (306). The hollowness of Mrs Moore in this 
sense is matched by the representation of Hindu beliefs, predominantly illustrated 
through the figure of Professor Godbole. In one of his earliest appearances, Godbole 
sings a song in which he is placed in the position of a milkmaiden who repeatedly asks 
the God Krishna to come to her. When asked if Krishna ever does come to the 
milkmaiden he replies: ‘oh no, he refuses to come’ (96). The absence of the deity is later 
offered by Godbole as an explanation of what happened to Adela. According to his faith, 
acts of good and evil express the whole universe, as both are aspects of God: ‘He is 
present in the one, absent in the other, and the difference between presence and absence 
is great, as great as my feeble mind can grasp. Yet absence implies presence, absence is 
not non-existence, and we are therefore entitled to repeat, “Come, come, come, 
come”’(186).  
For Godbole, the incident in the cave is an exemplification of Krishna’s absence. 
Yet, it is an absence that implies his presence just as mystery implies the presence of an 
absent event that can link the chain of cause and effect. Godbole’s cave thus forms a 
duality like Plato’s, where the shadows of experience imply the presence of a reality 
outside the cave.22 But Adela’s shadows are not like this at all. For her, ‘there was this 
shadow, or sort of shadow, down the entrance tunnel, bottling me up’ (199). These 
shadows, as indistinguishable as the distorted ‘Ou-Boum!’ of the cave’s echo, do not 
refer to anything else. There is no original entity to be discerned. After the collapse of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
peace and lasting connection which, alas, he never achieves. He is trapped in a Marabar cave, and he finds 
there only panic and emptiness'. Shusterman, The Quest for Certitude in E. M. Forster's Fiction  168 & 204.  
22 Weinstein writes that ‘echoing Plato's cave (that other challenge to the individual's epistemological over-
confidence), the scene at Marabar turns suddenly modernist, becoming the epicenter of the novel's 
implosions, the moment at which a gathering mystery (the novel's awareness that what is precious about 
India is beyond policing or commodification) reaches crisis and deflates into muddle (the state in which the 
attempt to pass over has necessarily failed.)’. Weinstein, Unknowing: The Work of Modernist Fiction  221. 
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trial Adela and Fielding discuss the possible experience that had actually occurred. Fielding 
suggests that Adela, suffering from a heat-induced hallucination was ‘alone in that cave 
the whole time’ (240). Whether this is the case or not is actually irrelevant. More 
importantly, it signals the way that the incident, as Adela’s experiential possession, has 
been lost. She is content for Fielding to speak of the supposed event with as great an 
authority as she can, just as she has passively let it become a ‘problem for others’ during 
the course of the investigation and trial.23 Gadamer’s definition that ‘what is experienced 
is always what one has experienced oneself’ is thus drastically undermined, as everyone in 
the novel owns as much of this experience as anyone else.24 But this is only logical, for, 
when it is not a mystery that requires reconstruction but only a muddle that needs 
disentangling, the individual experience no longer matters.  
 
Fictions and Lies 
 
In A Passage to India, the trial of Aziz collapses because Adela cannot produce a definitive 
statement about a prior experience. Without a specific charge, there can be no further 
effort at reconstruction: few would argue that this is an instance in which there is no case 
to answer. Yet, the criminal trial often attempts to reconstruct experiences which are not 
directly recounted – most notably the experience of the suspect, with its attendant 
features of intent and motive. The law in British India, in the latter part of the 
nineteenth-century, had the benefit of clarity on how to proceed in these matters. Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen, in his Introduction to the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, wrote that 
'when it is affirmed that a man has a given intention, the matter affirmed is one which he 
and he only can perceive'. As such:  
 
the approximate rules which relate to human conduct are warranted principally 
by each man's own experience of what passes in his own mind, corroborated by 
his observation of the conduct of other persons, which every one is obliged to 
interpret upon the hypothesis that their mental processes are substantially similar 
to his own.25  
                                                           
23 Ibid.  220. 
24 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Continuum, 2004) 53. 
25 Stephen, The Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872) With an Introduction On The Principles of Judicial Evidence  15 & 31. 
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This description reflects the nineteenth-century reliance on the ‘reasonable man’ 
construct in questions of criminal intent.26 In the Victorian era, ‘courts tried to avoid 
tortuous questions about states of mind. Instead, they relied on commonsense questions 
about what a "reasonable man" would know, feel and do under similar circumstances’.27 
The ‘reasonable man’ also puts in an appearance in the rhetoric surrounding what 
reasonable doubt could mean: ‘proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical 
demonstration, because that is impossible. It means such evidence as would induce a 
reasonable man to come to a conclusion’.28 A useful summation of this constructed 
figure is given by G. F. Arnold:  
 
He is sometimes known as "the reasonable man" or "a reasonable man" 
sometimes as "the man of ordinary prudence", or again he will appear as "the 
man who displays common care and caution" or as "the man of ordinary sense". 
But under these various aliases there is a common feature, namely, that he does 
not correspond to anybody in particular in everyday life, but is rather a type with 
whom everybody may be compared.29  
 
‘The reasonable man’, formed independently of any evidence in a particular case, is the 
embodiment of modern experience: a universal position in which an individual can 
assume other people’s mental processes and perception of the world to be ‘substantially 
similar to his own’. Arnold, a writer markedly up to date in matters of psychology and 
philosophy yet writing in the context of British Indian Law in the early twentieth-century, 
describes the issue of judging another’s intentions in a subtly altered fashion. He writes 
that, when forming a judgment, ‘consciously, sub-consciously or unconsciously, the judge 
or the juryman does in each case when he attempts to apply this test have in his mind a 
concrete individual who is no less person than himself'. Arnold, thus, emphasises a 
                                                           
26 This figure also came in the guise of the ‘responsible individual’. See Martin J. Wiener, Reconstructing the 
Criminal: Culture, law and policy in England, 1830-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
27 Roger Smith, Trial by Medicine: Insanity and Responsibility in Victorian Trials (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1981) 75-6. 
28 Quote from Lord Moulton (Hawkins v. Powells Tilley Co., Ld (L R. [1911] 1 K. B., p. 995) in Walter 
Russell Donogh, Principles of Circumstantial Evidence Applicable to British India, 2nd ed. (Calcutta: Thacker, 
Spink & Co, 1922) 5.  
29 G F Arnold, Psychology Applied to Legal Evidence and other Constructions of Law, 2nd ed. (Calcutta: Thacker, 
Spink & Co, 1913) 239. 
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greater specificity of experience than Stephen’s more universal outlook.30 For Arnold, to 
judge, in practice, is to turn oneself into the accused: judgment is always a self-judgment. 
Lisa Rodensky makes a related point in her analysis of Stephen’s essay on the trial of 
Nuncomar and the involvement of Warren Hastings and Elijah Impey. She writes: 
'Stephen imagines what a reasonable man might have intended when faced with the 
choices Impey and Hastings were making, but the reasonable man looks more like 
Stephen himself'.31 The idea of adopting another’s position is repeated – ‘one is struck by 
the moments in the narrative in which Stephen speaks in the voice of Hastings or Impey' 
– and through this repetition a crucial point is emphasised: Stephen may speak in the 
voice of Hastings and Impey but not once does he adopt the position of Nuncomar.32 
In the context of imperial Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-
centuries this is perhaps unsurprising. Even Arnold’s modern bent of thought betrays a 
fracture when it comes up against the question of native Indians and their testimony. In 
his attack upon the standard of ‘the reasonable man’ he writes:  
 
to seek to apply the same standard at all stages of development is to attempt the 
impossible: for no sane person can neglect the differences of temperament and 
race, and can really believe that the average Burman can be bracketed side by side 
with the average Englishman, and the same reason and prudence demanded from 
each on every occasion.33  
 
The native of India was thus seen to occupy a place outwith the realm in which standards 
of ‘reasonableness’ could be assumed. 34 The construct of the ‘reasonable man’ was, 
                                                           
30 Ibid.  247. 
31 Lisa Rodensky, The Crime in Mind: Criminal Responsibility and The Victorian Novel (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 178-79. 
32 Ibid. 206. Rodensky also analyses an essay by Keshub Chandra Achyrya, commenting that, 'Achyrya 
objects when Stephen interprets the external circumstances of the trial as if the trial could be fair, but a trial 
of an Indian in a colonial territory is necessarily unfair. Acharya's objection to Stephen recalls Peter 
Brooks's analysis of the Supreme Court's rulings on the admissibility of confessions. Acharya implicitly 
contests the way Stephen's colonialist discourse tells the legal event - Nunocmar's trial and execution. 
Brooks argues that the United States Supreme Court creates a story about voluntariness and 
involuntariness of confessions by invoking a context within which the confession takes place’. Ibid. 209.  
33 Arnold, Psychology Applied to Legal Evidence and other Constructions of Law  257. 
34 Of course the British were guilty of thinking themselves a superior race to the Indians and it cannot be 
denied that this was the reason they felt a universal standard such as reason could not be applied to the 
natives. However, more recent thinking on the cultural/historical rootedness of ‘reason’ in a tradition of 
the Western Enlightenment (ie. not a universal entity that existed in its own right) does shed a different 
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therefore, of no assistance in forming a judgment, as the inner world of the native 
represented an inexperiencable position. Within the context of trial judgment in British 
India, new methods had to be found in order to reach the criminal. No longer able to 
rely on a sense of shared experience, magistrates were entreated to perform radical acts 
of willed imagination. Arnold, for instance, writes that, in India, a judge must: 
 
search in his own mental life for analogies which will enable him to construct in 
imagination the different mental life of those around him [...] If he can succeed in 
doing this, actions which would otherwise appear to him extraordinary and 
motiveless, will be explained and seem natural while if through want of 
imagination he fails to do it, he will needlessly suspect everything that is told him, 
and will be forced to account for every event by supposing some deep motive 
which has not come to light.35  
 
Arnold further comments that, in forming judgments, 'if imagination is the most 
important quality, prejudice is perhaps the worst impediment'.36 Yet this clarity of 
language belies the conflation of concepts contained within it. Rather than being separate 
entities, the interplay of imagination and prejudice is clearly evident in the numerous 
classifications of Indian criminality made throughout colonial rule. A prominent example 
of this drive towards classification can be seen in the identification of criminal gangs, 
such as thags, who were believed to roam the highways, strangling and robbing their 
victims.37 Those guilty of robbery were identified as thags by their criminal method as well 
as their use of ‘a secret code of expressions, words, and signals’.38 This information was 
                                                                                                                                                                      
light on the matter. In fact, the standard of the reasonable man was dropped by Indian law after 
Independence, in 1962 to be precise, as it was felt the diversity of social and cultural life in the country 
meant that the construction of a single figure to cover all its inhabitant was an impossible enterprise. See 
The Indian Law Institute, Essays on the Indian Penal Code: Published on the Occasion of the Centenary of the Indian 
Penal Code (Bombay: N. M. Tripathi Private Ltd, 1962) 158. 
35 Arnold, Psychology Applied to Legal Evidence and other Constructions of Law  367. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Thags were just one of several groups identified. Bernard S. Cohn notes that in the British perception 
there 'were people who appeared by their nature to wander beyond the boundaries of settled civil society: 
sannyasis, sadhurs, fakirs, dacoits, goondas, thags, pastoralists, herders, and entertainers. The British 
constructed special instrumentalities to control those defined as beyond civil bounds, and carried out 
special investigations to provide the criteria by which whole groups would be stigmatized as criminal'. 
Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996) 10. 
38 H. L. Adam, The Indian Criminal (London: John Milne, 1909) 202. 
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collected by the British authorities from the evidence of ‘approvers’ or, as they would be 
termed in Britain, those turning Queens evidence.39 According to H L Adam, writing in 
1909, ‘by this means, and by no other means, it was possible to obtain such inner 
knowledge of the vast and subtle ramifications of the many criminal fraternities which 
had existed there from time immemorial'.40 Such knowledge could then be assimilated 
and organised into a structure of understanding in which the British saw ‘that a vast 
amount of crime committed in India is hereditary, and has been so for generations upon 
generations. Thus the natives guilty of such deeds do not imagine that they are 
committing any heinous offence, inasmuch as it is a natural result of their birth'.41 
In fact, this conception of a criminal fraternity of thags was nothing more than a 
figment of the British colonial imagination. As Thomas Metcalf writes, 'thagi was never a 
coherent set of practices, nor could thags easily be differentiated from other armed 
robbers, who were known more generally as dacoits’.42 By creating a loosely defined 
criminal gang, membership of which was an offence, the British authorities facilitated a 
greater ease in arresting, and hence controlling, the native population.43 What had been a 
dimly sensed anxiety of Indian otherness became a unit of classification within a definite 
system of knowledge and ‘the narrative of mystery unveiled and mastered caught the 
imagination of the British public'.44 But, the method by which knowledge of thag practice 
was supposedly built up exemplifies the ignorance that motivated its creation. As 
evidence was gleaned exclusively from ‘approvers’ it suggested ‘the inability of the Raj to 
                                                           
39 On the evidence of approvers see Ameer Syed Ali & John George Woodroffe, The Law of Evidence 
Applicable in British India (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co, 1898) 806-813. 
40 Ibid. 277. 
41 Ibid., 11. 
42 Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, The New Cambridge History of India (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) 41. 
43 In the mid-nineteenth-century the British wanted to include poisoning in their definition of thagi, which 
was originally restricted to murderers by strangulation. 'Consequently, Act III of 1848 defined the term 
"Thag", as a "person who is, or has at any time been habitually associated with any other or others for the 
purpose of committing by means intended by such person or known by such person to be likely to cause 
the death of any person, the offence of childstealing or the offence of robbery not amounting to dacoity". 
The word Thagi was defined as "the offence of committing or attempting any such child-stealing or 
robbery by a 'Thug'". And "Murder by Thuggee" was explained as the "Murder when employed as the means 
of committing such child-stealing or such robbery by a Thug"'. The circularity of these definitions is blatant 
– a thag is defined as doing thag acts; thag acts are defined as being done by thags. Institute, Essays on the 
Indian Penal Code: Published on the Occasion of the Centenary of the Indian Penal Code  25.  
44 Radhika Singha, A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India (Oxford: Oxfrd University 
Press, 1998) 203. 
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make use of testimony from supposedly disinterested witnesses and victims’.45 One of 
the foundations of the modern reconstructive trial was thus undermined. The collection 
of disinterested information, a fundamental tenet of modern science (with its basis in the 
modern concept of experience) was replaced by self-interested testimony that told the 
authorities what they wanted to hear.46 As Metcalf writes, rather than offering an account 
of any kind of experience, whether British or Indian:  
 
What gave thagi its distinctive appeal was rather the way it enabled the British to 
give voice to their own enduring fears and anxieties. Uneasily dependent upon 
native intermediaries, whom they could not bring themselves to trust, but 
without whose collaboration the Raj could not function, the British saw 
deception and deceit everywhere in India. Thagi thus became a metaphor for the 
representation of what they feared most in India, the inability to know and 
control their colonial subjects.47 
 
The inability to know their colonial subjects and the perceived deception and deceit of 
the natives was nowhere felt so forcefully as in the law courts. Quite apart from the 
identification of thags, the administration of justice was widely thought to be undermined 
by rampant perjury. Adam writes:  
 
one of the most difficult tasks European officials, new to their posts, have to deal 
with is the sifting of evidence, in order to separate the truth from that which is 
rank mendacity. Experience, of course, renders this task lighter, and in time a 
magistrate is able, by familiarity with the idiosyncrasies of his subjects, to tell 
them at once when a native is endeavouring to "trim" his evidence.48  
 
Adam clings on to a certain sense of experience here, as the guide to understanding and 
assessing witness testimony. Stephen, too, thought that 'the natural and acquired 
shrewdness and experience by which an observant man forms an opinion as to whether a 
                                                           
45 Sandra Freitag, "Collective Crime and Authority in North India," in Crime and Criminality in British India, 
ed. Anand A. Yang (Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1985), 150. 
46 Ibid., 151. 
47 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj  41. 
48 Adam, The Indian Criminal  14. 
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witness is or is not lying, is by far the most important of all a judge's qualifications'.49 Yet, 
whereas in England the oath was still seen as enforcing a truthfulness in which false 
testimony was the exception rather than the rule, and so the goal of reactualizing an 
original experience could remain a dominant assumption, in India the situation was 
reversed.50 Many judges and magistrates became convinced that perjury was the norm in 
their courtrooms, leading to crippling doubt over the judgments they made, and so to the 
practicality of the rule of law.51 The native who lied became a symbol not just of British 
superiority but of colonial anxiety: for, despite the physical control exerted on the 
population, a lack of veracity from witnesses took actions, events and the natives 
themselves, beyond the understanding of the British authorities.52  Yet, that lack of 
understanding, linked to the sense of native deceit, fed back into the British conception 
of themselves as morally superior, and therefore the justified rulers of the country.53  
Such an interplay of superiority and anxiety had a long history, announced by 
Cornwallis: ‘Every native of Hindustan, I verily believe, is corrupt’.54 With such a 
standard set it is hardly surprising that a significant proportion of judges and magistrates 
found their own courts ‘corrupted’ by native testimony. A typical opinion was voiced by 
a magistrate from Bahar in 1801: 'In short, to speak my mind without reserve, this crime 
[perjury] is so common and audacious, that it has excited in me the most complete 
scepticism with respect to all evidence which is offered and I seldom pass a judgment, 
without having cause to doubt if I have not been imposed upon'.55 Wendie Ellen 
                                                           
49 Stephen, The Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872) With an Introduction On The Principles of Judicial Evidence  41. 
50 The belief in the trial’s capacity to find truth was so great even false testimony was thought to be of 
value. Stephen wrote in 1863 that, in Britain, ‘though it may be expected that particular classes of witnesses 
will not always tell the truth, yet their testimony will have some sort of relation to it, from which it may be 
inferred what the truth really is [...] In other words, evidence, whether true or false, is almost always 
instructive and ought therefore to be given in all cases for what it is worth’. Thus, even lies can be 
assimilated into a story of truth when truth is assumed to be dominant. When lies are dominant this no 
longer applies. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A General View of the Criminal Law of England (London ; 
Cambridge: Macmillan and Co, 1863) 284. 
51 Wendie Ellen Schneider writes that 'perjury loomed large in the colonial imagination because of the 
British conviction of its prevalence. British administrators in India tended to see most, if not all, witnesses 
as likely perjurers'. Wendie Ellen Schneider, ""Enfeebling the Arms of Justice": Perjury and Prevarication 
in British India," in Modern Histories of Crime and Punishment, ed. Markus D. Dubber and Lindsay Farmer 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 300. 
52 See Jorg Fisch, Cheap Lives and Dear Limbs: The British Transformation of the Bengal Criminal Law 1769-1817 
(Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1983) 80. 
53 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj  24. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Schneider, ""Enfeebling the Arms of Justice": Perjury and Prevarication in British India," 303. See also 
Elizabeth Kolsky, who quotes from George Barker's memoir A Tea Planter's Life in Assam: 'the sahib acts as 
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Schneider has charted the various attempts to combat perjury made by the British in the 
nineteenth-century, commenting that by 1860, and the introduction of the penal code:  
 
Justice in many cases had become a quixotic attempt to discern which of the 
parties was honest, not who had the better case. Disturbingly, judges confronted 
with the same case could come to radically different assessments of the credibility 
of witnesses. More than half a century of attempts to control perjury through 
legal innovations had led not to more efficient application of the law, but to the 
creation of a cadre of judges ruling on the basis of the perceived mendacity of 
witnesses.56 
  
Just as with the fabrication of thagi, the British preoccupation with perjury relied on their 
own ‘colonizing’ of Indian criminal justice. The structures of an enforced, alien, system, 
were not properly understood by the native population. The imposition of a foreign 
system of law in a colonial situation also did not render the indigenous people 
sympathetic to British justice. There was, therefore, a degree of perjury that was 
attributable both to a lack of understanding of the system and to a wilful undermining of 
that system by the Indian population.57 More importantly, the imposition of British legal 
procedures wiped out traditional methods of fact-finding. In eighteenth-century India, 
testimony would be given in courts by a succession of local authorities such as local 
elders, religious scholars, legal experts and the like.58 The veracity of such testimony was 
never in question. By subjecting such figures to a procedure in which they had to swear 
an oath (even when the Christian connotation was divorced from such a procedure) the 
British courts ‘implied that their status by itself did not give sufficient credit to their 
deposition'.59 This undermining of testimony began prior to rule by the Crown and the 
acts of codification. While under the rule of the East India Company, the ancient Muslim 
                                                                                                                                                                      
judge and jury, and often sits in judgment, listening to the evidence brought forward [...] It is impossible to 
believe one word that a native utters in an affair of this kind'. Elizabeth Kolsky, "Crime and Punishment 
on the Tea Plantations of Colonial India," in Modern Histories of Crime and Punishment, ed. Markus D. Dubber 
and Lindsay Farmer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 289.       
56 Schneider, ""Enfeebling the Arms of Justice": Perjury and Prevarication in British India," 326. 
57 Michael Edwardes writes that 'justice could be distorted. An alien system, based as it was on alien moral 
concepts, was bound to suffer in a society which gave general acceptance to very few of those concepts. 
Perjury. for example, was not thought to be particularly reprehensible’. Michael Edwardes, British India 
1772-1947: A Survey of the Nature and Effects of Alien Rule (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1967) 210. 
58 Singha, A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India  46. 
59 Ibid.        
74 
 
and Hindu laws that the Indian population had traditionally lived under were supposed 
to remain in force. An uneasy alliance therefore had to be struck between young British 
magistrates who looked to English case law and the rules of evidence for their practice 
and Muslim and Hindu scholars well versed in their own respective legal precedents. In 
theory, the magistrate was to be in charge of determining the facts, while the Maulavi and 
Pandit were responsible for ruling on the applicable law.60 In practice, however, 
magistrates sought to apply British justice by whatever means possible. To get the 
decisions they wanted, aspects of Hindu and Islamic law which became awkward, such as 
particular witnesses not being considered worthy due to class or age, had to be 
circumvented. In Islamic law, rules governing the level of evidence required for a 
conviction and the severity of punishment to be handed down were established by the 
fatwa in which the crime itself was stated. For ‘British’ justice to be executed the fatwa, 
therefore, had to produce the outcome that the magistrates deemed the crime to merit, 
rather than match the specific facts of the case. As Jorg Fisch writes:  
 
from a formal point of view, not a new system of law was built up, but a system 
of fictions which transformed real cases into fictitious ones, so that the outcome, 
the fatwa of the law officers, although given according to the traditional Islamic 
law, corresponded to the expectations and wishes of the British. Because the laws 
could not be changed, the facts to which they applied were changed - the 
outcome was the same.61 
 
That trials in India came to be based on ‘fictitious constructions’ was openly 
acknowledged by Thomas Macaulay. Indeed it was one of the pre-eminent arguments he 
made for the institution of a penal code which would automatically do away with such 
procedure. In Macaulay’s covering letter to the draft Indian penal code of 1837 he wrote 
that ‘Nothing is more usual than for the courts to ask the law officers what punishment 
the Mohammedan law prescribed in a hypothetical case, and then to inflict that 
punishment on a person who is not within that hypothetical case and who by the 
Mohammedan law would be liable either to a different punishment or no punishment’.62 
                                                           
60 It will be noted that a similar distinction exists in the common law jury trial, where the judge is deemed 
the authority on the law, while the jury are to be the arbiters of the facts. 
61 Fisch, Cheap Lives and Dear Limbs: The British Transformation of the Bengal Criminal Law 1769-1817  46.  
62 Ibid. 113. 
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The eventual instituting of the penal code may have offered a greater clarity over 
the charges laid, but the practices of the police remained unaltered. Cases were regularly 
‘padded with false evidence’ in order to ensure convictions.63 T C Arthur’s Reminiscences of 
an Indian Police Official (1894) offers a rare insight into the practice of investigating crime 
in late nineteenth-century India: 
 
A very rough-and-ready investigation ordinarily suffices to bring home his guilt 
to the average Indian criminal. As a matter of fact, the commoner offences - 
murders, manslaughters, and thefts - have usually been traced to the perpetrators 
before the constable makes his appearance, and he finds that the patel (or head 
man) and the humble mhar (village watchman) have already got the offender in 
custody. It only remains for the constable to get the case into order and to supply 
- which he is very ingenious in doing - any gaps in the chain of evidence. After 
this it runs the usual monotonous course - to the nearest Magistrate or to the 
Sessions, as the case may be.64  
 
The police official is required to fill in any ‘gaps in the chain of evidence’, thus reducing 
the mysterious to the logical. But it is in the service of a ‘fictitious construction’ that 
events, states of mind, and circumstances are posited which can fill those gaps. Arthur, 
on a chapter specifically relating to perjury and forgery, goes on to write that:  
 
I am afraid I must declare my belief that “tutoring” is commonly resorted to in 
India. Good cases are often broken down by being bolstered up, in what the 
police imagine are weak points, by false usually, (sic) unnecessary evidence. Bad 
cases are often supported by false evidence so cleverly connected that the 
innocent are not infrequently found guilty.65 
 
Ironically, the British, according to Arthur, were responsible for much of the perjury 
which they then became intensely anxious about, as it was in the need to create a 
                                                           
63 Freitag, "Collective Crime and Authority in North India," 149. 
64 T. C. Arthur, Reminiscences of an Indian Police Official (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1894) iv. 
See also, Leonard Woolf’s description of a set-up court case in The Village in the Jungle where the Head Man 
conspires to frame Silindu and Babun by creating a story for the British judicial authorities. Leonard Woolf, 
The Village in the Jungle (London: Eland, 2005). 
65Arthur, Reminiscences of an Indian Police Official  99-100.  
76 
 
connected story that the veracity of testimony was allowed a subservient role. The desire 
for ‘strong representations’ thus helped to create a situation in which trial representations 
became extremely weak. With the very real conviction that both sides in a case were 
lying, many magistrates and judges were left in a position where uncovering truth, solving 
mystery, and telling the real story had become impossible. Just like the attempts to reach 
Adela’s experience in A Passage to India, the trial in British India had become a muddle of 
confused language only: the flood of deceitful words that indicated nothing in a trial 
mirroring the distortion of any words, true or false, into the indecipherable ‘Ou-Boum!’ 
of a Marabar echo.  
 
Prejudice and Doubt 
 
The anxiety about perjury that circulated amongst the British judiciary in India existed 
right up until the time of A Passage to India. Ronny Heaslop, the court magistrate who is 
engaged to Adela Quested, is emblematic of this fear as he claims to have seen a very 
different side to the natives than the one presented to his fiancée and mother:  
 
Every day he worked hard in the court trying to decide which of two untrue 
accounts was the less untrue, trying to dispense justice fearlessly, to protect the 
weak against the less weak, the incoherent against the plausible, surrounded by 
lies and flattery. That morning he had convicted a railway clerk of overcharging 
pilgrims for their tickets, and a Pathan of attempted rape. He expected no 
gratitude, no recognition for this, and both clerk and Pathan might appeal, bribe 
their witnesses more effectually in the interval and get their sentences reversed 
(69).  
 
In the Introduction, the development of a coherence, as opposed to correspondence, 
theory of truth in the study of the common law trial, was commented upon. While, 
theoretically, this did not occur until the mid to late twentieth-century it is precisely this 
movement in which Ronny finds himself caught. He genuinely wants to dispense justice 
in his court, to deliver verdicts based on a true reflection of events. As such, the 
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incoherent may correspond to the truth to a greater degree than the plausible.66 But, 
Ronny is also uneasily aware of the fact that coherence is all he has to go on. The 
individuals he has convicted that day ‘might appeal, bribe their witnesses more effectually 
in the interval and get their sentences reversed’. These new explanations will not 
correspond to a prior truth in any way. They will simply offer a more coherent account 
which will, Ronny fears, guarantee their acquittal. The sense that his judgment can 
accurately reflect the past event – the prior experience – in question is therefore 
beginning to be lost. But, what made this such a source of anxiety for British magistrates 
was the fact that both sides in a case were capable of bribing their witnesses effectually. 
The problem was, paradoxically, one of too much coherence rather than too little. How 
could judgment be made in the face of this perceived mendacity? How could a court 
decide on truth when the narratives produced in court were both coherent and 
incredible? 
In the investigation of Aziz in A Passage to India, the authorities see no such 
problem. Aziz, as a native, will lie, while Adela, as a British subject, will tell the truth. In a 
simplistic reading of the novel, this prejudice of the Anglo-Indians towards their colonial 
subjects is what convinces them of Aziz’s guilt while those lacking in prejudice, like 
Fielding and Mrs Moore, are able to perceive his innocence. But this reading ignores the 
prejudicial stance that is also immediately taken up in favour of Aziz by both Fielding 
and Mrs Moore. Shortly after Aziz’s arrest, Fielding has a discussion with the Collector, 
Turton, in which their opposing views become clear: ‘it is impossible to regard a tragedy 
from two points of view and, whereas Turton had decided to avenge the girl he [Fielding] 
hoped to save the man’ (174). In the subsequent gathering of evidence by both sides it is 
these diametrically opposed views that form the starting point of all inquiry. There is no 
neutrality, only presuppositions. When Adela’s field-glasses are discovered upon Aziz 
‘the logic of evidence said “Guilty”’, but this could only show guilt if there was already an 
expectation as to what its discovery would prove (176). When Fielding is told of this 
find, for instance, his response is that ‘it’s impossible that, having attempted to assault 
her, he would put her glasses in his pocket’ (177). Fielding is seen to be fair-minded – ‘he 
was still after facts, though the herd had decided on emotion’ – when he is, in truth, just 
as prejudiced as the Anglo-Indians (174). Aziz’s lie about Adela’s initial disappearance, 
his attempt to run away when charged and his possession of Adela’s field-glasses are not 
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even considered by Fielding as possible evidence of his guilt. On the contrary, 'Aziz was 
innocent, and all action must be based on that’ (181). The trial in A Passage to India is 
therefore a competition of reinforced prejudices (or pre-judgments). Its impotence as a 
means of discovering the truth, a fear that arose in the context of belief in widespread 
perjury, also has the effect of nullifying any sense of closure which a verdict is supposed 
to bring. It can hardly be doubted that Fielding, and the rest of Aziz’s supporters, would 
continue to believe in his innocence no matter what the outcome of the trial just as, 
following the collapse of the case, the majority of Anglo-Indians ‘still believed he [Aziz] 
was guilty, they believed it to the end of their careers’ (259).67  
The nullity of the opposing view, in which impartiality and doubt are the starting 
point of inquiry, is summed up by Professor Godbole. He greets the news of Aziz’s 
arrest with a tranquil calm and refuses to state an opinion on his guilt or innocence. 
Rather, when asked by Fielding for a judgment, he replies: 'That is for the court to 
decide. The verdict will be in strict accordance with the evidence, I make no doubt' (185). 
Godbole is the one character who remains neutral: he represents true impartiality. Yet, as 
in his song of the milkmaiden, Godbole’s stance ends in a position of absence, from 
which presence is merely implied. Godbole, starting from this initial point of indecision, 
will never make the leap to a position of knowledge about what happened. Fielding’s 
attitude, on the other hand, is evident from his reply: 'I know he didn't, and from that I 
start. I mean to get at the true explanation in a couple of days’ (185). 
Forster’s point is not the truism that bias influences judgment. Nor is it the 
necessarily pessimistic view that would attach to his depiction if it were of a mystery: 
which would indicate that truth and knowledge are beyond humanity’s grasp. Rather, he 
is suggesting that knowledge is not discovered but produced, and that this production 
must always begin with a prior sense of what truth is to be fashioned. Developments 
made in both Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy of the time mirror this insight. 
Charles Sanders Peirce, writing in the late nineteenth-century, argued that 'we cannot 
begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have 
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when we enter upon the study of philosophy’.68 More contemporaneously with Forster, 
Heidegger proposed the concept of fore-understanding in epistemological matters – one 
of the fundamental inspirations for Gadamer’s project of philosophical hermeneutics.69 A 
later emanation of Wittgenstein’s thought also stresses a similarly anti-Cartesian response 
to the problem of judgment: ‘somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, 
so to speak, hasty but excusable; it is part of judging’.70 These notions are, of course, in 
stark contrast to the Enlightenment principles that were seen to underpin the realist 
novel and modern day trial. As Gadamer put it ‘the fundmental prejudice of the 
Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself’.71 
 Of these philosophical schools, the connection between Forster’s writing and a 
form of pragmatism is most obvious. In another letter to Dickinson, this time while 
staying with the Maharajah of Chhatarpur, he relates a story about a correspondence the 
Maharajah had entered into with Bertrand Russell. In what turned into a lengthy 
philosophical debate the Maharajah, according to Forster, had been left ‘in a tight hole’. 
Not, it turned out, a drastic problem as ‘every Indian hole has at least two exits’.72 In his 
letter, Forster then immediately proceeds with an analysis of Dickinson’s latest novel The 
Magic Flute, in which he discerns a pragmatist influence. An overlap, or compatibility, 
between Indian life and pragmatist philosophy is thus stressed. Forster’s idea that ‘every 
Indian hole has at least two exits’ is, in this sense, similar to James’ attack on the ‘ideal 
vanishing-point’ of absolute truth which ‘runs on all fours with the perfectly wise man, 
and with the absolutely complete experience; and, if these ideals are ever realised, they 
will all be realised together’.73 By contrast, the truth that is attainable in pragmatism is 
akin to a temporary belief which can be placed in a pleasing and practically worthwhile 
relation with other beliefs. As such, and as William James points out, 'the greatest enemy 
of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths’.74 So, while the Maharajah, in his 
tight hole, cannot simply discard all the truths to which he holds, it must be recognised 
that there is more than one way to organise their relationship. Experience, here, is not in 
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the world, but rather, toward it, and it can be arranged in a variety of ways. The pragmatist 
position thus offers a striking challenge to the modern experience that was defined in the 
previous chapter, in which the inability to control experience is precisely what gives it its 
truth value. Doubt, in this epistemology, works as a starting point because experience can 
be relied upon to provide truth. But, according to Peirce, any ‘initial scepticism will be a 
mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method 
will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he 
has given up’.75  
At some point, trust has to be made in something. In the case of a trial in British 
India, the judge must decide to trust one of the witnesses (a belief that could be based on 
any number of prejudicial assumptions). The trial in A Passage to India is a case in which 
this trust is given on the basis of blatant racial prejudice, but this only dramatises what 
must always be the case: no judgment can be made without pre-judgment. Despite 
commenting on the functioning of prejudice in this sense, Forster himself was accused of 
a distorting bias by both British and Indian readers of A Passage to India.76 A particularly 
strong rebuke came in a public letter by E A Horne (who had served in the Indian 
education service). Forster’s response was published in New Statesmen on 16 August 1924. 
On specific points over which he was accused of being partisan he wrote:  
 
but even if I made these and similar changes, you still wouldn't feel the Anglo-
Indian picture fair. The facts might be right, but the accent would remain, and 
how on earth is one to do away with one's accent? I tried, but knew I'd failed [...] 
you have hit the nail on the head. I don't like Anglo-Indians as a class. I tried to 
suppress this and be fair to them, but my lack of sympathy came through. You 
say I don't like them because I don't really know them. But how can I ever like 
them when I happen to like the Indians and they don't? They don't (this part of 
my picture you do not challenge) - so what am I to do? Sympathy is finite - at 
least mine is, alas [...] That is why I feel your letter so fair and so unfair at the 
same time. You say that I am always prejudiced and frequently preposterous - 
quite right, I am (if by prejudice you mean honest prejudice, blindness temporary 
or congenital, and I think you do). But you haven't seen that this lack of balance 
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is inherent in the Indian tangle, and that if I got the Club sympathetically true, 
Aziz's shanty would ring false and no longer move you.77 
  
What Forster eschews here is the position of disinterested witnessing that informed so 
much of the realist narration of ‘facts’. In writing of India, he has been forced to pick a 
side and make it ‘sympathetically true’ while, in doing so, he has allowed the other side to 
‘ring false’. But there is no other way. The view from nowhere is a view of nothing. The 
‘Indian tangle’ is, therefore, the site of Forster’s leap into modernism because it 
exemplifies this new facet of the modern world: there is no truth, only truths which are 
neither commensurable nor communicable. The novel itself expresses this idea with an 
array of misunderstanding and misinterpretation between the British and Indian 
communities.78 
But there is a still deeper prejudice hinted at here. In the uncertainty surrounding 
the incident at the Marabar one thing seems to be certain: Aziz is innocent. As suggested 
earlier, this is because the reader is given access to Aziz’s consciousness at the time of the 
supposed assault. As Elizabeth Heine puts it, 'By all the rules of "old-fashioned" fiction, 
the reader provides Aziz's alibi, joining him as he smokes a cigarette in one cave while 
whatever happens to Miss Quested happens in another’.79 While Chapter Twenty-Five 
concludes with the possibility that Adela has followed Aziz into the same cave, crucially, 
the next chapter begins with Aziz alone: ‘he waited in his cave a minute, and lit a 
cigarette so that he could remark on rejoining her, “I bolted in to get out of the draught,” 
or something of the sort’ (164). The reader is then given access to Aziz’s thoughts as he 
emerges from the cave, his panic over Adela’s disappearance, and his relief upon seeing 
her with Miss Derek. These thoughts not only fail to contain any reference to assaulting 
Adela, they are incompatible with him having committed that act.  
In a notebook that he kept prior to his Aspects of the Novel lecture series, Forster, 
musing over the shifts made by some authors between omniscience and a restricted 
viewpoint, asked himself the question: ‘why is it right to deceive the readers in some ways 
and not in others’.80 In the final draft a definitive response was given: ‘questions like 
these have too much the atmosphere of the law courts about them. All that matters to 
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the reader is whether the shifting attitude and the secret life are convincing’.81 While the 
withdrawal of omniscience from Adela’s cave was thus justified, the factual basis of what 
an omniscient narrator reports is still sacrosanct. In other words, it would be an 
unacceptable deception to narrate Aziz’s definitive innocence if he was actually guilty. 
This, for the reader, is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But what this rests on is an 
implicit belief in the narrator – an accepted prejudice that, while he may not impart the 
whole truth, he will not tell any blatant lies. So, just as the majority of the Anglo-Indians 
believe Adela’s accusation without any proof, so too the reader believes the narrator even 
though Aziz’s lies and attempt to run away make him look guilty. By highlighting this 
prejudice at play in novel reading itself, Forster is running dangerously close to a position 
in which the narrator, like the witness in an Indian court, could be perceived as someone 
to be mistrusted – someone who will not report an experience but fabricate a scene. But 
this is, of course, what a novelist does: fabricate scenes. What was changing in the early 
twentieth-century, and what the Marabar episode hints at, is the way in which those 
scenes refer to their own fabrication. What was being lost, in both the novel and the trial 
in British India, was the sense that they referred to anything other than their own forms 
of representation. The experience that should have been at their heart was disappearing. 
 
Theories and Codes 
 
In the practical action of a criminal trial in British India and in the last novel of E M 
Forster, there is a dissolution of the central axis. In the Indian courts, the sense of a real 
crime which the trial judgment can coincide with is being lost behind a flood of deceitful 
language while in A Passage to India the plot is based around a blank point in the story. In 
both instances, experience, in its modern guise, is being undermined. There is no 
experience to which these different forms of representation refer – rather, there is only 
the representations themselves, to be disentangled in a way that suits the prejudicial 
beginning of understanding held by the reader and writer. As such, representation attains to 
a more elevated status in epistemological matters. But this, in turn, calls for limitations as, 
when representation is all there is, it becomes even more important to control what it can 
look like: the belief being that in the precise control of representation, aesthetic 
experience and judicial decision-making can be safeguarded. It is just such projects that 
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Forster, responding to his own novel, and Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, responding to 
the ‘vices of vagueness’ in the Indian legal system, embarked upon.82 
In Forster’s case the site of such an effort was his theoretical work, Aspects of the 
Novel. Yet, just as his authorial freedom had required a forceful willing into submission 
for the scene in the Marabar cave to remain blurred, so too his artistic spirit rails against 
the controlling form of theory. Forster, in employing a conversational tone, attempts to 
distance himself from bold methodological statements. Indeed, the introductory lecture 
of the series is more a denial of method than a statement of one. The aspects themselves 
are formed neither directly from philosophical first principles, nor built upon a 
chronological understanding of literary history. It is, rather, from an a-historical 
interpretation of his own reading that Forster forms the structure of his aspects: ‘by 
imagining that all the novelists are at work together in a circular room’.83 The novel is to 
be attacked not ‘with any elaborate apparatus. Principles and systems may suit other 
forms of art, but they cannot be applicable here’.84  Indeed, the very title of Aspects of the 
Novel is used ‘because it is unscientific and vague, because it leaves the maximum of 
freedom’.85 Forster did recognize that a ‘vantage-post’ was required in order to assess the 
‘amorphous’ mass of the novel. This position, however, was only to be based upon a 
partiality for certain novels which was ultimately to be measured by the ‘human heart’: 
‘the final test of a novel will be our affection for it’.86  
These gestures towards informality and vagueness obscure another Forster – one 
who has a deep and quite stringent sense of novelistic form. Some years later he would 
famously declare the work of art to be ‘the one orderly product which our muddling race 
has produced'.87 The first sentence of the first lecture in Aspects of the Novel also begins: 
‘we shall all agree that the fundamental aspect of the novel is its story-telling aspect’. A 
rhetoric of fundamentals is thus immediately established. The ‘aspects’ of Aspects of the 
Novel are, in fact, the principles of just such an ‘orderly product’ and affection for the 
novel, far from being the final test, is, in fact, the initial test that motivates further 
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analysis. In other words, it is from examining the novels that Forster considers most 
successful (an initially intuitive judgment) that he is able to form the ‘aspects’ he 
considers most important. There is a thin line, however, between the important and the 
essential and the ‘aspects’ soon come to look more like the latter, taking on a form of 
rules or laws. These rules are given the clarity and authority of philosophical first 
principles but they are not the product of abstract thought. Rather, Forster is attempting 
to uncover principles and values that are deemed to have always governed the novel 
though they have, up until then, been clouded by obscurity and only vaguely understood. 
His project, in Aspects of the Novel, is, thus, to codify the laws of the novel.  
This work was undertaken just two years after the publication of A Passage to 
India: a novel placed in a cultural context deeply imbued with a history of legal 
codification. The initial period of expropriation to Company rule in India, dating from 
the late eighteenth-century onwards, was characterised by the organization of systems of 
courts and the gradual institution of legislation. A distinct change occurred around 1860 
when a period of extensive codification began in which the system of courts was 
rationalised and the sources of law fixed.88 It will be noticed from this historical analysis 
that the second stage begins shortly after the Mutiny of 1857 and the subsequent control 
of government in India moving from the East India Company to the Crown. Macaulay 
had in fact written the Draft Penal Code in 1833; its enactment with only minor 
alterations in 1862 would suggest that the theoretical preservation of Hindu and Islamic 
law (theoretical because it had already been gradually eroded through the work of judges 
and magistrates who looked to English case law for guidance and precedents) was 
something that could be thrown off more easily when the crisis of mutiny was so fresh in 
the memory.89 
It was due, also, to the legal climate in Britain itself. Eric Stokes writes that 'in 
England law reform was under way, although it went forward in halting and piecemeal 
fashion. Reform progressed more quickly in India but it may be regarded as part of the 
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same movement'.90 The roots of such reform are to be found in the philosophy of 
Utilitarianism; roots that Stokes argues were most forcefully expressed to practical 
purpose by Macaulay, whose code was the enactment of Benthamite principles: ‘a code 
of law drawn not from existing practice or from foreign law systems, but created ex nihilo 
by the disinterested philosophic intelligence’.91 What this disinterested intelligence dealt 
in, however, was far from an idealist abstraction. According to K J M Smith, the 
fundamental attraction of Benthamism was its "reverence for facts" - its belief that the 
source of knowledge was observation and the systematic appeal to experience'.92 While 
Stokes argues that the later codes failed to live up to this noble beginning, in the work of 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen a weaving of utilitarianism and the common law took place. 
Stephen claimed himself a follower of Bentham, but he was also loyal to the traditions of 
case law. He saw the goal of legal codification in India as ‘the reduction for the first time, 
to a definite written form, of law, which had previously been unwritten, or written only 
in an unauthoritative form, such as that of text-books and reported cases’.93 In fact, 
contrary to the analysis of Stokes, Stephen himself thought that Macaulay’s own code 
was a direct descendant of the English common law. He wrote that, 'the Indian Penal 
Code is to the English Criminal law what a manufactured article ready for use is to the 
materials out of which it was made'.94 While this conception of codification forms a polar 
opposite to the fruits of pure intellectual reasoning suggested by Macaulay, Stokes does 
allow that in comparison to the other codes enacted:  
 
Fitzjames Stephen's Evidence Act of 1872 laid greater claim to originality. 
Although founded on an English basis, Stephen claimed to have "discarded 
altogether the phraseology in which the English text writers usually expressed 
themselves", and to have "attempted first to ascertain and then to arrange in their 
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natural order the principles which underlie the numerous cases and fragmentary 
rules which they have collected together".95  
 
The need for such work was most intensely felt in India, where Stephen claimed that, 
'few persons are aware of the extreme degree in which both the unwritten and the 
written law were, and to a great extent still are, infected with the vices of vagueness, want 
of arrangement, redundancy and prolixity'.96 
Thus, despite the fifty years between them, Stephen’s Indian Evidence Act of 
1872 and Forster’s Aspects of the Novel (1926) share the similarity of utilising the language 
of first principles within a broader context of textual background, in which those 
principles have come to the fore. They are both intent on the same thing: the quest for 
certainty that codification represents. 97 This similarity of form, and in motivation, is 
matched by the connection between the entities being codified. In coding the aspects of 
the novel Forster is stating what the novel can be: by implication this is to set limits on 
what the novel can tell of. The specific subject of Stephen’s contribution to the 
codification of Indian law is the rules of evidence. He sets out to specify what can be 
proved and, therefore, sets a similar limit on what the trial can hear.  
Why this need to limit what can be told? In both instances, the answer has to 
include an account of how these men, both Victorians though to varying degrees, 
responded to unsettling eruptions in their chosen fields.98 For Forster, this came in the 
form of an experimental modernism that came even to invade his own work. Forster 
venerated the work of Proust, but his praise of other modernist figures is more muted. In 
Aspects of the Novel, Ford, Mann, and Kafka all go unmentioned while Joyce and Woolf are 
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purveyor of Victorian liberal humanism’. Brian May, The Modernist as Pragmatist: E.M. Forster and the Fate of 
Liberalism (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1997) 75. Claiming Stephen as a Victorian is 
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given only limited acclaim. Through this omission of more experimental writers it 
becomes apparent that the limits on the novel are the limits it has traditionally kept 
within – limits which, in the past, had not been set by a codified set of practices but by 
experience itself. After his time in India, and his most adventurously modernist novel, 
which remained his last work of fiction, Forster felt the need to set boundaries.99 In so 
doing he is not only responding to the disappearance of experience; he is attempting to 
salvage its place in the novel.  
Forster’s position was not unique, but it was an individual response to a specific 
circumstance in his own career. For Stephen, his drafting of the Indian Evidence Act was 
part of a much wider project of codification throughout the 1860s and ‘70s. The 
inspiration was, however, the same. The mutiny of 1857 stirred up anxieties about rule 
and beliefs about the native population that were to be quashed by acts of legal 
aggression, tightening the control over the sub-continent. Those anxieties had been long 
held, and many were found in relation to the conduct of the trial. The prevalence of 
perjury, anxiety over judicial knowledge, and doubt about the safety of most trial verdicts 
were all fears that inhabited the colonial imagination. In reducing case law to first 
principles, Stephen attempted to distil all that had been formed by the tradition of the 
British judicial system. As the notion of precedent had arisen in tandem with the 
authority given to experience in a range of disciplines, Stephen’s project was thus an 
effort to reach a pure form of experience. The influence of utilitarianism on the 
codification project was also significant as, though working from first principles, it was 
designed to produce the same effect. Utilitarianism, in analysing the world in terms of 
commensurable conceptions of the ‘good’, suggested that experience could be collected, 
measured, and produced in quantifiable units – something that was seen by Forster to be 
undermined by the colonial situation and the contemporary world more generally.  
 
The Relevant Aspects 
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Forster wrote several novels, abruptly stopping after A Passage to India, and then wrote only non-fiction 
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first period was a necessary forerunner of the second; whether the creative literature of youth was not 
necessary to open out the reflective literature of the older man. It is my contention that it was so. It is my 
belief that Forster was using his fiction, at least in part, as a means of self-discovery, of self-formulation’. 
Shusterman, The Quest for Certitude in E. M. Forster's Fiction  5.   
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In attempting to retain a sense of experience in the novel and trial, Forster and Stephen 
shared similar goals. But were their methods also similar, and how consistently were their 
principles maintained? An examination of Forster’s first ‘aspect’ forms a good starting 
point to this discussion. He writes:  
 
the novel tells a story. That is the fundamental aspect without which it could not 
exist. That is the highest factor common to all novels, and I wish that it was not 
so, that it could be something different - melody, or perception of the truth, not 
this low atavistic form.100 
 
Story is low because, in being simply the ‘narrative of events, arranged in their time-
sequence’ it is something less than structure or plot (aspects which receive Forster’s 
specific attention in separate lectures).101 The other adjective Forster uses to describe 
story – atavistic – is justified on the basis of its ‘fundamental’ nature. Story is the primary 
element of a novel precisely because it speaks to the most primeval desire involved in the 
reading process: curiosity. It is the basic drive to know what happened next that keeps a 
reader turning the pages of a novel. As Forster put it, 'we are all like Scheherazade's 
husband, in that we want to know what happens next. That is universal and that is why 
the backbone of a novel has to be a story'.102 
The simplicity of story is further emphasised by Forster when he claims that it is 
rooted in a sense of time divorced from any signification of value. The time of story is 
the chronological sense in which an individual sees ‘dinner coming after breakfast, 
Tuesday after Monday, decay after death’.103 There is no particular importance, indeed 
there is no importance at all, to be attached to any of these moments; it is simply that 
one comes after the other. Without such a time-sense, understanding would be 
impossible. Forster argues that this method of ordering is so pervasive it amounts to a 
tyranny and he commends the experimental writing of Gertrude Stein for valiantly 
attempting to liberate the novel by privileging value over time. Yet, despite his praise, it is 
at this moment that the novel’s basis in story and a time-sense becomes most law-like. 
Forster declares that Stein’s work ultimately fails because 'the time sequence cannot be 
                                                           
100 Forster, Aspects of the Novel  40. 
101 Ibid. 42. 
102 Ibid. 41. 
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destroyed without carrying in its ruin all that should have taken its place; the novel that 
would express values only becomes unintelligible and therefore valueless'.104 Not only is 
Forster unaware of any successful novels which are not based in time – there never could 
be any such novels. Stein, in transgressing the law, has failed to produce a novel of value, 
and Forster’s description of an ‘aspect’ has become a prescription. But, as the preceding 
discussion suggested, this initial aspect is itself only a distillation of the novels that 
Forster has found most worthwhile – a list that is predominantly realist. It is, therefore, 
the realist stress upon ‘plotting’ a character’s journey through time that Forster wants to 
preserve and, in order to do this, he has to reject the work of an arch-modernist like 
Stein. 
Having established the basic status of story, Forster proceeds to advance the next 
stage of narrative:  
 
we have defined a story as a narrative of events arranged in their time-sequence. 
A plot is also a narrative of events, the emphasis falling on causality. "The king 
died and then the queen died" is a story. "The king died, and then the queen died 
of grief" is a plot. The time-sequence is preserved but the sense of causality 
overshadows it [...] Consider the death of the queen. If it is in a story we say: 
"And then?" If it is in a plot we ask: "Why?".105 
  
Value, incapable of existing on its own, must be achieved within time, as plot is imposed 
on story. A novel’s plot thus asks its reader not just to follow events but to notice the 
intrinsic value, intensity and meaning of those events. The act of interpretation that 
depends on a relationship between text and reader is based upon the value of plot in this 
sense; and the reader requires a greater sophistication than the primeval curiosity that was 
satisfied by the low form of story. Quite apart from constantly moving on to what 
happens next, the mind of such a reader must have the ability to remember what has 
occurred and apply its significance to the subsequent course of events. The memory of 
the reader:  
 
will constantly rearrange and reconsider, seeing new clues, new chains of cause 
and effect, and the final sense (if the plot has been a fine one) will not be of clues 
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and chains, but of something aesthetically compact, something which might have 
been shown by the novelist straight away, only if he had shown it straight away it 
would never have become beautiful.106 
  
During the reading process, plot has a malleable quality which the reader is moulding 
into a shape that will match a particular interpretation. New events will either fit in with 
such interpretations or take on the status of a new clue and become part of a different 
reading. This point was realised in a more formally theoretical manner later in the century 
by reader-response theorists such as Wolfgang Iser, who formulated the concept of the 
‘wandering viewpoint’. In Iser’s theory, ‘a reader's view is constantly shifting dependent 
on how much of the text has been read, altering their understanding of previous sections 
(gestalts) and expectations for the rest of the text’.107 Where Forster differs from Iser is 
that he sees the ‘clues’ of a text as being discerned and connected only by a central 
feature of realism: clearly visible chains of cause and effect. 
The fact that Forster’s thought can be connected to elements of twentieth-
century critical theory belies the ‘intellectual nullity’ he was accused of by F. R. Leavis.108 
Forster’s distinction of story and plot also bears a strong resemblance to the fabula/sjuzhet 
and story/discourse definitions of Russian Formalism and Narratology mentioned 
earlier. According to these schools of thought, fabula was exactly as Forster conceived of 
story: a chronologically ordered series of events. His conception of plot is slightly more 
problematic. Frank Kermode, another critic of Aspects of the Novel, has suggested that, 
particularly in modernist texts contemporaneous with Forster’s own, effects of time-
distortion manipulate the power of the sjuzhet in ways that a chronological ordering could 
not achieve. Kermode, therefore, argues that ‘it is not merely, as Forster's plot formula 
suggests, that an element of causality is introduced into the "and then and then" of the 
fable’.109 The plain definition given of Forsterian plot would suggest that Kermode is 
right, and Forster’s novels do, in the main, comply with a fabula-like chronological 
structure. However, the prior distinction made between story and plot was between time, 
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ordered by story, and value, offered by plot. For Forster, value, though contained 
intrinsically within time, was not measured by it. Rather, value is attributed by the 
‘intensity’ accompanying certain events. Forster writes that ‘when we look back at our 
past it does not stretch back evenly but piles up into a few notable pinnacles, and when 
we look at the future it seems sometimes a wall, sometimes a cloud, sometimes a sun, but 
never a chronological chart’.110 While a novel’s story narrates the life in time, as a whole 
‘the life by values’ in this sense will also be expressed.111 As such, Forster’s admiration for 
In Search of Lost Time is unsurprising: he described Proust as employing the ‘legitimate’ 
device of ‘altering the hands’ of the clock ‘so that his hero was at the same period 
entertaining a mistress to supper and playing ball with his nurse in the park’.112 The value 
that plot adds is therefore based upon an intensity that is not bound by a chronological 
sense of time, therefore allowing for the manipulation of a basic time-sense. A lot more 
can be done with Forster’s ‘plot’ than either he explicitly stated or Kermode has 
admitted. Forster, according to his theory, can easily manipulate his sjuzhet into a form 
which confuses a chronological sense of time (though he did not choose to do so in his 
own fiction). What he will not do, however, is deny the time-sense at base in the fabula. 
What Forster fundamentally wants to retain is the sense that there is a chronologically 
ordered story (fabula) which the plot (sjuzhet) in all its potential manipulations and 
distortions, is narrating. In this sense, his thoughts are similar to Watt’s, who emphasises 
‘the novel’s insistence on the time process’.113 What happens with modernism is that this 
time process, and the fabula more generally, becomes harder to see: in fact, it could be 
said to hardly exist at all.114 
Just as Forster attempted to preserve his sense of the fabula in Aspects of the Novel, 
so too Sir James Fitzjames Stephen set out, in his Indian Evidence Act 1872, to restore 
belief in the fabula by limiting the rules as to what sjuzhet could be produced in an Indian 
trial. The originality of the Act, referred to by Stokes earlier, was mostly attributable to 
Sections 6-11, coming under the chapter heading ‘Of the Relevancy of Facts’. Stephen 
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himself wrote: ‘these sections are by far the most important, as they are the most original 
part of the Evidence Act, as they affirm positively what facts may be proved, whereas the 
English law assumes this to be known, and merely declares negatively that certain facts 
shall not be proved’.115 The rules of evidence, which had been built up by negatively 
excluding specific forms of proof and which John Bender had seen as so influential in 
the creation of disinterested judicial observers, now, in the face of the ‘vices of 
vagueness’, had to be asserted positively.116 Stephen’s ‘relevant facts’ were, in the order of 
the Act, facts that are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same 
transaction; facts that are the occasion, cause or effect, immediate or otherwise, of facts 
in issue; motives, preparations and previous or subsequent conduct; facts necessary to 
explain or introduce relevant facts or facts in issue; things said, done or written by 
conspirators in reference to their common intention; and facts not otherwise relevant 
that become relevant either because they are inconsistent with a fact in issue or because 
they make a fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable.117 
Once stripped of their rhetorical veneer these principles actually all conform to 
the second definition. In Walter Donogh’s analysis, 'facts to be relevant under sec. 7 
must be connected. Similar but isolated facts, when they have a direct bearing on the fact 
in issue, are not admissible in evidence. The connection too must be that of cause and 
effect, or such as will afford the occasion or opportunity for the occurrence'.118 Stephen 
himself also wrote that, ‘it would be correct to say that when any theory has been formed 
which alleges the existence of any fact, all facts are relevant which, if that theory was true, 
would stand to the fact alleged to exist either in the relation of cause or in the relation of 
effect’.119 The basis of connecting facts together, which forms the backbone of any trial 
narrative, is to be made by the linking of cause and effect. Facts brought forward to an 
Indian court must therefore, conform to a Forsterian sense of plot. The time sequence of 
story is important but, just as in Aspects of the Novel , it is not enough. There must also be 
a plot; ‘a narrative of events, the emphasis falling on causality’. 
                                                           
115 Stephen, The Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872) With an Introduction On The Principles of Judicial Evidence  55. 
116 John Bender, Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and the Architecture of Mind in Eighteenth-Century England 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) 176. It is for this reason that Kieran Dolin refers to the Act as 
as ‘epistemological manual’. Kieran Dolin, Fiction and the Law: Legal Discourse in Victorian and Modernist 
Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 188. 
117 Paraphrased from Sections 6-11 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872. 
118 Donogh, Principles of Circumstantial Evidence Applicable to British India  9-10. 
119 Stephen, The Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872) With an Introduction On The Principles of Judicial Evidence  52. See 
also Rankin, Background to Indian Law  124. 
93 
 
In his Introduction Stephen attempts to bolster his doctrine of relevant facts by 
claiming it is based upon John Stuart Mill’s theories of induction in his System of Logic. 
Much of the introduction in this connection is taken up with drawing parallels between 
judicial and scientific investigation. Stephen writes that ‘inquiries into matters of fact, of 
whatever kind and with whatever object are, in all cases whatever, inquiries from the 
known to the unknown [...] They proceed upon the supposition that there is a general 
uniformity both in natural events and in human conduct; that all events are connected 
together as cause and effect'.120 The underpinning of experience, which also, of course, 
informed the rise of the novel, is clearly evident here. Stephen perceives a ‘general 
uniformity’ of events and conduct: people are thus seen to experience the same world 
and act on it in the same way. But it is precisely this view of experience that is being 
undermined by the practical application of the law in British India and by A Passage to 
India. As Kieran Dolin remarks, the ‘assumptions of this legislation, particularly the belief 
that individuals can testify to the facts of their own experience, or that the relevance of 
facts to rights in issue may be determined without prejudice or self-interest, or even the 
confidence that facts will be available, are put in question by the Marabar case'.121 
Throughout the Introduction, and most importantly in the Act itself, the 
assumption is also made that causality is both a simple concept and that its concrete 
occurrences are easily discernible (precisely how Forster, and others, though of a realist 
‘plot’). This is one of the main grounds for G F Arnold’s criticisms in his Psychology 
Applied to Legal Evidence, first published in 1906. Arnold claims that the law in general 
treats causation in 'a dilettante and inadequate fashion [yet] without it we should find it 
extremely difficult to arrive at any adequate idea of what "relevancy" means'.122 By 
analysing Stephen’s lackadaisical attitude towards knowledge of causation in the light of 
contemporary debates in psychology and philosophy Arnold successfully argues that, in 
terms of causality, Stephen has defined nothing at all. He writes:  
 
The fact is that by sometimes regarding cause and effect as requiring immediate 
connection and sometimes allowing remote connection and sometimes looking 
also to the intention of the agent in the case when deciding the mere question of 
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causation, our author plays fast and loose with Causality, and so we get results 
that contradict one another and offend the plain man's sense of what is right.123  
 
Yet, to make such an argument is perhaps to attack Stephen for failing in a project he 
never intended to complete. For all the importance he claimed of ‘relevant facts’ Stephen 
admits that these sections are ‘designedly worded very widely, and in such a way as to 
overlap each other’.124 Earlier in the Introduction he writes that  
 
approximated generalizations are more useful in judicial than they are in scientific 
inquiries, because in the case of judicial inquiries every man's individual 
experience supplies the qualifications and exceptions necessary to adjust general 
rules to particular facts, which is not the case in regard to scientific inquiries.125 
 
Stephen appeals to experience here – but it is in a form subtly different to that defined in 
the previous chapter. Stephen, though he refers to ‘every man’s individual experience’, 
does not mean every man at all. Crucially, Stephen’s experience, as in his reconstruction 
of the trial of Nunocmar, is only his own: a basis of thought that must be preserved by 
learned members of the judiciary and fed, piecemeal, to uninitiated others. In the case of 
many trials in India, which were adjudicated by a single magistrate, this could be easily 
achieved, as learned experience could come bound in a single authoritative judgment. But 
it was no less possible in jury trials as the issue of ‘relevancy’ dictated precisely what 
experience a jury would be allowed to hear of. Indeed, even once all the evidence had 
been heard, Stephen thought the Judge:  
 
ought not to conceal his opinion from the jury, nor do I see how it is possible for 
him to do so if he arranges the evidence in the order in which it strikes his mind. 
The mere effort to see what is essential to a story, in what order the important 
events happened, and in what relation they stand to each other must of necessity 
point to a conclusion. The act of stating for the jury the questions which they 
have to answer, and of stating the evidence bearing on those questions and 
showing in what respects it is important generally goes a considerable way 
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towards suggesting an answer to them, and if a Judge does not do as much at 
least as this, he does almost nothing.126  
  
In attempting to retain a sense of experience at the heart of trial procedure, Stephen has 
slipped into something rather more exclusive: the experience of the judge alone. In a 
parallel with A Passage to India, whose narration was based on a prejudicial point of view 
that extolled one truth while denying another, the opinion of Stephen’s judge is designed 
to push the jury towards a particular decision. In doing so the judge takes up a position 
of finality: the story, from where he sees it, is complete and all the jury have to do is 
follow his lead. There are no disinterested, neutral observers here. 
Stephen’s notion that to see what is essential to a story ‘must of necessity point to 
a conclusion’ thus mirrors Forster’s contention that the reader’s active connecting of 
‘chains of cause and effect’ ultimately leads to the vision of ‘something aesthetically 
compact’. Forster’s conception of plot is as law-like as that of story (despite the inability 
he shares with Stephen to provide a definition of causation). But it is also an authorial 
deception that is deemed admissible. The author writes from the state of finality but 
obscures the correct interpretation of the chains of connection until the narrative is 
complete. Forster excuses such deception on the grounds of aesthetics. He writes that 
plot is ‘something which might have been shown by the novelist straight away, only if he 
had shown it straight away it would never have become beautiful'.127 Although not 
exclusively concerned with plot, Victor Shklovsky’s well known theory of 
‘defamiliarisation’, first expounded in 1917, strikes a similar chord. According to 
Shklovsky, ‘the technique of art is to make objects “unfamiliar”, to make forms difficult, 
to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an 
aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged’.128 What a fine plot does is make its simple 
articulation unfamiliar, more difficult, elongated, and thus aesthetically pleasing. A 
familiar truth is thus made beautiful by being connected in a way that makes the reader 
work for it.  
As such, one of the most important elements of a plot is the way that it retards 
the final saying of a simple truth. A particularly important technique in this retardation is 
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the use of enigmas or mysteries. For Forster, novelistic mystery is a 'suspension of the 
time-sequence; a mystery is a pocket of time’. It is also ‘essential to a plot, and cannot be 
appreciated without intelligence. To the curious it is just another "And then-". To 
appreciate a mystery, part of the mind must be left behind, brooding, while the other part 
goes marching on'.129 Mystery is evidently so closely connected to plot their specific 
effects become identical. It makes the reader ask ‘why’ rather than ‘and then?’, enforcing 
a pause in the reading process and a subsequent rearrangement of events into a causal 
chain. The final effect of a well conceived plot is, however, not to be of clues and chains 
of cause and effect but of ‘something aesthetically compact’. That is to say, Forster’s 
conception of mystery is of something that is temporary. His mystery is one that is 
ultimately solved in a way that creates beauty: to use Stephen’s words, it will ‘point to a 
conclusion’. Mystery is an experience that comes back: always existent in the fabula, it is 
subject to only temporal delay in the sjuzhet and its resolution produces, as Barthes puts 
it, ‘a veritable “thrilling” of intelligibility’.130  
That this is precisely what fails to happen in A Passage to India which, as discussed 
earlier, descends into muddle, is testament to the doubts and divisions within Forster that 
induced him to write such a novel and then make it his last. On the one hand a Victorian, 
while on the other a man of the twentieth-century; at times an extoller of the realist 
tradition, though at others a practitioner of modernist aesthetics, the ruptures in Forster 
were summed up in a letter to William Plomer on the subject of his (Plomer’s) latest 
novel. Forster, commenting on the similarity between Plomer’s novel and A Passage to 
India wrote:  
 
I tried to show that India is in an unexplainable muddle by introducing an 
unexplainable muddle - Miss Quested's experience in the cave. When asked what 
happened there, I don't know. And you, expecting to show the untidiness of 
London, have left your book untidy. - Some fallacy, not a serious one, has 
seduced us both, some confusion between the dish and the dinner.131  
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For Forster, experience and mystery should not be lost to literature: and in never writing 
another novel, he chose never to commit the same fallacy as he thought he had with A 
Passage to India. His codification of the novel was an attempt to save an entity in which 
experience was enshrined – but his Act had come too late. Whether a fallacy or not, the 
form of his last novel, and the non-incident in the Marabar cave, were now emblematic 
of a new style of literature and of a new world: one in which experience was 
disappearing. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE GOOD SOLDIER AND THE GOOD READER 
 
The judge added it all up, starting with the police record and the vagrancy, and presented 
it as Moosbrugger's guilt, while to Moosbrugger it was a series of completely separate 
incidents having nothing to do with one another, each of which had a different cause 
that lay outside Moosbrugger somewhere in the world as a whole. 
Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities1 
 
The most amazing thing about it was that the police could not only dismantle a man so 
that nothing was left of him, they could also put him together again, recognizably and 
unmistakably, out of the same worthless components. 
Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities2 
 
Unlike Forster’s work, which suggests a trust in experience up until the break performed by the 
non-incident in the Marabar cave, the fiction of Ford Madox Ford, although mostly written prior 
to A Passage to India, assumes that a crisis is already in existence. In his theoretical writing this is 
couched in purely literary terms. Ford, together with his long time friend and collaborator Joseph 
Conrad, was intent upon changing the English novel. The Literary Impressionism promulgated 
by Ford and Conrad was designed to give the ‘reader the impression that he was witnessing 
something real, that he was passing through an experience'.3 It is therefore assumed that the 
novel, in its nineteenth-century realist form, had failed to capture the reality of experience: a 
concern which would never have occurred to Eliot or Dickens and could, in fact, only appear 
once experience itself was in crisis. For Ford, these authors produced only the ‘corrected 
chronicle’ of events, while he was after the brute immediacy of life. If phrased in the manner of 
Dilthey, while realism dealt in a cognitively ordered Erfahrung, Ford was intent upon reaching an 
elemental Erlebnis.  
In this chapter, it will be shown that, despite this aim, in The Good Soldier Ford produces 
not an experience of lived immediacy but an impression of obsessive reflection. Various features 
of this reflective narrative serve to undermine its relation to experience. The novel has been 
described as one ‘which raises uncertainty about the nature of truth and reality to the level of a 
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structural principle'.4 It will be argued that this level of doubt, ultimately, attains a level in which 
the experiential quality of anything that Ford’s narrator, Dowell, relates has to be questioned. 
Yet, while the question of what really happened is an important one, the more central issue of 
the novel is whom it portrays. Dowell trawls through his experience of Edward Ashburnham, 
and through Edward’s experience itself, for signs of character, finding none, while the expression 
of his own identity seems to indicate a similar blankness. Unlike Forster and the Marabar cave, 
the question is less what happened in experience than what kind of identity, if any, can 
experience produce. 
At roughly the same time as Ford was writing, several changes in the legal conception of 
character and identity were taking place.5 The straightforward question of what could be 
expected of a ‘reasonable man’, first seen to be undermined in British India, was being 
challenged as a barometer for testing criminal intention. In a similar development, the 
discernment of causes was no longer being seen as a case of perceiving the ‘natural 
consequences’ of actions. But, as opposed to the Indian codification projects embarked upon by 
the likes of Stephen, at home the attempt to safeguard judgment was made in a different way: the 
discernment of singular causes and the placing of responsibility became, increasingly, a job for 
experts. New technologies of identification also came into operation which allowed for an 
increase in the level of surveillance under which the general population lived while altering the 
very conception of individuality which such surveillance monitored. Again, these technologies 
operated through an economy of expertise that excluded lay participation. In both the trial and 
the novel, it will be argued, such expertise drove experience further from the centre of questions 
about truth, judgment and identity.  
 
The Good Soldier 
 
According to Michael Levenson, The Good Soldier is an entirely successful attempt to reach 
Erlebnis: he describes the narration as one in which, ‘at every moment, he (Dowell) confronts 
experience as though for the first time'.6 But what Levenson describes is an illusion that belies 
                                                           
4 Samuel Hynes, ‘The Epistemology of The Good Soldier’, in Ibid.  311. 
5 As has been suggested elsewhere, the connections between law and literature discussed in this thesis are not to be 
considered on the basis of influence. However, in the case of Ford, his specific interest in the law has been 
documented. Barbara Leckie writes that ‘Ford, in fact, was an ardent reader of legal trials’. In her work, Leckie takes 
particular interest in divorce trials and how they shaped Ford’s ‘modernist narrative innovations'. Barbara Leckie, 
Culture and Adultery: The Novel, The Newspaper and the Law, 1857-1914 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1999) 204.  
6 Michael Levenson, "Character in The Good Soldier," Twentieth Century Literature 30, no. 4 (1984): 384. 
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the logical position from which the narration of The Good Soldier originates. Dowell, like most 
first-person narrators, is relating events that are now in the past. In the introductory chapter of 
this thesis it was argued, following Welsh and Schramm, that the realist narrator produced 
narratives that had certain traits in common with a prosecuting counsel in court.7 One of the 
major factors in this comparison was the way that these figures both submit cases and write 
novels from the point of their completion. The lawyer and realist novelist each present the 
illusion of finalised cases – which, in the case of the lawyer, is a particularly radical deception as 
the trial in which it takes place is charged with determining what actually occurred. In the case of 
the novel, the finality of the narrator’s position does not entail that things are exactly as they first 
seem, or characters precisely whom they initially appear to be. Indeed, several of Wilkie Collins’ 
novels rest on exactly this disguising of both truth and identity.8 But, as indicated in the previous 
chapter, such a state of finality implied that any mysteries within the text would eventually be 
solved and that true character would, ultimately, be fixed correctly and revealed.9  
Ford, though tied to the same temporal position, finds a unique way of presenting it in a 
very different fashion. As numerous critics have noted, Dowell, as a narrator, is not in a timeless 
position. Vincent Cheng, by gathering all the textual clues on offer (a method that will be 
returned to later in this chapter) charted the chronology of the novel, showing that the majority 
of the action took Dowell six months to complete. Cheng is then able to show that there is a 
hiatus of eighteen months in which Dowell fetches Nancy from India, and Leonora marries 
Bayham. His work is calculated to be complete in late 1915 or early 1916: 'a curious 
computation, since Ford's The Good Soldier itself had already been published on March 17, 
1915!'.10 In creating a narrator who is, himself, in time, Ford produces something quite different 
from realism’s ‘corrected chronicle’ of events. Impressionism, by contrast, ‘is the record of the 
recollection in your mind of a set of circumstances that happened’.11 The reader is encouraged to 
feel that the reflections of Ford’s narrator, Dowell, are reproduced the instant that he has them: 
as if they were a kind of pre-reflective reflection. Ford thus creates the illusion of reaching 
immediacy not by describing it but by providing the impression of its initial, most 
                                                           
7 For Maria Aristodemou, this connection exists to this day. She writes that 'legal writers are like writers of realist 
fiction, trying to maintain the illusion of an omniscient narrator, chronological sequence, plot inevitability, and 
causal connections between events’. Maria Aristodemou, Law and Literature: Journeys from Her to Eternity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) 25.       
8 The Moonstone and The Woman in White being two examples. 
9 Classic examples of this can be found in the hidden relationships (often familial) revealed by many of Dickens’ 
plots: Bleak House, Little Dorrit and Great Expectations, for example. 
10 Vincent Cheng, “A Chronology of The Good Soldier,” in Stannard, ed., The Good Soldier: an Authoritative Text, Textual 
Appendices, Contemporary Reviews, Literary Impressionism, Biographical and Critical Commentary  388. 
11 Ford Madox Ford, “On Impressionism,” in Ibid.  263. 
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unsophisticated, conceptualisation. But these basic forms of cognitive interpretation also have a 
cumulative effect. That is, as Dowell writes, he finds out more about his subject and his 
interpretation of events changes. As David H. Lynn comments, ‘the narrative evolves' as it is 
produced.12 Dowell’s opening line – ‘This is the saddest story I have ever heard’ – which seems 
such a peculiar way to begin a story in which one is experientially involved, is justified in this 
respect. Dowell only experiences his story as he hears it told, by himself. But as he tells it slightly 
differently every time, the experience is never quite the same. Even the formal end of The Good 
Soldier, therefore, does not provide a final case because the sense is created that another, different, 
interpretation of events would have been proffered by Dowell if he had just kept on writing. The 
experience that supposedly prompted him to write in the first place thus recedes further and 
further from view. 
 Dowell’s story is only heard by him in another sense, which relies on his basic condition 
of ignorance. The Good Soldier is a story in which Dowell’s participation is limited by his sheer 
lack of knowledge. He claims to have been completely unaware not only of the deep 
unhappiness of Edward and Leonora’s marriage but also of the fact that his wife, Florence, was, 
over a period of several years, having an affair with Edward. Florence’s lack of a heart condition, 
the fact that she killed herself as opposed to suffering a fatal heart attack, and Edward’s love for 
his ward Nancy, are, similarly, only known by Dowell once he has been told of them. Dowell 
only hears this ‘saddest story’ when Leonora apprises him of it. Her version of events, what 
Dowell only knows from her lips, then becomes another layer of subjectivity to be borne in 
mind by the reader. But the epistemological and ontological complications do not stop there. 
Dowell’s real subject, the ‘good soldier’ of the title, is Edward Ashburnham. But though he may 
end up knowing many of the ‘facts’ of Edward’s life, his experience, and Dowell’s experience of 
him, remain frustratingly elusive. Dowell claims to be unable to give an ‘all-round impression’ of 
the good soldier, or to fully convey his tale.13 So, in the very act of telling Edward’s story, Dowell 
tells the reader that he cannot tell it.  
 This does not, at first, appear to be a problem: the first impression that Dowell has of 
both Edward and Leonora is vivid enough. But it soon becomes apparent that this sense of their 
character is based solely on stereotype. In their first portrayal the Ashburnhams are described as 
                                                           
12 David H. Lynn, “Dowell as Unromantic Hero,” in Ibid.  392. 
13 For instance, Chapter Eleven of Part One begins with Dowell commenting that ‘I don’t know how it is best to 
put this thing down’. After a brief narration he asks ‘is all this digression or isn’t it? Again I don’t know’. Ford 
Madox Ford, The Good Soldier (London: Penguin, 2002) 123, 19 & 21. Future references will be made in brackets 
within the text. 
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being ‘what in England it is the custom to call “quite good people”’ (14).14 Much of the novel is 
taken up with the fragility of these respectable exteriors as, with the slightest of scratches, a 
seething mass of passion, betrayal and resentment is revealed. In this, simplistic, sense the 
exterior is a facade, a role that is played by people, while beneath it lies their true self. For 
instance, in the pivotal scene at Marburg, Florence tells Edward that it is only because of 
Luther’s protest that he is decent, honest, hard-working and clean living – the stereotypical 
qualities of Protestantism which the reader later discovers that neither Edward nor Florence 
possess (42). But if this were all that the novel had to say about identity then it would be no 
different to its realist parent, and the revelation of Edward’s infidelities would be no more than 
the lifting of the Victorian disguise worn by Godfrey Ablewhite in The Moonstone. The initial 
impression of Edward, by contrast, immediately suggests something other than a mask. In 
Dowell’s description of the scene in which the couples first meet he writes that Edward’s 'face 
hitherto had, in the wonderful English fashion, expressed nothing whatever. Nothing' (28). As 
Dowell gets to know Edward this perception is deepened as he comes to think of Edward as, in 
a very real sense, nothing at all. It is this nullity at the heart of Edward that leads Dowell to 
wonder at his attractiveness to women: 'Good God, what did they all see in him for I swear that 
was all there was of him, inside and out; though they said he was a good soldier. Yet Leonora 
adored him with a passion that was like an agony, and hated him with an agony that was as bitter 
as the sea. How could he arouse anything like a sentiment in anybody?' (29). Crucially, Dowell’s 
sense of Edward as a person is not altered in any positive sense over time. After years of 
acquaintance he still feels that nothing has been gained from his time with the Ashburnhams: 
'And as for experience, as for knowledge of one's fellow beings - nothing either [...] After forty-
five years of mixing with one's kind, one ought to have acquired the habit of being able to know 
something about one's fellow beings. But one doesn't' (36).  
The person whom, traditionally, one should know best of all (the beloved) is, in fact, the 
furthest from Dowell’s recognition. Florence dupes Dowell into believing that she has a heart 
condition which precludes any sexual activity when, in reality, she has been capable of at least 
two affairs, one of them with Edward. Even her demise is only fully divulged to Dowell by 
Leonora, months after her death has actually occurred (92). Just as Dowell conceives of Edward 
as a kind of nothing, so too his marriage is represented as a blank space. Florence’s death, 
                                                           
14 In this sense, the Dowells and the Ashburnhams are what Georg Simmel termed ‘acquaintances’. Simmel wrote 
that ‘in the very assertion that one is acquainted with a given person, or even well acquainted with him, one indicates 
very distinctly the absence of really intimate relationships. In such cases one knows of the other only his external 
characteristics’. Georg Simmel, "The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies," American Journal of Sociology 11 
(1906): 452. 
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therefore, does not create a void in his life but is merely registered as a commonplace absence: 
'You have no idea how quite extraordinarily for me that was the end of Florence. From that day 
to this I have never given her another thought; I have not bestowed upon her so much as a sigh 
[...]She just went completely out of existence, like yesterday's paper' (101). Florence’s death fails 
to register with Dowell as a painful event because she had never managed to achieve a level of 
substantial reality in his eyes. Rather, she had only ever been a 'mass of talk', a 'scrap of paper' 
(101). Florence was only ever a collection of words which, as soon as they stopped being 
produced, went completely out of existence, as an object that need not be mourned. 
 The knowledge that Dowell eventually garners about Edward’s life fails to dislodge his 
initial impression. Halfway through the novel he declares that 'it is impossible of me to think of 
Edward Ashburnham as anything but straight, upright and honourable' (96). Dowell clings to the 
superficial and stereotypical characteristics that are based on Edward’s nationality, gender, and 
class. There is no deeper reality to be found in Edward’s character other than the ‘nothing’ which 
first impressed itself upon Dowell. Having charted all the sordid deeds of Edward’s life Dowell 
reflects that 'it is very difficult to give an all-round impression of any man. I wonder how far I 
have succeeded with Edward Ashburnham. I daresay I haven't succeeded at all' (123). He goes 
on to provide a description of a normal working day for Edward: a day of managing the affairs 
of his regiment, playing polo, and attending social evenings, all of which was done with a 
scrupulously applied integrity. In terms of the time it took up, this formed the larger part of 
Edward’s life.15 Should it be discounted at the expense of a few costly mistakes? If the form of 
identity that could be summarised by the term a ‘good soldier’ or ‘quite good people’ could be 
seen to be false then so too should the form which makes itself visible in Edward’s adulterous 
affairs and gambling binges. Both are ‘characters’ that are, in fact, painted on to the blank canvas 
that forms the reality of Edward’s individuality. Edward’s true self can never be exposed because 
when one disguise is lifted it is only another one that is revealed.  
In the final pages of the novel Dowell admits that 'I can't conceal from myself the fact 
that I loved Edward Ashburnham – and that I love him because he was just myself' (197). Yet 
this seeming identity between the characters is immediately undercut as Dowell adds: ‘If I had 
had the courage and virility and possibly also the physique of Edward Ashburnham I should, I 
fancy, have done much what he did’. Michael Levenson comments that 'Dowell refuses here, 
                                                           
15 In making Dowell question the relationship between time, value and identity, Ford’s writing here forms a literary 
exposition of Forster’s theory of story and plot from Aspects of the Novel. According to Forster, ‘when we look back 
at our past it does not stretch back evenly but piles up into a few notable pinnacles, and when we look at the future 
it seems sometimes a wall, sometimes a cloud, sometimes a sun, but never a chronological chart’. E. M. Forster, 
Aspects of the Novel (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) 42. 
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refuses with a supreme negligence, to define himself in terms of traits. He regards courage, 
virility, and physique as secondary qualities, mere contingencies which scarcely bear on the 
problem of identity'.16 The ‘problem of identity’, in this sense, is double-sided: it is not just that 
Dowell has difficulty in identifying a ‘real’ Edward but also that Dowell is not apparent to 
himself either. This nullity of self-knowledge is intimately related to his more commonplace 
ignorance. As discussed in the Introduction, modern experience was an arena in which the 
subject of knowledge found both itself and an external world. But, Dowell is no modern 
knowing subject, and his inability to find knowledge in experience extends into a sense of vacant 
self-identity. His reaction to Leonora’s revelation that Florence had committed suicide rather 
than dying of a heart attack is complete incredulity: 'It had never entered my head. You may 
think that I had been singularly lacking in suspiciousness; you may consider me even to have 
been an imbecile. But consider exactly the position' (91). Dowell’s complete ignorance makes 
him a preposterously weak narrator in a traditional sense (this is no promulgator of ‘strong 
representations’). But his ignorance goes further – or, rather, recedes even deeper – as he is also 
unable to comprehend his own motivations. Dowell’s first remark to Leonora after the death of 
Florence is 'now I can marry the girl' (meaning Nancy), yet he tells the reader that he had no idea 
he was going to say this before he did (93). Even more significantly, his words have first been 
intimated four pages earlier by Leonora’s response to them: ‘”Of course you might marry her,” 
and when I asked whom, she answered: “The girl”’ (89). Dowell marvels that 'I had thought 
nothing: I had said such an extraordinary thing' (89). His own speech is thus prefaced by 
someone else’s response to them, while his thoughts have remained completely obscure. Much 
of his emotional life is similarly murky. He writes: 'You ask how it feels to be a deceived 
husband. Just Heavens, I do not know. It feels just like nothing at all' (60). Basic human desires 
are similarly denied as Dowell, who finds it surprisingly easy to be the husband in a sexless 
marriage, denies any sexual urges: ‘I will vouch for the cleanness of my thoughts and the absolute 
chastity of my life’ (19). His feelings for Leonora, are claimed to be similarly devoid of erotic 
content. He writes, 'I loved Leonora always and, today, I would very cheerfully lay down my life, 
what is left of it, in her service. But I am sure I never had the beginnings of a trace of what is 
called the sex instinct towards her' (33). Dowell negates desire for another, but the very act of 
doing so works as a form of self-negation: there is no Freudian desiring subject here.17 The 
blankness of Dowell is summed up in a conversation with Leonora about his wish to marry 
Nancy. Dowell reports the content of the meeting but tells the reader: ‘I spare you the record of 
                                                           
16 Levenson, "Character in The Good Soldier," 384. 
17 It is also one of numerous inconsistencies in the narration. Later, Dowell claims that he actually dislikes Leonora.  
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my emotions’ (192). This is Dowell encapsulated. Even when it is suggested they have been 
discerned, his emotions and the workings of his own mind will be withheld from the narrative. 
Dowell tells a story he has heard rather than acted in – a story that he feels and knows ‘nothing’ 
about. In the conclusion, Dowell, whose very life negates both himself and experience, ultimately 
succeeds in producing a kind of non-experiential life. After Florence has died he could return to 
the US, as 'my experiences there were vivid and amusing', yet he decides to spend the rest of his 
days at Bramshaw Teleragh as Nancy’s attendant: Nancy, who has been reduced to virtually mute 
incoherence and withdrawn from experience completely to a state in which, as Richard Cassell 
puts it, she ‘signifies nothing’ (124).18 These peculiarities of the narrative allow Michael Levenson 
to write of Dowell that:  
 
Doing nothing, he feels nothing, and feeling nothing, he knows nothing. [...] In 
important respects, let us recognize, Dowell is nothing. No "paradigm of traits" can 
describe him, because there is nothing substantial to describe: no determining past, no 
consistency of opinion, no deep belief, no stable memory. He cannot be "justified". 
There is no accounting for Dowell (369).  
 
The figures of Edward Ashburnham and John Dowell, then, both fail to attain any level 
of substantiality. The attempt to describe Edward by Dowell has resulted, by Dowell’s own 
admission, in failure, while the narration of Dowell has not expressed any abiding sense of his 
own character either. Welsh wrote that in Defoe's novels 'we have a sense of personal identity 
subsisting through duration and yet being changed by the flow of experience'.19 But what Ford is 
producing is something quite different. Here there is ‘no determining past, no consistency of 
opinion, no stable memory’. The Good Soldier produces subjects who fail to grasp their experience 
and so cannot be defined by it: they are characters with no character. 
 
Reasonable Intentions 
 
Was the centrality of character diminishing in the legal context also? Martin Wiener, in charting 
the developing conceptualisation of criminality in the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries 
                                                           
18 Richard A. Cassell, Ford Madox Ford: A Study of His Novels (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961) 200. Nancy’s 
fate is somewhat similar to Mark Tietjens in The Last Post, the fourth part of Ford’s tetralogy, Parade’s End, though he 
is, of course, faking. Ford Madox Ford, Parade's End (London: Penguin, 2002). 
19 Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1992) 24. 
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writes of the early-to-mid-Victorian era that ‘the guiding vision of this reconstructed system of 
criminal justice was that of the responsible individual. Members of the public were to be 
considered more rational and responsible than they had been hitherto'.20 The Victorian 
conception of responsibility found character to be at the heart of criminal behaviour while at the 
same time seeking to build ‘character’ in the enforcement of its laws. By mid-century ‘law was 
being employed with increasing consistency as an instrument for developing self-disciplining and 
gratification-deferring personalities in the population at large. To counter the crime wave and 
immorality wave of the first half of the century stood a newly character-building law'.21 While this 
active effort to establish moral character in the population at large was new to the nineteenth-
century, the understanding of responsibility that it rested on was historically entrenched. Indeed, 
in classic texts such as Blackstone’s and Hale’s, it was considered so obvious as to be unworthy 
even of mention.22  
The character that was epitomised by the ‘responsible individual’ made judgment a 
simple matter. Lisa Rodensky notes that, in the early part of the nineteenth-century, ‘knowledge 
and intent could be imputed to an accused on the basis of the “natural” consequences of his act, 
without any further evidentiary showing’.23 Rodensky argues that the notion of criminal intent 
was then both fuelled and undermined by the development of the realist novel. As the novel 
seemingly offered direct access to the thoughts of another it provided ‘an opportunity to know 
character separately from conduct’, thus making the attribution of mens rea a more complex 
matter.24 According to Rodensky, by the mid-nineteenth-century the criminal law was 
questioning whether 'intentions could be presumed from the natural consequences of acts or 
whether evidence of actual knowledge and intention needed to be introduced'.25 The difficulty 
was that, while 'novels invite readers to imagine that they are in the mind of the criminal', in 
practical matters of criminal law, knowledge and intention could only be inferred from the 
known circumstances. Those sitting in judgment actually envisaged themselves in the same 
situation as the accused, as opposed to really entering the ‘mind of the criminal’, and the issue of 
determining mens rea thus reduced to the responsible individual theory, as that was how the 
                                                           
20 Martin J. Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, law and policy in England, 1830-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990) 11. 
21 Ibid.  91. 
22 Nicola Lacey, "Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law," The Journal of Political Philosophy 9, no. 3 (2001): 256. 
23 Lisa Rodensky, The Crime in Mind: Criminal Responsibility and The Victorian Novel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003) 95. 
24 Ibid. 43. 
25 Ibid. 89. 
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majority of those judging conceived of themselves.26 In the previous chapter, Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen’s thoughts on the matter from his Introduction to the Indian Evidence Act were quoted: 'the 
approximate rules which relate to human conduct are warranted principally by each man's own 
experience of what passes in his own mind, corroborated by his observation of the conduct of 
other persons, which every one is obliged to interpret upon the hypothesis that their mental 
processes are substantially similar to his own'.27 The concept of the ‘reasonable man’ thus rested 
on the modern notion of experience as neutral and shared. It was ‘premised not only on a 
dualistic vision of human being traceable back to Descartes but also on the idea that the interior 
world of human individuals can be the object of social knowledge and indeed of proof in a 
criminal court'.28 This was precisely what was undermined by the practical functioning of courts 
in British India, where the commensurability of individuals’ minds, and indeed the simple 
veracity of their testimony, could not be so comfortably assumed. 
A similar undermining of the ‘reasonable man’ and ‘responsible individual’ was not fully 
felt in Britain until the early twentieth-century. However, its earliest stirrings can be seen not only 
in the treatment of natives in British India but also in the way that insanity was approached by 
the judicial system earlier in the nineteenth-century. Traditionally, the issue of whether an 
accused was of sound mind was solved by the right-wrong test. If the accused was aware that 
their actions were wrong then they could be prosecuted as normal. This test was supposedly 
shown to be inadequate following the case of McNaughtan, who was tried in 1843 for shooting a 
person whom he thought was the Prime Minister, thus becoming the third political assassin (or 
would be assassin) since 1800 to be acquitted on grounds of insanity.29 However, the 
McNaughtan rules really only restated the right-wrong test.30 Joel Eigen notes that 'by stressing 
the mind's cognitive faculties, the McNaughtan Rules affirmed the common law's traditional 
construction of the forensic person: a rational, purposeful being capable of perceiving the 
consequence of his acts'.31  
                                                           
26 Ibid. 6 & 178-9.. 
27 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, The Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872) With an Introduction On The Principles of Judicial 
Evidence (London: MacMillan and Co, 1872) 31. 
28 Lacey, "Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law," 268. See also Roger Smith: 'in practice, courts tried to 
avoid tortuous questions about states of mind. Instead, they relied on commonsense questions about what a 
"reasonable man" would know, feel and do under similar circumstances’. Roger Smith, Trial by Medicine: Insanity and 
Responsibility in Victorian Trials (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981) 75-76. 
29 Joel Peter Eigen, Unconscious Crime: Mental Absence and Criminal Responsibility in Victorian London (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003) 6. 
30 Smith, Trial by Medicine: Insanity and Responsibility in Victorian Trials  15. 
31 Eigen, Unconscious Crime: Mental Absence and Criminal Responsibility in Victorian London  7. 
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Medical writing was, at the time, stringently questioning such a construction, with the 
conflict between the discourses of law and medicine continuing throughout the century and to 
this day.32 This was a battle between theories of depravity and of disease:  
 
Depravity theories emphasised continuity between the criminal's past and present; it was 
right to find responsibility and to punish, since past actions could have been avoided. 
Medical theories, by contrast, emphasised discontinuity between past responsibility and 
present conduct. Disease cut across a person's life.33  
 
The theory of disease eroded the connection between thought and action, conduct and 
responsibility; and its proponents in terms of law reform were not without success as the rules 
were, gradually, worn down.34 The pressure it exerted could also be said to have influenced the 
inauguration of the diminished responsibility plea, first recognized in Scotland in the case of 
Dingwall (1867).35 This judgment required a state of mind to be construed that became 
notoriously difficult to define, the best-known attempt being made by Lord Alness in 1923:   
 
It is very difficult to put it in a phrase, but it has been put in this way; that there must be 
aberrations or weakness of mind; that these must be some form of mental unsoundness; 
that there must be a state of mind which is bordering on, though not amounting to, 
insanity; that there must be a mind so affected that responsibility is diminished from full 
responsibility to partial responsibility - in other words, the prisoner in question must be 
only partially accountable for his actions.36 
 
Some crimes seemed to defy the possibility of establishing any level of responsibility, 
even when the accused stood in the dock and seemed in full command of their senses. In 
Unconscious Crime, Joel Eigen traces the history of a very special class of cases: those in which the 
accused, due to disorders including dual personality, could be said to be ‘absent’ from the 
                                                           
32 Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood and Michel Foucault’s I, Pierre Riviere... represent two case studies of this conflict 
(the cases in question being separated by over a century). Truman Capote, In Cold Blood (London: Penguin, 1966), 
Michel Foucault, ed., I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister, and my brother-: a case of parricide in the 19th 
century (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973). 
33 Smith, Trial by Medicine: Insanity and Responsibility in Victorian Trials  83. 
34 Roger Smith comments that 'modern psychiatrists in turn consider the Rules eroded through subsequent 
progressive court decisions which were responsive to the medical viewpoint’. Ibid.  16. 
35 F. A. Whitlock, Criminal Responsibility and Mental Illness (London: Butterworths, 1963) 94. 
36 H.M. Advocate v. Savage, [1923] S. C. (J). 49. Quoted in Ibid.  95. 
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commission of the crime they committed. Eigen notes that 'the legal issue that sat at the heart of 
these mid-nineteenth-century trials was not therefore the actor's intent, but whether the person 
on trial was the same person who committed the crime'.37 Despite a positive identification of the 
body, these identities resisted easy definition. The legal system was unable to accommodate such 
cases: 'the Old Bailey was asked to decide the criminal responsibility of a defendant who failed to 
rise to the law's conception of the Person: a sentient being capable of maintaining a continuous 
awareness of who he was'.38 These individuals were 'not deluded, not deranged, not delirious in 
the slightest, the defendant’s action was involuntary because an automaton had committed the 
crime'.39 Such a description finds parallels in the work of the pioneering psychiatrist Henry 
Maudsley, who, in 1868, described a girl in his care as ‘an automatic machine incited by sensory 
impressions to mischievous and destructive acts'.40 The body of the criminal is, here, a conduit 
for criminal activity while the ‘character’ and ‘mind’ of the individual is completely divorced from 
the mechanistic functioning of the brain. In the cases that Eigen examines, acts are produced 
rather than committed; they are manufactured without being designed.  
Wiener argues that the Edwardian era forms a sharp contrast to the Victorian in its 
conceptualisation of the criminal. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, the sense of 
getting inside the head of the criminal was being shaken by the growing awareness that this was 
an impossible task. Secondly, the source of behaviour was no longer thought to be formed by a 
necessary connection between cognition and action.41 Wiener writes that:  
 
the giddy sense of unleashed powers that had excited, and frightened, middle-class early 
Victorians, was being countered as the century progressed by a sense of subjection to the 
actions of remote others, actions that became increasingly crystallized into impersonal 
forces. By the turn of the century, it was becoming widely recognized, as the social 
analyst Graham Wallas put it, that "each man's life depends on causes he can't 
understand"'.42  
 
                                                           
37 Eigen, Unconscious Crime: Mental Absence and Criminal Responsibility in Victorian London  Preface x. 
38 Ibid.  14. 
39 Ibid.  10. 
40 Quoted in Smith, Trial by Medicine: Insanity and Responsibility in Victorian Trials  53. 
41 In literary terms, Rodensky locates this change in Hardy’s Tess of the Durbervilles, a text in which the fixed idea of 
‘character’ required by the law to apportion guilt has been abandoned. Rodensky, The Crime in Mind: Criminal 
Responsibility and The Victorian Novel. 214-5. 
42 Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, law and policy in England, 1830-1914  160. 
111 
 
Books such as William Morrison’s Crime and its Causes (1891) and Charles Goring's The English 
Convict: a Statistical Study (1913) sought deeper explanations for the emanation of crime.43 Why did 
it exist? Where did it come from? But these questions were only being asked because of earlier 
legal anxiety over the complete otherness of those such as native Indians and insane automatons. 
By the end of the nineteenth-century, the suspicion had grown that everyone but oneself was just 
such an-other. 
As such, the most heinous crimes could exist in the most unsuspected of places. David 
Bentley reports that, in the early nineteenth-century, the calling of witnesses to speak to the 
character of the accused was common: ‘if an accused was of good character judge and jury would 
indeed expect to hear the fact confirmed by witnesses'.44 The idea of consistency was at play 
here: if someone was respectable they were likely to remain respectable throughout time and in 
any circumstances. Responsibility thus 'lay in an evaluation of the defendant's conduct judged in 
the light of evidence about his or her character and reputation'.45 Such a view of character is evident 
in The Moonstone, as the most conclusive evidence imaginable is amassed against firstly Rachel 
Verinder and then Franklin Blake, only for the reader to have a sense of mystery aroused rather 
than be convinced of their guilt. Even the final unmasking of Godfrey Ablewhite only works 
because of an investment in the ‘character’ of the stereotypical gentleman: it is supposed to be a 
shocking dénouement precisely because it is almost unbelievable. But by the end of the century 
responsibility was no longer thought to be so straightforwardly connected to evident 
respectability in this way: evidence of good character, therefore, became far less prevalent.46 
 Of course, the belief that Edward and Leonora’s public image as ‘quite good people’ 
truly reflects their turbulent relationship is precisely the naive assumption that Dowell has 
smashed in the course of his ‘saddest story’. But the real issue is how Edward is held responsible, 
or not, for the misery that ensues. Dowell reports of an incident from the past in which 
Florence’s maid had stolen some jewellery: ‘We should not have believed her capable of it; she 
                                                           
43 Ronald Thomas also notes that 'in contrast with the biological positvism of the Italians, for example, the French 
school (following figures like Alexandre Lacassgne, Gabriel Tarde, and Henri Joly) emphasized the sociological 
conditions rather than the anatomical determinants that led to crime’. Ronald R. Thomas, Detective Fiction and the Rise 
of Forensic Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 25. 
44 David Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century (London: The Hambledon Press, 1998) 237. 
45 Lacey, "Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law," 257. Richard Sennett also argues that, due to changes in 
the constitution of social communities and class codes in the nineteenth-century, the modern city became an arena 
in which a person's outward appearance became a means of concealment rather than an indicator of character. 
Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 
46 Nicola Lacey argues that thought on responsibility has shifted in emphasis from ‘character’ to ‘capacity’. It should 
be noted, however, that this is a shift of emphasis and not a replacement. In current thinking, capacity’ is to the fore, 
but ‘character’ is still utilised. Lacey, "Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law." 
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would not have believed herself capable of it. It was nothing in her character’ (126). This denial 
of character as a cause of criminal activity is explicitly related to Edward’s behaviour in the 
Kilsyte case and implicitly to all his various crimes: ‘So, perhaps, it was with Edward 
Ashburnham’ (126). As a victim of Edward’s ‘crimes’, Dowell claims the right to denounce him, 
yet he chooses not to do so:  
 
I have the right to say it, since for years he was my wife’s lover, since he killed her, since 
he broke up all the pleasantness that there were in my life. There is no priest that has the 
right to tell me that I must not ask pity for him, from you, silent listener beyond the 
hearth-stone, from the world, or from the God who created in him those desires, those 
madnesses (46).  
 
Firstly, Dowell makes a claim that is later shown to be somewhat melodramatic: that Edward 
killed Florence. But what comes from this over the top sentiment is not a desire to condemn, 
nor even a desire to forgive, but, rather, a desire to justify. Edward is not held responsible for his 
actions because they are ‘madnesses’.47 Of course, Edward is at no point portrayed as if he is 
literally insane. The point is, rather, that to probe his mind in search of a good ‘reason’ for his 
behaviour is a pointless exercise. His motivations are not ‘reasonable’ and, in a very important 
sense, not commensurate with ordinary experience.  
 At almost every turn, Edward is seen by Dowell as the innocent party in a series of 
unfortunate events. Dowell constantly shifts blame elsewhere. He writes that if he had suspected 
Florence of sleeping with Edward, and thereby making Leonora jealous, he would have turned 
on her with a ‘mad rage’ (58). He thereby negates the impact of Florence’s betrayal on their own 
marriage (which itself is another example of his own experience consistently being demoted) 
while also denying the guilt that should attach to Edward. For Dowell, it is Florence who is guilty 
of hurting Leonora: Edward is absolved of any responsibility. In the final part of the novel, 
Edward is said to have spent a considerable amount of time in helping his gardener’s daughter 
escape conviction following an accusation of infanticide. A short number of pages later, and in 
throwaway fashion, Dowell refers to the 'gardener's daughter who had murdered her daughter' 
(195). There is no reason given for this complete assurance of guilt but it shows that Dowell is 
                                                           
47 In The Diseases of the Will, Théodule Ribot reports a case in which a young man feels the unwanted urge to kill his 
own mother. He tells her of this desire and insists on enlisting in the army so as to be separated from her. Ribot 
writes that 'he was immovable in his resolution, went away and was a good soldier. However, a secret will continually 
urged him to desert, so as to return to the country and kill his mother’ (my emphasis). Théodule Ribot, The Diseases 
of the Will, trans. Merwin-Marie Snell (Chicago: Open Court, 1896) 59-60. 
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capable of judgment – even judgment of the harshest kind. There is plenty of guilt to go round 
in The Good Soldier but somehow Edward, the central ‘character’ of the tale, manages to escape 
Dowell’s censure. 
Edward is less immune from criminal prosecution. In the Kilsyte case, Edward is accused 
of imposing his unwanted attentions on a young lady of a lower class whilst alone together in a 
train compartment. In Dowell’s account, which he gets from Edward, the girl was upset about a 
quarrel with her boyfriend and Edward’s desire to comfort her is the innocent explanation for 
his actions. Dowell reports that Edward:  
 
assured me that, before that case came on and was wrangled about by counsel with all 
sorts of dirty-mindedness that counsel in that sort of case can impute, he had not had the 
least idea that he was capable of being unfaithful to Leonora. But, in the midst of that 
tumult - he says that it came suddenly into his head whilst he was in the witness-box - in 
the midst of those august ceremonies of the law there came suddenly into his mind the 
recollection of the softness of the girl's body as he had pressed her to him. And, from 
that moment, that girl appeared desirable to him - and Leonora completely unattractive 
(127).  
 
In claiming not to have found the girl attractive until he was in court hearing about his own 
actions, Edward’s innocence is reinforced. What is also evident is that, for Edward, character and 
agency are formed within the forum of the law, and as an afterthought. What Dowell would term 
‘madnesses’ have been formed into standardised desires which can be held open to judgment – 
he has been turned into what Eigen described as ‘the law’s conception of the Person’. But the 
law has not captured a moment in time and attributed blame here. It has created a ‘character’ 
who can explain the development of the facts as they have been presented.48 The law, because of 
the influence of psychology, was becoming more aware of the stereotypical and fictional nature 
of such constructions. But Edward accepts such a formalisation, indeed he grasps it as a 
definitive sign of himself: he becomes the ‘character’ bestowed on him by the court. The 
                                                           
48 As Maria Aristodemou writes: 'The law is unwilling to acknowledge the idea of a life made up of discontinuous, 
isolated events, without a logical sequence designed to conform to and achieve an overall plan’. Aristodemou, Law 
and Literature: Journeys from Her to Eternity  139. 
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individual in the train compartment, the event that occurred, and the experience that he went 
through are, thus, obliterated.49  
 Peter Brooks connects similar ideas in his work on the formal implications of police 
interrogation in the narrative construction of confessions. In their subtle coercion of suspects, 
interrogators produce inculpating statements – and so the authoring of the confession is 
removed from the sole ownership of the suspect: 'the narrative written in his name - signed by 
him - is an alienated production’.50 With Edward, such alienation moves beyond the coercive 
forms of judicial power and becomes completely internalised. He is said to have no intentions 
towards Nancy until the moment he starts talking to her as he would to a potential conquest. 
Dowell proclaims that:  
 
in speaking to her on that night, he wasn't, I am convinced, committing a baseness. It 
was as if his passion for her hadn't existed; as if the very words that he spoke, without 
knowing that he spoke them, created the passion as they went along. Before he spoke, 
there was nothing; afterwards, it was the integral fact of his life (98).  
 
Edward’s words are, thus, an alienated production which create, rather than capture, experience. 
And they are words that appear to come from nowhere – at least nowhere from which blame or 
guilt could be attributed.51 Edward’s indiscretions pile up without ever attaching themselves to 
him. His actions are, like the automatons that Eigen studies, somehow not his own. No wonder 
Dowell finds it impossible to give an ‘all-round impression’ of such a figure, and why he falls 
back on the superficial public construct of the ‘good soldier’ with which his knowledge of 
Edward had begun. 
                                                           
49 Edward lets his motive be told to him because he cannot define it himself. Wittgenstein suggested a similar idea 
when he wrote that 'in a law-court you are asked the motive of your action and you are supposed to know it. Unless 
you lie you are supposed to be able to tell the motive of your action. You are not supposed to know the laws by 
which your body and mind are governed. Why do they suppose you know it? Because you've had such a lot of 
experience with yourself?'. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief, 
ed. Cyril Barrett (London: Blackwell, 1966) 21. 
50 Peter Brooks, Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) 
78. 
51 Ford writes of a similar idea in a non-fiction work, connecting notions of crime, authorship and motivation in a 
startling way: 'I imagine that the greatest literary crime ever committed was Thackeray's sudden, apologetic incursion 
of himself into his matchless account of the manoeuvres of Becky Sharp on Waterloo day in Brussels. The greatest 
crime that anyone perhaps ever committed! For the motive of most crimes is so obscure, so pathological or so 
fatalized by hereditary weakness that there is almost nothing that can not be pardoned once one has dived beneath 
the calm surface of things. But Thackeray as child-murderer can never be forgiven: the deeper you delve into the 
hidden springs of his offence the more unforgiveable does he appear’. Ford, ‘The English Novel’, in Ford Madox 
Ford, Critical Writings, ed. Frank MacShane (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964) 7. 
115 
 
Causes, Clues and Expertise 
 
In Wiener’s account, by the end of the nineteenth-century, the criminal comes to be 
‘reconstructed’ in a way that takes little account of the ‘responsible individual’ so prevalent 
throughout the nineteenth-century. One of the texts he cites in this development is the Rev. 
William Morrison’s Crime and its Causes. Morrison, a prison chaplain, attempts to provide a 
serious account of crime’s origins. Yet, while Wiener is right to use this source as an example of 
a more in depth explanation of crime (as opposed to simple ‘depravity’) it is also an example of 
the kind of thinking that was fast becoming outdated. Morrison, in attempting to discern causes, 
only considers crime in terms of the results it could rationally be expected to have. So the 
possible explanation of poverty as a cause of crime is only examined in relation to the specific 
offence of theft (as that is the only crime which it would be rational to see more evidence of 
amongst the poor rather than the rich).  
 In fact, the ‘responsible individual’ theory was lessening in influence precisely because 
such connections could not be so easily assumed. There was a proliferation of causes for any one 
event and reason or rationality was only one element amongst many. The myth of a single cause 
was being ousted in all fields of cultural life.52 For instance, whereas previously, Charcot had 
realistically postulated the cause of hysteria in a single lesion in the brain, Freud declared there to 
be an over-determination of causes in the dream work or neurotic symptom.53 Similarly, the task 
of tracing the historical causes of events was undermined by Max Weber’s methodological 
essays. In fact, Weber made a conscious parallel between the work of the social sciences and 
criminal inquiry:  
 
We ask first, in common with juristic theory, how in general is the attribution of a 
concrete effect to an individual "cause" possible and realizable in principle in view of the 
fact that in truth an infinity of causal factors have conditioned the occurrence of the 
                                                           
52 In philosophy, such thinking had perhaps come a little earlier, as John Stuart Mill had criticised Hume for ignoring 
the complexities of antecedents which go to form a consequence. However, Mill did suggest that human beings still 
tended to think in terms of singlular causes. See H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honore, Causation in the Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1959) 15-17.  
53 Stephen Kern, A Cultural History of Causality: Science, Murder Novels, and Systems of Thought (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004) 244. 
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individual "event" and that indeed absolutely all of those individual causal factors were 
indispensable for the occurrence of the effect in its concrete form.54  
 
The discernment of such an infinity of causal factors was partly due to scientific progress. In 
1902 the French physicist Henri Poincare wrote that ‘we are continually perceiving details ever 
more varied in the phenomena we know, where our crude senses used to be unable to detect any 
lack of unity. What we thought to be simple becomes complex, and the march of science seems 
to be towards diversity and complication'.55 The illumination provided by science’s intricate 
devices thus brought with it more, rather than less, uncertainty in the analysis of phenomena. In 
keeping with its own diversity there were, therefore, numerous reasons why between the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Stephen Kern puts it, 'causal understanding moved in the 
direction of increasing specificity, multiplicity, complexity, probability, and uncertainty'.56 
The relationship between this cultural dissolution of singles causes and criminology was 
explicitly raised by a German literary series entitled AuBenseiter der Gesellschaft: Die Verbrechen der 
Gegenwart (‘Outsiders of Society: The Crimes of Today’). In his penetrating analysis of the series 
Todd Herzog points out that ‘the criminal justice system, like the criminal case study, seeks to 
construct a narrative that traces an event back to [...] a cause’.57 For Herzog, the heritage of such 
criminal case studies in Germany was seen in the Pitaval tradition. Much like the Old Bailey Sessions 
Papers in England, these were short accounts of criminal cases, made with the lay reader in 
mind.58 These works ‘seemed to be able to explain the causes of criminal behaviour’.59 By 
contrast, in ‘Outsiders of Society’, the illustration of a proliferation of causes ‘is precisely what 
the series strives to attain as it demonstrates the difficulty (perhaps impossibility) of clearly 
locating causality and guilt’.60 
 With even criminal case studies being driven into a position in which single causes could 
not be determined, how was the criminal court to react? The answer was to fall back on the very 
                                                           
54 Max Weber, "Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in Historical Explanation," in The Methodology of the 
Social Sciencs, ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York N.Y.: The Free Press, 1949), 169. First published 
in 1914. 
55 From Henri Poincare, Science and Hypothesis. Quoted in Kern, A Cultural History of Causality: Science, Murder Novels, 
and Systems of Thought  9. 
56 Ibid.  6. 
57 Todd Herzog, "Crime Stories: Criminal, Society and the Modernist Case History," Representations 80 (2002): 54. 
58 The Old Bailey Sessions Papers were transcripts of trials from the famous court which were ’assembled and published 
as pamphlets, of which there were one or more for each session. It is pretty clear that the whole process was a 
commercial venture with an eye to the interest of the public in general’. Thomas Rogers Forbes, Surgeons at the Bailey : 
English Forensic Medicine to 1878 (New Haven, Conn. ; London: Yale University Press, 1985) 17. 
59 Herzog, "Crime Stories: Criminal, Society and the Modernist Case History," 35. 
60 Ibid.: 39. 
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specificity of knowledge that was splintering the sense of singular causation in the first place. 
Hart and Honore write that 'very often expert evidence will settle whether an A can cause a B'.61 
Such evidence had been a feature of common law trials for many years - the earliest official point 
of its use, and its classic formulation, coming in the case of Folkes v. Chard (1782).62 The judge in 
this case ruled that ‘the opinion of scientific men upon proven facts may be given by men of 
science within their own science’.63 In its earliest origins, the predominant science to be utilised 
in this respect was medicine.64 The Old Bailey Sessions Papers contain the testimony of 'surgeons, 
physicians, medical students, apothecaries, chemists, midwives, and empirics' – evidence which 
was commonly given on the basis of a fairly broad range of knowledge.65 In his analysis of the 
history of coroner’s inquests, Ian Burney reports that prior to reforms in 1858 medical witnesses 
were not called to inquests for their special skill in reading dead bodies but for their experience 
of a specific individual whilst alive.66 It was only as the century progressed that in depth post-
mortems, conducted by trained Pathologists, became more routine.67 By 1895, the London 
County Council’s Public Control Committee was adamantly claiming that the earlier claim of the 
1823 Medical Witnesses Act that 'all medical men are equally competent' was erroneous.68  
The Pathologist, in contrast to the earlier medical expertise of the practising Doctor, 
sought to ‘ground all causal explanations in the physical traces he found upon and in [the 
body]'.69 Such traces could, individually, reveal the causal factors of a death. Once knowledge was 
removed from the individual taken as a whole, living, organism in this way, the reduction of its 
dead matter to divisible parts began and forensic science, as opposed to medicine, became the 
dominant form of expert testimony. Roger Smith writes that in the division of labour in relation 
                                                           
61 Hart and Honore, Causation in the Law  366. 
62 Some commentators have noted the un-formalised use of expert evidence in earlier times. Carol Jones writes that 
'legal texts cite the case of Folkes v. Chard as the precedent for the acceptance of expert testimony on opinion n 
English courts despite the fact that experts had been giving opinion evidence for almost a century beforehand'. 
Jones cites the use of physicians as expert defence witnesses by Spencer Cowper in 1678. Carol A. G. Jones, Expert 
Witnesses: Science, Medicine, and the Practice of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 57. 
63 Brian Wynne, "Establishing the rules of laws: constructing expert authority," in Expert Evidence: Interpreting Science in 
the Law, ed. Roger Smith and Brian Wynne (London ; New York: Routledge, 1989), 29. 
64 Roger Smith, "Forensic Pathology, Scientific Expertise, and the Criminal Law," in Expert Evidence: Interpreting 
Science in the Law, ed. Roger Smith and Brian Wynne (London ; New York: Routledge, 1989), 59. 
65 Forbes, Surgeons at the Bailey : English Forensic Medicine to 1878  15. 
66 Ian A. Burney, Bodies of Evidence: Medicine and the Politics of the English Inquest, 1830-1926 (Baltimore ; London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000) 109. 
67 Ibid.  113. 
68 Ibid.  123. 
69 Ibid.  131. In relation to The Good Soldier Sally Bachner notes that ‘death enables the novel’s only successful 
strategies for knowing another’s heart: identification and autopsy’. Sally Bachner, "'The Seeing Eye': Detection, 
Perception and Erotic Knowledge in The Good Soldier," in Ford Madox Ford's Modernity, ed. Robert Hampson and Max 
Saunders (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003), 106. 
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to dead bodies, the medical examiner ‘performs the autopsy (or post-mortem) on "the body", the 
scientist examines "the bits" removed from the body'.70 Poisoning trials then became focal points 
of public interest as the Victorian era progressed, with the expert Toxicologist acting ‘as a 
mediator between the insensible and the sensible, his task to demonstrate the presence of things 
not evident to others'.71 
While the coroner, pathologist and toxicologist examined the traces that were left on and 
in the body a whole array of techniques began to be used in the opposite direction. Alphonse 
Bertillon, whose anthropometric system of criminal identification will be referred to at length in 
due course, became one of the driving forces behind this as he directed his research ‘to the crime 
sites themselves, and in this sense the use of clues, forensic photography, and anthropometry 
together contributed to the crystallization of what came to be called "criminal science"'.72 In 
India, in 1897, the first recorded case was solved using fingerprint evidence – a bloody 
thumbprint being left at the scene of a crime.73 The new technology of discovering the criminal’s 
latent prints at a crime scene then became one of the most potent weapons in the investigator’s 
armoury.  With an ethos summarised by Edmond Locard’s influential dictum that ‘every contact 
leaves a trace’, the range of ‘traces’ left at a crime scene multiplied.74 By the turn of the century 
'the task of the forensic scientist was to examine paint, fibres, bloodstains, soil, debris, cigarette 
ash, marks, and impressions'.75 The body always left a trace on whatever it had come into contact 
with, but these were traces that, to most, were invisible. It took the eye of the trained expert to 
discern who had been where.76  
 Such techniques of detection formed the antidote to public concerns about hidden 
criminality: now the stain of guilt was invisible to the naked eye, but could never actually be 
erased. Crime tarnished the world in which it was committed with a smear that could be 
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71 Ian Burney, Poison, Detection, and the Victorian Imagination (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006) 6. 
72 Martine Kaluszynski, "Republican Identity: Bertillonage as Government Technique " in Documenting Individual 
Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World, ed. Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), 127. 
73 Chandak Sengoopta, Imprint of the Raj: How Fingerprinting was Born in Colonial India (London: Macmillan, 2003) 158. 
74 Matsuda writes that ‘medical-legalists operated with a profound assumption: nothing takes place without leaving 
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Matsuda, The Memory of the Modern (New York, N.Y.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 139. 
75 Jones, Expert Witnesses: Science, Medicine, and the Practice of Law  95. 
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observed, collected, and deciphered by, and only by, the trained expert.77 But the methodology 
employed by such expertise was not unique to the work of detecting crime. Carlo Ginzburg 
connects the art criticism of Giovanni Morelli, the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud and the 
detection of Sherlock Holmes as examples of a newly rediscovered epistemological paradigm 
that began to circulate in the late nineteenth-century. All three of these figures made almost 
imperceptible details the bearers of a hidden truth. While Freud examined the symptoms of 
neuroses, and Holmes found the clues to criminal activity, Morelli discerned forgeries not by 
what was perceived as the chief subject of the artwork but by its seemingly unnoticed features 
such as fingernails, eyebrows and eyelashes. One of Ginzburg’s key claims is that these examples 
all required their clues to be placed in a classificatory schema of esoteric knowledge (a knowledge 
which, in fact, came into being with the creation of a method such as psychoanalysis itself).78 In 
the criminal trial such a device could be seen in ‘the development of new techniques of forensic 
investigation’ which deduced ‘unrepeatable causes from consequences (ie. the traces or clues that 
remain)'.79 Those with the expertise to discern such causes became figures of some celebrity: 
'these were the experts who supplied the means to trap even the most sophisticated villain. They 
could not only prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt; they could prove him guilty beyond 
any doubt at all'.80 In the early twentieth-century, the most prominent of these figures was Sir 
Bernard Spilsbury, whose testimony came to be considered of the highest value.81 Spilsbury, and 
experts like him, became mechanisms of social reassurance: they ensured that the criminal would, 
without fail, be caught, as their powers of detection were ranked alongside those of their fictional 
contemporary, Sherlock Holmes.  
The comparison with Holmes’ detection is, in fact, instructive in a number of ways. 
Franco Moretti writes of the way that 'Holmes knows all the possible causes of every single 
                                                           
77 This sense of finding the invisible stain is still prevalent today, with recent reports of a new fingerprinting 
invention which can ‘reveal "hidden" fingerprints on metal - especially shell casings - by detecting the minute traces 
of corrosion on the surface caused by salt in the sweat on human fingers’. Quotation taken from BBC News, 
“Fingerprint Test May Catch US Killer”, 22/1/09. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7844665.stm. 
78 Carlo Ginzburg, Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). 
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event. Thus the relevant causes are always a finite set'.82 It is this reduction of seeming infinitude 
into a limited set of circumstances which is precisely the reassurance that expertise provided. Of 
course, in the case of Holmes, his area of expertise is more wide ranging than any real life expert 
witness. He could never know what a case would throw up and so had to ‘be well informed 
about a vast spectrum of potentially relevant bits of information'.83 Such knowledge allowed 
Holmes to make logical connections between the normally unobserved minutiae of his 
surroundings. Or rather, the details that Holmes utilises are not realised by others in their full 
significance because they do not have his knowledge. Holmes’ detection thus relies ‘on strong 
indexical codes belonging to special areas of knowledge and techniques of classification and 
identification worked on and recast by Holmes himself'.84 In another connection to Ginzburg’s 
analysis, and in a method which bears striking similarities to the philosophy of Charles Sanders 
Peirce, Holmes’ next move, following the discernment of a hidden clue, is to test his own 
hypothesis.85 Neither induction nor deduction is, in actual fact, Holmes’ complete method. 
Rather, he ‘starts by observing, recording, and matching up several observational data 
(induction); he then advances a hypothesis to account for or interpret the observed facts in order 
to identify possible causes of the resulting event (abduction)'.86 Holmes begins with observational data, 
but it is data that has only become observable, has only been made visible to Holmes himself, 
because of the ‘techniques of classification’ with which he works. The hypothesis then put 
forward, which tests the data observed, is similarly built upon Holmes’ own special areas of 
knowledge. Holmes never ventures outside of this zone: he is never surprised by what he finds 
or placed in a position of having to revise what he thinks he knows. By the logic of pragmatism, 
Holmes thus only rearranges the facts in a way that makes for a practically efficient interpretation. 
The classic fictional detective, whose work was so intimately connected to the scientific expert, 
is, therefore, ‘a riddle-solver, not an interpreter of “opaque" facts’.87 As with Forster’s portrayal 
of Aziz’s trial in A Passage to India, the issue was how to create truth in an act of puzzle-solving, 
rather than how to reconstruct reality by the solving of a problem.  
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As knowledge has continued to branch off into ever more specialist areas, expert 
evidence has been submitted from a burgeoning range of witnesses.88 A series of evidential rules 
have also arisen in relation to expert testimony. One of the most prominent of these, the 
ultimate issue rule, prohibits the solicitation of expert testimony as to the existence of a 
constitutive fact (such as the intention to kill in a case of murder). Yet it has been noted that ‘it is 
doubtful whether any such rule has ever fully crystallized' and that ‘experts are asked questions 
on such issues and do give their answers'.89 This was one of the issues raised by Marshall Hall in 
his defence of George Joseph Smith in the infamous ‘Brides in the Bath’ case. Sir Bernard 
Spilsbury, who had been called as an expert witness by the prosecution, was specifically asked 
whether the deaths in question could be consistent with a theory of accidental death. Marshall 
Hall’s objection was that this ‘was the question for the jury’, but the question was allowed and 
Smith was convicted.90 This case was also the first in England to utilise ‘similar fact evidence’, in 
which evidence of other offences other than the one at issue is deemed admissible if it goes 
towards proving ‘design’ on the part of the accused. Expertise was thus employed, and in this 
case allowed, in the seemingly basic connection of facts as ‘similar’. 
 Marshall Hall’s objection was based on a notion of expert testimony summarised by a 
recent legal textbook:  
 
Traditional theory has it that the role of the expert is to furnish fact-finders with the 
specialist knowledge they require to return a well-informed, true verdict on the facts of 
the case. Expert witnesses are not supposed to pre-empt the jury's determinations, even 
on technical or scientific matters beyond lay knowledge or experience.91  
 
This ‘traditional theory’ is one in which expertise is utilised in order to educate the juror, 
providing them with the knowledge they need to adjudicate on a case. But, as Scott Brewer 
remarks, ‘most judges and juries [...] are not sufficiently familiar with relevant scientific fields to 
be able independently and reliably to bring scientific information to bear on their decisions. 
Instead, they must solicit and defer to the judgments of expert scientific witnesses’.92 Rather than 
educating the juror, then, the expert commands that a certain decision be taken.  
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 The growing authority of expertise in the courtroom, while saving the world of singular 
causes so important for judgment to be possible, was, thus, removing the question of judgment 
from the layman. The notion of causation, the basic connecting of events crucial to a trial’s 
reconstruction of events, was being taken out of the hands of ordinary observation and 
experience. As Matsuda writes 'the witness, the presence of the one who had heard and seen, was 
challenged, or justified, by the one who never heard and never saw, but who nonetheless could 
render commentaries on the experience of the other'.93 The myth of singular causes needed the 
parallel myth of the unfailing expert vision that could see them. Experience was no longer 
enough – its raw immediacy and collected recounting now had to be supplemented by expert 
authority.94 Crime, and the criminal, was not to be perceived by the layman in ordinary 
experience but to be deciphered, classified and interpreted by a range of experts bound by a 
schema of esoteric knowledge.  
 
Identity and Identification 
 
The use of expertise at trial helped to safeguard the notion of singular causes, of which 
‘character’ and ‘intent’ could be examples. But identity and expertise intersected at exactly the 
same time in a different, perhaps even more essential way: that of criminal identification. What 
happened with the identification of criminals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
mirrors exactly the dissolution of character that was seen in questions of motive and intent. As 
Ronald Thomas notes, 'during the nineteenth-century, this development involved the systematic 
transformation of the notion of the individual citizen's essential reality from something we call 
"character" to something we came to call "identity"'.95 The precise way in which this was done, 
and the role that expertise played in its evolution, also had parallels in the novel, where the 
depiction of identity needed new literary techniques. 
The most obvious form of identification had, for a long time, been the individual name. 
But whereas in the medieval and early modern periods when this had been tied, as with so much 
else, to the local knowledge of a community, in the early nineteenth-century the greater mobility 
of people throughout nation states led to a more systematic tracking of individual identities.96 In 
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a sense, the change from character to identity was already complete at this stage, as identity 
became known by ‘means of registrations, passes, censuses, and the like’.97 As Jane Caplan and 
John Torpey put it: 
 
The identity document purports to be a record of uniqueness, but also has to be an 
element in a classifying series that reduces individuality to a unit in a series, and that is 
thus simultaneously deindividualizing. This discloses the fundamental instability of the 
concept of the "individual" as such, and helps to explain the uneasy sense that we never 
fully own or control our identity, that the identity document carries a threat of 
expropriation at the same time as it claims to represent who we "are".98 
 
Even as it conferred identity, official documentation seemed to take it away. Despite this, the 
fundamental component of the early identity document – the validated name – was vitally linked 
to an individual’s sense of self. To be an individual was to have a name.99 To have the document 
was to be that person – but documents could be forged and names easily appropriated.  
The motivation to take on new identities in this way was not limited to the potential it 
offered for criminal opportunities. First time offenders were treated with greater leniency by the 
justice system so avoiding recognition as a recidivist was also worthwhile. The authorities, 
becoming aware of this practice amongst the criminal classes, had to find methods of identifying 
the real criminal behind the fake name. In London, throughout the Victorian period, all newly 
convicted prisoners were initially held in Holloway and inspected three times a week by the 
Metropolitan and City of London Police. It was the recognition of previous offenders by these 
officers which was relied upon to identify recidivists and then treat them accordingly.100 This was 
a reasonably successful system, but it was not without difficulties. It took up a considerable 
amount of man hours and relied on both chance (as not all police officers attended every 
inspection) and human fallibility. It was also easily circumvented. A criminal need only move to 
an area policed by a different force to completely evade detection. Failing this, the other main 
method of identification was the register of distinctive marks, in which descriptions of convicted 
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criminals were made. The register was an unsystematic format and its descriptions were not 
formalised in any way. It listed only very broad traits such as ‘tall’, ‘stocky’, or ‘dark’, to which 
was added a note of any tattoos or visible scars.101 In placing faith in the ability of police officers 
to recognise previously convicted criminals, and the assurance found in an unsystematic 
description of physical attributes, Victorian society placed their belief in the hands of recognition. 
Just as in the realist novel, in reality, the identity of a character would inevitably be discerned. 
But in the late Victorian period recorded crime was increasing. This was thought to be 
predominantly the result of recidivism, but nothing could be definitively proven. For crime to be 
reduced, it would first have to be ascertained exactly who was committing it. Recidivism 
therefore became ‘the central issue around which criminal policy was reshaped in the 1890s'.102 
Prominent legal cases formed the focal point of attendant concerns about criminal identification. 
The famous case of the Tichborne Claimant in the early 1870s had already raised serious 
question marks about the accuracy of identification. It was, however, superseded in the cultural 
imagination by the miscarriage of justice involving Adolf Beck, who was first tried in 1896 for a 
series of confidence tricks over the previous eighteen months in which affluent women were 
fleeced of both cash and jewellery.103 A pattern of very similar crimes had taken place in 1877, 
with a conviction being made, and it was thought that this recent spate was the work of the same 
criminal. Beck was identified as the guilty party in two ways. Firstly, fifteen of the victims 
inspected Beck. Ten of them claimed that he was the culprit, with only one of them stating that 
he definitely was not the man in question.104 Following this, the officers who had arrested the 
perpetrator of the 1877 frauds were traced and asked to identify Beck, which they both duly did, 
Constable Ellis Spurrell stating that 'There is no doubt whatever he is the man’.105 The second 
way in which Beck was identified was by way of his handwriting. Letters had been exchanged as 
part of the confidence trick. A comparison was made between those sent in 1877 and those in 
1894-5 and the judgment made that they were the work of the same hand. The fact that Beck 
had been in Peru in 1877 and so incapable of committing the earlier offences was, inexplicably, 
never raised by his defence counsel at trial. He was found guilty and sent to prison. Upon his 
                                                           
101 Simon A. Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2001) 28. 
102 Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, law and policy in England, 1830-1914  342. 
103 Ian Dennis writes that 'well-known cases of miscarriage of justice resulting from mistaken evidence of identity 
start with Adolf Beck’. I. H.  Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) 216. 
104 John W. Shepherd, Haydn D. Ellis, and Graham M. Davies, Identification Evidence: A Psychological Evaluation 
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1982) 10. 
105 Eric R. Watson, ed., Trial of Adolf Beck 1877-1904 (Edinburgh: William Hodge and Company Ltd, 1924) 19. 
125 
 
release he was charged again in 1904 for yet another outbreak of the same crimes. It was only at 
this point that he was finally discovered to be innocent as the real culprit was found. 
The failure of identification in the Beck case, therefore, took place on two distinguishable 
planes. Firstly, he was falsely identified by witnesses because he shared a passing resemblance to 
the real culprit – who was later found to be one John Smith. In the preface to the Notable Trials 
series report of the case Eric Watson writes that for this reason the Beck case 'still remains a 
most remarkable example of the fallibility of human testimony and of human judgment'.106 This 
had far reaching effects. After his acquittal 'a committee of enquiry, headed by the Master of the 
Rolls, investigated the whole saga, concluding that evidence of identity based solely on personal 
recognition was unreliable'.107 Similar conclusions were being reached in the scientific forum, 
particularly on the continent.108 In France, for instance, psychologists such as Edouard Claparède 
were conducting tests, the results of which undermined the certainty assumed to be provided by 
conscious human memory. Claparède had masked men burst into a room in which he was 
working with his students and make a series of strange gestures and outbursts. Upon asking his 
students for their recollection of the event some two weeks later he found their memory to be 
extraordinarily weak: most of them could not even identify the masks worn by the intruders. He 
concluded that ‘the reliability of past events was shaped less by experience than by the structure 
of expectations by which they were investigated'.109 Witnesses, even when acting with the best of 
intentions, were turning out to be the most unreliable of evidentiary resources. As Matsuda 
writes: 'witnessing depended upon presence, yet presence (like "experience") was itself a 
problematic category for establishing the truth of the past'.110 Experience, previously the source 
of fact and truth, was now a ‘problematic category’ in evidential terms because its discovered 
yield was bearing marked discrepancies to its original lived immediacy.  
The second way in which Adolf Beck was falsely identified, the analysis of his 
handwriting, suggested that he had the same ‘hand’ as John Smith. The expert testimony of 
graphologists in this instance rested on the notion that Beck was consciously attempting to make 
his writing appear different to its natural style. The proof that they were, in fact, mistaken was a 
serious body blow to the ‘science’ of graphology. Its premise, that conscious disguise, as opposed 
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to unintentional authenticity, could be spotted and unmasked had now to be seriously 
questioned.111  
Ironically, a further way in which the authorities strove to fix Beck’s identity, but which 
was not properly utilised, bore striking similarities to methods which would soon become the 
focal point of efforts to avert similar injustices recurring. When Beck went to prison, he had to 
undergo the standard physical examination made on admittance. This information was to be 
added to his record – which was the criminal record of the ‘John Smith’ he was assumed to be. 
At this point it was discovered that while he was not circumcised, John Smith was. Beck 
therefore had his prisoner status changed to that of a first time offender. But, in another 
inexplicable oversight, this information was not communicated to the relevant authorities and 
the injustice remained unchecked. 
 The key marker of Beck’s identity ultimately resided in an intimate physical detail – a 
hidden detail even. Of course, the discernment of the minutiae of an individual’s physical being 
was not a new form of identification. In the Tichborne case, Lady Tichborne was convinced by 
the claimant because his ears ‘looked like his uncle's’.112 Similarly, in a case which resembled 
Tichborne in many respects, a man who claimed to be the Second Kumar of Bhawal was 
identified by his sister thus: ‘I noticed his features. I noticed his adam's apple. I noticed his hair 
was red; kata eyes, brownish. I noticed his teeth: they were those of the Second Kumar, even, 
smooth and beautiful. I noticed his hands and fingernails – every one of the fingernails. I noticed 
the palm and back of the hand. I noticed his leg, feet and toes’.113 Just like the Tichborne 
claimant, 'the kumar’s ears were so unusual that they were a mark of identity’.114 And, in a 
connection to the register of distinctive marks, it was the finding of a scar on the claimant’s left 
foot which corresponded with an archived medical report on the Second Kumar that was 
thought to be particularly strong evidence of his identity. 
 But such distinctions of unusual physical detail could not always be relied upon to exist, 
and their random and unsystematic formation still implied a great deal of uncertainty (as such, 
the identity of the Kumar remains an open question to this day). That specific details could be 
systematically utilised for the purposes of identification was, however, the way forward. 
Alphonse Bertillon was, in the early 1880s, a low ranking official in the Parisian police force, 
tasked with the job of matching the descriptions of individuals in arrest reports in the hope of 
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identifying repeat offenders.115 Frustrated by both the inaccuracy and lack of specificity in the 
descriptions he found, Bertillon hit upon a new, ‘anthropometric’, form of identification. This 
technique involved the measuring of various portions of the body (for example, the 
circumference of the head, the length between wrist and elbow, the width of the foot). 
Foremost, amongst these measurements was the examination of the ear. Bertillon’s method 
rested on two fundamental assumptions: that the human skeleton was peculiarly unique to its 
owner and that its dimensions remained unaltered once adulthood had been reached. But this 
was uniqueness by a route – it was not immediately discernible. Bertillon’s measurements were 
notoriously difficult to make and a specific area of expert ‘measuring’ came into being. This was 
no work for the lowly police clerk. Identity was now, rather, in the hands of the expert, via the 
measurements of their carefully calibrated instruments. As Matsuda writes: 'Bertillon's team 
carefully guided and noted the measurements, but the real testimonies of identity now were in 
the lenses and engraved scales of the camera, meter stick, and calipers'.116 This was a system 
which could literally capture identity: 'no name change, no change in personality could elude 
Bertillon's classification system, which ensnared the body in a textual net made of its own naked 
corporeality'.117 Like Florence in The Good Soldier, identity had become a ‘scrap of paper’. 
 The anthropometric system made detail king. As such, it utilised exactly the same 
evidential paradigm defined by Ginzburg. Bertillon’s ears were in fact the same as Morelli’s – the 
often unexamined item of the physical body that could give identity away.118 Yet, Bertillonage also 
had another facet. Identity lay in physical details, systematically measured and recorded. But, it 
was the combination of these details that made the individual. In Bertillon’s classroom, where he 
trained new operatives in his system, the following was written on the wall in large black letters: 
‘The eye sees in each thing only what it is looking for, and it only looks for what is already an 
idea in the mind’.119 In normal perception, people only see what they expect to. With Bertillon’s 
system, by contrast, the identity card (termed a portrait parle by Bertillon) would speak the 
individual’s identity by collating measurements which had to tally within a set limit of 
diversion.120 Identity was the sum of seemingly insignificant parts and ‘complete identity was 
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about taking the face and body apart’.121 The individual had to be fragmented in order to be 
discerned. 
The anthropometric system worked, but its weaknesses were exposed by the discovery of 
a competing system of identification which is still utilised to this day: fingerprinting. The 
discovery of fingerprints, as a mark of identity, had first been made in British India. In fact, its 
development owed much to the very colonial situation which formed the context of the previous 
chapter. It was the issue of dishonesty – specifically, the problem of impersonation – that first 
led administrators to think of novel ways to guarantee identity. The drawing of pensions, for 
instance, seemed to indicate either members of the native population living to incredible ages or 
the criminal adoption of identities for financial gain. William James Herschel first explored the 
possibility of fingerprints being added to legal documents as a form of signature in the 1860s. 
Herschel, however, never dreamt of the overall impact fingerprinting could have on criminal law 
and the identification of prisoners. Francis Galton and Edward Richard Henry were responsible 
for driving the system in that direction. Their efforts proved successful as, in 1897, the 
identification of criminals by their fingerprints was universally adopted in British India.122 
 One reason that the development first occurred in India was that Bertillon's system was 
thought unworkable in the sub-continent because of the perceived similarity of the natives. Eye 
colour, for instance, was considered a useless distinction between Indians, as all were brown. 
This was despite the fact that the anthropometric system listed over twenty different shades of 
brown eye colour.123 What did help to advance the dominance of fingerprinting in Europe, 
however, was the powerful hold that its potential to solve crime had upon the public’s 
imagination . The technology which allowed for guilty prints to be revealed at the scene was fast 
becoming another weapon of detection in the arsenal of the expert witness. For this reason, 
Bertillon’s promotion of forensic science, in effect, led to the demise of his own identification 
system as ‘criminals might leave their fingerprints at the scene of a crime, but never dropped lists 
of their anthropometric measurements'.124 
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Fingerprinting was also simply more reliable. Without being able to explain why from 
first principles, no one had yet discovered two people with the same fingerprints. By contrast, in 
1903 in the US case of ‘Will West’, two men were discovered who were identical to the point of 
foiling the anthropometric system.125 But just as anthropometry had altered the notion of identity 
by taking the individual apart in order to put him back together again, so too, fingerprinting 
offered a different view of identity. Identity had gone from being ‘a string of measurements of 
body parts to an image of patterned lines and ridges; from a construction that construed identity 
as emanating from the whole to a formulation of permanent identification from a part’.126 
Fingerprinting found identity in just one of the insignificant details that Bertillon had added 
together. And this identity was an image that in no way connected to the normal view of the 
individual. The fingerprint provided a way of seeing identity as an abstract image. It was a sign of 
unalterable selfhood and it resided in the capillary ridges of everyone’s fingers.127 
Just as with other forms of expertise, the institution of fingerprint analysis as a specialist 
form of knowledge had to be won by treading a fine evidential line. Fingerprints, as images of 
individuality, had to be, in some sense, self-evident. But the analyst who appeared in court to 
verify the identity of two sets of prints also had to maintain their position as a member of an 
enlightened group who were the only ones able to make such identifications. Just as with 
graphology, where identity was to be found in the hand of the individual but only correctly read 
by the expert, the ridges of an individual’s fingers were only to be fully grasped by the analyst. 
Instruction manuals and diplomas were offered (the brochure for one claiming that ‘this is the 
age of the man who knows – the trained expert’).128 By systematically offering formal training, 
the science of fingerprinting articulated 'norms of method and conduct that would preclude 
disagreement between experts'.129 This, allied to a subtle refraining from the language of fact, 
allowed fingerprint examiners ‘to insist both that fingerprints "spoke for themselves" and that 
credentialed experts spoke for them'.130 
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While the rest of the body, and certainly the ‘self’ that it supposedly housed, could 
change beyond recognition over the years, the fingerprint never altered. In this sense, it acted like 
a collected, tabulated form of what Walter Benjamin termed the dream ‘image’. The ‘image’, for 
Benjamin, was generated in the ‘echoing of two dissimilar things’.131 The physical being of an 
individual at two distinct moments, separated by time, were two such ‘dissimilar things’. What 
echoed through the years though, what tied these two things together as an identity, was the 
image of whorls, loops and ridges that defined them. Benjamin’s most developed use of the term 
comes in an article on Proust in which he writes that: 
 
According to Proust, it is a matter of chance whether an individual forms an image of 
himself, whether he can take hold of his experience. It is by no means inevitable to be 
dependent on chance in this matter. Man's inner concerns do not have their issueless 
private character by nature. They do so only when he is increasingly unable to assimilate 
the data of the world around him by way of experience.132 
 
Finding an image of oneself was thus becoming a problem just as the identification ‘image’ of the 
fingerprint was coming into being. So, at the same time as citizens were coming to be identified 
with greater precision, thus increasing their potential surveillance, individuals were, themselves, 
losing their identities. Not only was the experience of knowing another person downgraded by 
the impoverishment of recognition as a form of identification, but the ability to turn one’s own 
experience into identity was being lost. 
By turning the digits of the hand into ‘the individual letters of a printing press' the 
criminal could now be ‘captured in police files in the form of a concise "primary text" literally 
"hand-written" by (and on) the suspect body itself’.133 But what of the ‘primary text’ of literature 
and its printed form? For Ford Madox Ford the aim of fiction was to make his readers see truth, 
but this was not to be achieved by providing a realist account of ‘facts’.134 Ford’s technique, 
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rather, depended on his ability to ink out the impression of truth – his Literary Impressionism 
was designed to provide the ‘image’ of experience. Of this technique he wrote: 
 
I [...] considered for a long time how conversations presented themselves to the mind. I 
would find myself in a room with a gentleman who pursued an almost uninterrupted 
monologue. A week later, I would find that of it I retained, verbally, only his most 
characteristic expletives - his "God bless my soul's," or his "You don't mean to say so's" 
and one or two short direct speeches: "If the Government goes to the country, I will bet 
a hundredweight of China tea to a Maltese orange that they will have a fifty-eight to 
forty-two majority of the voters against them". But I remembered the whole gist of his 
remarks.135 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, the lack of character in the depiction both of Edward and Dowell 
was noted. In The Good Soldier, the type of speech that Ford refers to above is, therefore, 
characteristic of nothing other than whatever mask is, at that moment, being worn. For instance, 
Dowell comments on the habitual topics of Edward’s conversation: ‘Martingales, Chiffney bits, 
boots; where you got the best soap, the best brandy, the name of the chap who rode a plater 
down the Khyber cliffs; the spreading power of number three shot before a charge of number 
four powder ... by heavens, I hardly ever heard him talk of anything else’ (28). These subjects, 
utterly the domain of ‘the good soldier’, are listed precisely for their lack of essential character – 
nothing can be made of a person who talks only of such matters and, hence, Dowell still does 
not really know Edward after many years of acquaintance. 
The impression of Edward Ashburnham, what Ford refers to as the ‘gist’ above, is 
exactly what Ford’s narrator, Dowell, attempts to produce, thinking that he has failed. But 
despite his essential blankness being very much in evidence, a certain impression of Edward is 
given. Edward is found in the image, or images, which Ford creates. These images are not based 
upon a recognition of his physical characteristics – indeed, when such descriptions do appear 
their generic quality is significant. For instance, Edward is described at one point thus: ‘his hair 
was fair, extraordinarily ordered in a wave, running from the left temple to the right; his face was 
a light brickred, perfectly uniform in tint up to the roots of the hair itself; his yellow moustache 
was as stiff as a toothbrush’ (28). The ‘uniform’ tone of Edward’s skin is, here, matched by the 
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uniformity of the overall description, which eventually reduces to comparisons with the most 
commonplace of mass-produced objects (bricks and toothbrushes).  
Edward’s identity is given in a more individual fashion by way of certain abstractions. Near 
the end of the novel, Dowell, in emphasising the tortuous situation that Edward is in, writes that 
‘I seem to see him stand, naked to the waist, his forearms shielding his eyes, and flesh hanging 
from him in rags (186-7). A similar description occurs earlier, when Edward and Florence are 
imagined to be facing God’s judgment: ‘it is in black and white, my picture of that judgement, an 
etching, perhaps; only I cannot tell an etching from a photographic reproduction’ (60). Is this an 
etching, a photograph, or the impression of Edward’s print? Dowell’s visions present a certain 
image of Edward. More significantly, however, is the way that Edward can be seen in certain of 
his poses and actions precisely because they form images which are caught between the dissimilar 
extremes of his life. After the listing of the topics of Edward’s ‘good soldier’ speech, Dowell’s 
narration continues:  
 
And that was absolutely all that I knew of him until a month ago – that and the 
profusion of his cases, all of pigskin and stamped with his initials, E.F.A. There were 
guncases, and collar cases, and shirt cases, and letter cases and cases each containing four 
bottles of medicine; and hat cases and helmet cases. It must have needed a whole herd of 
Gadarene swine to make up his outfit. And, if I ever penetrated into his private room it 
would be to see him standing, with his coat and waistcoat off and the immensely long 
line of his perfectly elegant trousers from waist to boot heel. And he would have a 
slightly reflective air and he would be just opening one kind of case and just closing 
another (29). 
 
Here, what begins as a similar cataloguing of objects becomes something quite different to the 
blank listing of Edward’s speech. Within the single image of Edward in his ‘private room’ are the 
echoes of the various strands of his life, all of them connected to material objects rather than 
physical traits. Edward, the rough-and-ready officer in the mess, at work with his jacket and 
waistcoat off, is glimpsed at the same time as the line of his trousers illustrates his perfect 
elegance. The gun and helmet case of the robust soldier exists in tandem with the several cases 
‘each containing four bottles of medicine’ of an ailing heart ‘case’. The classic insignia of a 
gentleman, the monogrammed object, overlays the source from which the leather cases are 
made: a herd of gadarene swine, intent upon their own demise. What is also glimpsed is a man in 
a perpetual state of transit: objects are never removed from their cases permanently, only taken 
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from one and transferred to another – Edward is never at home, no matter what identity he 
occupies. 
Edward is glimpsed in this way in numerous moments throughout the text. The boyish 
exuberance and desire for companionship as well as the ‘good form’ required of a gentleman are 
surely evident when he remarks to Leonora that ‘By jove, you're the finest woman in the world. I 
wish we could be better friends’ (141). Yet, at the same time, is the guilt of his failure as a 
husband, his sense of his incompatibility with Leonora, and his simplistic interpretation of 
human affairs not equally as evident? Edward is never so much himself as when he is all things. 
Dowell remarks that, upon entering a room, Edward ‘snapped up the gaze of every woman in it, 
as dexterously as a conjuror pockets billiard balls’ (31). Edward is found in images of multiples, 
whether it be billiard balls or pigskin cases, and he pockets gazes both as a romantic innocent 
and a cruel seducer. His eyes, the windows to his soul, are therefore ‘as blue as the sides of a 
certain type of box of matches. When you looked at them carefully you saw that they were 
perfectly honest, perfectly straightforward, perfectly, perfectly stupid. But the brick pink of his 
complexion, running perfectly level to the brick pink of his inner eyelids, gave them a curious, 
sinister expression’ (30). Just as with the earlier physical description, Edward’s eyes, seemingly so 
extraordinary, are also compared to an everyday mass-manufactured object. But, in this image, 
Edward’s eyes also come to signify honesty, before being subverted into stupidity, only to 
become emblematic of his sinister side. Not one of these traits is more ‘Edward’ than another 
and, despite their incongruity, they all subsist equally within this singular image.  
Ultimately, these images, though they echo dissimilar things, build up a collective 
impression of Edward. It is an impression that is bolstered by the variety of more commonplace 
dimensions of his life. Edward is produced as a collection. His existence is given in the form of 
not one or two, but a proliferation of measurements. The measure of his life that sees him 
gambling away forty thousand pounds in Monte Carlo and spending a week with La Dolciquita is 
to be placed alongside and not apart from his generous treatment of his tenants at Bramshaw 
Teleragh. Edward is fragmented through his incongruous collection of acts but all of these 
events can be collected and placed together in a portrait parle: crucially, one of Bertillon’s cards need 
not have meaning nor hang together cohesively, it just needed to be recorded and filed. It is 
purely information just as Edward’s identity is nothing but a record of events. His speech, which 
revolved around such seemingly trivial and impersonal matters, thus does contribute to the 
ultimate image of him which is created. Dowell admits that he fails to provide an ‘all-round 
impression’ of Edward that would satisfy his recognition but he offers something much more 
relevant to the time: his anthropometric measurements. In providing individual images which 
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suggest, or allude to, such a multiplicitous existence Ford inks out the impression of Edward in a 
single instant. Experience may no longer be evident, but the image of its echo has been retained, 
and Edward’s prints are smeared all over the text. 
 
The Good Reader 
 
If identifying Edward is a matter of noting his measurements and viewing his images, what kind 
of expertise is required to read the rest of Ford’s novel? Some of the epistemological 
complications of The Good Soldier were mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. These ranged 
from Dowell’s significant lack of experiential knowledge, the filtering of the story through both 
Leonora’s, then his, conscious reflection, and the stressed impossibility of expressing one’s 
impressions with complete accuracy. Accepting these complications, and reading the novel as 
even a distorted vision of reality is something that requires a certain degree of good faith. 
Dowell, through no fault of his own, is ignorant; Dowell, no matter how hard he tries, is 
doomed to see his written version never quite live up to the real events as they occurred.136 But 
there is another possibility which rests on a hermeneutics of suspicion rather than faith. What if 
Dowell knew more than he lets on and much of his written account is simply lies? This 
possibility is more than hinted at by the narration itself, as Ford creates the impression of a 
narrator who is prone to slip-ups. Dowell writes a narration in which he makes mistakes. These 
come initially in the form of simple factual errors: for instance, he wrongly associates William 
Penn with Farnham in Surrey. But these ‘mistakes’ develop into what feel like genuine slips of 
the tongue (or pen).137 Dowell, this figure who supposedly knows nothing of what is going on 
around him, divulges that he was aware of Edward and Leonora prior to their first meeting 
because they are staying at the same hotel and Dowell, ‘used, by the courtesy of Monsieur 
Schontz, the proprietor, to inspect the little police reports that each guest was expected to sign 
upon taking a room’ (28). Dowell, who spends so much time protesting both his gullibility and 
ignorance, is here seen to have both a suspicious mind and to possess the requisite ingenuity to 
surreptitiously attain confidential knowledge. Why would he want the reader to know this? It is 
                                                           
136 Dowell’s lack of knowledge is, of course, in stark contrast to the ‘experts’, such as Sherlock Holmes, examined 
earlier. Sally Bachner writes that 'as a detective of barely visible traces, Sherlock Holmes holds out the hope that, if 
we only look with adequate attention, all will become visible. This fantasy of a visual empiricism without bounds is 
taken up by Dowell, who insists that his unflagging failure to know is an index only of his stunted observational 
powers’. Bachner, "'The Seeing Eye': Detection, Perception and Erotic Knowledge in The Good Soldier," 104. 
137 The influence of Freud’s work on mistakes, slips, and forgetfulness, first published in 1901, is of obvious 
significance here. Sigmund Freud, The psychopathology of Everyday Life, trans. Anthea Bell (London: Penguin, 2002). 
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the impression that some statements are intentional while others, such as this one, are simply 
allowed to slip out that encourages critics to feel that they can strip away the false narration from 
the true. Yet, despite Dowell’s inconsistency and unreliability being widely recognised, the full 
implications of these suspicions have rarely been discussed. Grover Smith writes that: 
 
it was essential to Ford that the untrustworthiness of the frame, the narrator, should 
point to the untrustworthiness of the tale. For most readers Ford's clues have proved too 
subtle: they have rushed in and hailed the romance of Edward Ashburnham as 
something ideal and noble, paying Dowell the compliment.138  
 
To avoid ‘paying Dowell the compliment’ is to recognise that, in creating a narrator who seeks to 
conceal what he cannot fail to divulge, Ford not only leaves clues but also makes concealment 
Dowell’s main feature.139 As such, an immediate sense of guilt is created. Rather than performing 
as a prosecuting lawyer, marshalling the facts and producing a concise account of events, Ford’s 
narrator thus comes to look more like an accused. The narration creates the peculiar sensation 
that Dowell is on trial, accused of some unnamed crime. Dowell is guilty – it is just not obvious 
of what.  
Such a correlation between narrator and accused could only make sense once the accused 
had the right to speak in court – something that, in England and Wales, had only been 
sanctioned with the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898. For the duration of the nineteenth-century, 
the accused had been silent at trial, playing no part in a forum increasingly dominated by lawyers. 
But the change from narrator-as-lawyer to narrator-as-accused also alters the position of the 
reader. In realist fiction the action of the novel had been a communication of facts in which the 
general experience of the reader could both discern and test the causal connections made (the 
reconstructive trial, similarly, appealed to the experience of the jury). In the literature of 
modernism, not only are the causal connections less obvious, but the communication is bound 
to be incomplete: Dowell explicitly claims to be incapable of expressing everything he wants to. 
Being a witness to the truth of what is being divulged therefore becomes something that requires 
a certain skill or a degree of expertise. Dowell’s possible duplicity adds another layer to this 
                                                           
138 Grover Smith, "Ford Madox Ford," in Six Modern British Novelists, ed. George Stade (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1974), 114. 
139 For a perceptive discussion along these lines see Colm Toibin, "The Art of Being Found Out," London Review of 
Books, 20th March 2008. Also, Peter Brooks, in summarising Foucault’s comment that Western man became a 
‘confessing animal’ writes that ‘'Foucault contends that the obligation to hide [...] is merely an aspect of the need to 
avow, to confess’. Brooks, Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature  99. 
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expertise as the reader must, to greater or lesser degree, read against his narration. In becoming a 
witness to the story, the reader now needs to become an expert witness: The Good Soldier requires 
the good reader.140 
In law, a particular area of expertise had arisen in relation to this notion of reading 
another’s words. During the early years of the twentieth-century, throughout continental Europe, 
various investigations were taking place in what could loosely be described as a science of 
testimony. Matt K. Matsuda, in examining the French variant of this research, which was 
undertaken by figures such as Ernest Dupré and Edouard Claparède, writes that 'the 
psychological investigation of testimony was an attempt to shape a science to interrogate a 
modern, indeterminate "self", driven by inner, unsuspected motivations'.141 Similar work was 
done by, amongst others, Alfred Niceforo, Hans Gross, and Hugo Munsterberg. Indeed, 
Munsterberg was responsible for many of the theories promulgated by these researchers 
spreading, as he accepted a position at Harvard and moved to the United States. Munsterberg 
then became involved in the development of the polygraph machine, famously publishing his 
findings in the case of Harry Orchard in 1907. Having found that Orchard was telling the truth, 
Munsterberg claimed that ‘no witnesses for the prosecution could have such convincing 
character as the results of the tests, and no witnesses for the defense and, of course, no opinion 
of twelve jurymen could have shaken this scientific finding’.142 This ‘science’, it turned out, rested 
on exactly the same forms of belief that had been the foundation of pre-modern judicial practice: 
it tested the veracity of statements and was validated by a quasi-religious belief in its efficacy. The 
ritualistic procedure of being ‘hooked up’ to the machine and asked a series of trivial questions 
interspersed with potentially incriminating ones, as the twitching ink-filled rods scratched out the 
real truth, formed a powerful image. As Ken Alder writes: ‘then, after the exam is over, the 
examiner confronts the subject with the inky, graphical traces of what the examiner asserts to be 
the subject's body's supposed betrayal (which, of course, the subject is unable to read), and 
advises the subject to confess. Under the circumstances, many subjects do self-incriminate’.143 
The polygraph machine has, in fact, never justified its claim to scientifically produce truth (hence 
the inadmissibility of its findings in US courts). But it has, despite this, produced results, and this 
                                                           
140 In an article for The Guardian, Julian Barnes writes of Ford: ‘he is not so much a writer’s writer (which can suggest 
hermeticism) as a proper reader’s writer. The Good Soldier needs The Good Reader’. Julian Barnes, "The Saddest 
Story," The Guardian, 7th June 2008. 
141 Matsuda, The Memory of the Modern  103. 
142 Quotation taken from unpublished 'Experiments on Harry Orchard’ held at Harvard University. Quoted in 
Thomas, Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science  30. 
143 Ken Alder, "A Social History of Untruth: Lie Detection and Trust in Twentieth-Century America," Representations 
80 (2002): 15. 
137 
 
is precisely because of the inability of the lay accused to read the results of his test. Alder notes 
that the technology of the machine has hardly altered since the 1930s, claiming that this is 
precisely because it is only a placebo and its outdated forms increase its ‘unreadable’ quality.144 
Only the expert could read the findings. By extension, only the expert could read the individual. 
The task of being a ‘good reader’ is, in one sense, precisely to read the unreadable in this 
way. In another sense it is to avoid ‘paying Dowell the compliment’ and evade what Frank 
Kermode termed ‘under-reading’. In ‘Secrets and Narrative Sequence’ Kermode argues that most 
readers under-read and that this allows for secrets to exist within texts – secrets which can only 
be uncovered by good, or even ‘over’ reading.145 The Good Soldier requires the over-reading 
normally associated with the academic critic in order to make its secrets visible: Ford, like Joyce, 
wrote a novel that would keep professors busy for years to come. This form of reading, the 
critical study of academics, has come to be as expert as the testimony of a fingerprint analyst or 
ballistics expert in court and, in its ability to find meaning in ‘inky, graphical traces’ it turns the 
reading of a literary text into a form of test. 
 A striking example of the kind of reading against the narrator that can be achieved in The 
Good Soldier is found in an article by Roger Poole (‘The Real Plot Line in Ford Madox Ford’s The 
Good Soldier: An Essay in Applied Deconstruction’). Poole’s reading depends, as his title suggests, 
on the expertise of the literary critic. This is first in evidence as he argues that what all previous 
readers of The Good Soldier have misunderstood is that Ford is writing a parody. It is always 
assumed that, following the example of his heroes Henry James and Joseph Conrad, Ford is 
producing just the same kind of narrative form. Poole argues that Ford is moving the technique 
on a stage, but, so subtly has this been done, it has eluded most readers:  
 
Indeed, so expert and deft is the misuse of the conventionalizations of parody and irony 
that there is a case for suggesting that Ford is not so much parodying or ironizing the 
narrative techniques of James and Conrad as putting a completely mendacious 
simulacrum in their place, a copy so good that no one ever suspected that it was not 
genuine, a latterday Golden Bowl. Not gold at all as it appears, but gilded crystal, and 
cracked into the bargain.146  
                                                           
144 Alder writes that ‘given the nature of the ruse, the internal working of the machinery was almost beside the 
point’. Ibid. 16. 
145 Frank Kermode, "Secrets and Narrative Sequence," in On Narrative, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981). 
146 Roger Poole, "The Real Plot Line of Ford Madox Ford's The Good Soldier: An Essay in Applied Deconstruction," 
Textual Practice 4, no. 3 (1990): 394. In the previous chapter, Welsh’s analysis of The Golden Bowl was mentioned. For 
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By invoking the image of the Golden Bowl, as an artistic fake, Poole recalls the knowledge 
paradigm that Ginzburg finds in the art criticism of Morelli, where the insignificant detail 
becomes the marker of truth. In this case it is Poole himself who is the arch detective, discerning 
nuances of style and genre on the basis of his literary knowledge. It is thus his expertise as a 
reader that gives him his first clue towards a new reading of the novel – and it is also the very 
expertise of Ford that has made this reading so invisible to most readers. 
For Poole, the narrative of The Good Soldier is not so much a communication of events as 
a test of the reader’s credulity. Central to this notion is the incoherence in the text surrounding 
the date of the 4th of August 1904. This is the date on which the Dowells and the Ashburnhams 
are described as first meeting but it is also reported as the date of their trip to Marburg. As they 
first meet in the evening, but the trip to Marburg takes place in the afternoon, this is impossible. 
Most editors and critics have attributed this to Ford’s slapdash attitude towards editing but Poole 
is not convinced. 
 
If one happened, the other didn't. But, since that follows, why has the narrator, Dowell, 
spent such a lot of ingenuity and technical expertise in establishing, at different points of 
his narrative, a pair of time schemes which are in fact not compossible? What could be 
his motive for setting up, in a novel totally committed to accurate time schemes, a 
'parallel causality' which equals in daring the inventions of the seventeenth-century 
theologians?147  
 
First the author’s and now the narrator’s ‘technical expertise’ have thus been invoked – this 
expertise forming precisely that which Poole’s own expertise can then utilise as proof towards an 
uncovering of the ‘real plot line’. And, in a further twist, it is not singular or plural causes that are 
at issue but a ‘parallel causality’ that evades logical conceptualisation. The conclusion Poole 
draws from this incoherent time frame is that the couples had met prior to the trip to Marburg 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Welsh the smashing of the bowl is the last rite of circumstantial evidence’s hold on matters of proof. Its invocation 
by Poole shows that, despite this, the bowl remains a powerful symbol of other forms of evidence. 
147 Ibid.: 405. Despite Poole’s claims, the notion that Ford was simply in error should not be completely dismissed. 
It could also have been an intentional error designed to represent the fallibility of memory. Few would be as aware 
of this as Ford, himself a notoriously ureliable narrator. In the introduction to his autobiographical work It was the 
Nightingale, John Coyle notes that 'many of the versions of events in the volume are contestable, not least by Ford 
himself in other accounts; yet this is surely to be expected of the author of The Good Soldier, in his own way as keen 
an explorer of the relation between memory, subjectivity and narrative as Proust or Beckett’. John Coyle, 
Introduction to Ford Madox Ford, It Was the Nightingale (Manchester: Carcanet Press, 2007) ix. 
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but that Dowell wants to conceal this for some reason. But the concealment is then multiplied as 
the question of when the couples met is joined by the issue of what other seemingly non-
compossible events could have occurred. For instance, if the two couples were not in Marburg 
then where might they have been when Maisie Maidan died? Poole argues that: 
 
The reason why the two sets of events for 4 August 1904 seem to be both necessary as 
told, and also not compossible, is that Dowell has cleverly run in together two sets of 
descriptions which 'belong' to each other in terms of plot, while he has used one to 
'mask' the other for reasons of alibi. For what Dowell wants the reader to come away 
with is the distinct impression that none of the four protagonists could possibly have had 
any opportunity to murder Maisie Maidan.148  
 
With the incoherence of the time frame, Poole begins to establish a completely new and unique 
view of the novel’s plot– he begins to uncover a fabula that has been more obscured than related 
by its sjuhzet.149 Firstly, he claims that Dowell and Leonora are the real adulterous couple and that 
they have plotted a scheme to rid themselves of their spouses, obtain the inheritance from 
Florence’s Uncle Hurlbird, and marry. He claims that the whole characterisation of Florence is a 
fiction that rewrites history – including the fact that he considers Jimmy to be a figure of 
unadulterated fantasy. The strange ending in which Leonora marries Rodney Bayham he sees as 
the perfect cover for the story. As for Dowell’s fate as the carer of Nancy – Poole claims that 
this is his natural position as Nancy’s father! 
All the specifics of Poole’s theory do not need to be investigated in full. The crucial point 
is the expertise with which he makes his reading. The theory that Dowell and Leonora are 
involved in a passionate relationship, for instance, is tested by a close examination of the scene at 
Marburg. As they inspect the pencil draft of the protest drawn up by Luther, Bucer, Zwingli, and 
Ludwig the Courageous, Florence points out to Edward the importance of the document:  
 
                                                           
148 Poole, "The Real Plot Line of Ford Madox Ford's The Good Soldier: An Essay in Applied Deconstruction," 408. 
149 This statement is true even in the most simplistic terms, as Ford’s exploration of the ‘time-shift’ makes the 
placing of events quite a challenge. As mentioned earlier, Vincent J. Cheng undertook this task, producing a 
chronological account of the story. Vincent J. Cheng, ‘A Chronoloy of The Good Soldier’, in Stannard, ed., The Good 
Soldier: an Authoritative Text, Textual Appendices, Contemporary Reviews, Literary Impressionism, Biographical and Critical 
Commentary. Barbara Herrnstein Smith, on the other hand, and as referenced in the previous chapter, goes so far as 
to claim that, in, The Good Soldier, 'there evidently are no sets and sequences of events that, already arranged in some 
particular way, could be spoken of as rearranged’. Barbara Herrnstein Smith, ‘Narrative Versions, Narrative 
Theories’, in W. J. T. Mitchell, ed., On Narrative (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) 224. 
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‘It’s because of that piece of paper that you’re honest, sober, industrious, provident, and 
clean-lived. If it weren’t for that piece of paper you’d be like the Irish or the Italian or the 
Poles, but particularly the Irish...’  
And she laid one finger upon Captain Ashburnham’s wrist (42). 
 
At the beginning of this chapter the superficial sense of this portrayal of Protestantism was 
mentioned, but Poole takes the analysis in another direction by closely examining Leonora’s 
reaction. Having left the Rittersaal, she asks Dowell: ‘Don’t you see that that’s the cause of the 
whole miserable affair; of the whole sorrow of the world? And of the eternal damnation of you 
and me and them...’ (43). Poole, utilising the terminology of Roland Barthes’ S/Z, argues that 
Leonora’s question brings ‘the “hermeneutic” and the “proairetic” codes into collusion’: the 
proairetic code being that by which the text is grouped into a sequence of events and actions, the 
hermeneutic code that which creates and reveals an enigma in the text.150 The mystery of what 
Leonora means by ‘that’ sets up an ‘agitation in the “hermeneutic” code’ – one which Poole 
argues is not adequately dissipated by the discord of Protestant and Catholic beliefs suggested at 
one level of the text (as Leonora is an Irish Catholic).151 Another possible explanation – that 
Leonora has discerned an intimacy between Edward and Florence – is rejected also. Why should 
that lead to the eternal damnation of her and Dowell? Dowell’s reply, which is not reported until 
some fifteen pages later, merely serves to agitate the ‘hermeneutic’ code further. He says ‘Do 
accept the situation. I confess that I do not like your religion. But I like you so intensely. I don’t 
mind saying that I have never had anyone to be really fond of, and I do not believe that anyone 
has ever been fond of me, as I believe you really to be’ (58). What is the situation that Leonora is 
to accept? Dowell is supposed to be ignorant of any relationship between Edward and Florence 
so it cannot be that. And how can Dowell think that Leonora is so fond of him if they have only 
just met? For Poole, the uncanny effect of the scene is due to its causal incongruity. There is a 
‘disproportion between what is cause and what is caused’.152 But it is only disproportionate if 
considered in relation to the above mentioned explanations. If Poole’s theory is considered, that 
Dowell and Leonora are plotting lovers, and that the scene just witnessed represents a new snag 
in their plans, then the impassioned language between them becomes explicable. Poole’s analysis, 
by way of narratological and structuralist theory, is thus closely related to the abduction of 
Charles Sanders Peirce or Sherlock Holmes. The smooth connection between cause and effect is 
                                                           
150 Poole, "The Real Plot Line of Ford Madox Ford's The Good Soldier: An Essay in Applied Deconstruction," 406. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid.: 422. 
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still the major form of proof, but these connections are no longer easily discernible. Rather, they 
are detected by the trained eye of the expert and submitted to the test of his imagined 
hypothesis.  
In a perfect use of one of Ginzburg’s examples, Poole then uses the language of 
psychoanalysis to further his argument. Dowell declares that  
 
Certain women’s lines guide your eyes to their necks, their eyelashes, their lips, their 
breasts. But Leonora’s seemed to conduct your gaze always to her wrist. And the wrist 
was at its best in a black or a dog-skin glove and there was always a gold circlet with a 
little chain supporting a very small golden key to a dispatch box. Perhaps it was that in 
which she locked up her heart and her feelings (33).  
 
Poole, by way of Freud, points out that:  
 
incomplete development of the sexual aim can lead to fixated desire, to desire for 
abnormal, partial, or displaced objects. One part of the body will stand in synecdochically 
for the whole possible relationship. Dowell's selecting of Leonora's wrist as her best 
feature seems to be such a partial perception of her. The transition through the glove, the 
little chain, the golden key and the implied dispatch box show the fetishistic gaze at 
work.153  
 
The scene at Marburg reaches a high point of tension when Florence ‘laid one finger upon 
Captain Ashburnham’s wrist’ (42). Dowell, who is, for some reason, ‘horribly frightened’ by this 
scene then discovers that ‘the pain in my left wrist was caused by Leonora’s clutching it’ (42). At 
this erotically charged moment in the text, therefore, passion and betrayal are connected, and 
condensed by the contact between finger and wrist. In this minor physical detail the pulse of the 
story beats. For Poole, it is the textual equivalent of a fingerprint. 
Poole’s account of the novel is hugely original, but it is also a prime example of what 
many critics have attempted to do with the text. Rose De Angelis, for instance, sees the 
underlying plot as one of Dowell’s sexual desire for Edward, the surface narrative only betraying 
the intricate triangulations that such a desire has caused.154 There have also been several readers 
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154 Rose De Angelis, "Narrative triangulations: Truth, identity, and desire in Ford Madox Ford's The Good Soldier," 
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who have suggested that, contrary to anything Dowell knows or admits, Nancy is, in fact, 
Edward’s daughter.155 These accounts, all attempts to uncover the real fabula behind the 
obscuring sjuhzet, are all predicated upon the use of specialist knowledge and the ability to find 
truth in details. Ford wrote that in a novel ‘every word set on paper – every word set on paper – 
must carry the story forward’.156 This desire was paraphrased by Kermode as the dream that 
‘nothing in the text is to be classifiable as formal or inert, merely consumable; everything is 
capable of production’.157 This potential for ubiquitous production relies on just the multiplicity 
of possible meanings that the text’s many critics have given evidence of. Not only is every word 
of The Good Soldier capable of production – every word is capable of multiple productions and, 
hence, the same words and sentences are utilised by different critics to bolster up the most 
divergent of readings.  
 Yet, while claiming genre, style, tone, narratology, and psychoanalytical theory as various 
forms of evidence, Poole, and other critics, also wants to use a more basic language of facts. 
Poole often refers to the ‘fictional facts’ of the novel while David Lynn argues that it is 
Florence’s betrayal and Edward’s suicide that motivate Dowell to tell the story: ‘the two years it 
takes him to finish the tale, the events that occur during these years and, most important, the act 
of narration and the necessity of imposing pattern, all enable Dowell to come to terms with 
those first undeniable facts'.158 Ford, himself, wrote in a similar vein, at one time proclaiming that 
as an author ‘above all you must not fake events’.159 The idea of ‘factual fictions’, discussed in the 
Introduction, is therefore still relevant throughout the twentieth-century. But are these the same 
kinds of ‘facts’. In stressing the importance of eyewitness testimony in the establishment of 
evidence (both circumstantial and direct), Jan Melissa-Schramm argues that 'as with legal 
discourse, the history of the realist genre is also the history of the construction of credible 
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testimonies'.160 As such, realist authors 'resist an over-reliance on hearsay material'.161 Poole, in 
one sense, seems to arrive at the same logical position, as he is unwilling to give credence to 
anything that Dowell says for which there is no ‘direct evidence’ (something which, itself, allows 
for enough doubt, as much of the action is only what Dowell hears of second-hand). But he is, 
in fact, working in quite a different manner. Poole dismisses the character of Jimmy as a ‘fiction’ 
designed by Dowell to impugn Florence’s character. This is despite there being Dowell’s direct 
evidence that he existed. Poole’s reasons for rejecting Jimmy: cultural knowledge and an eye for 
literary anomaly. How can the reader be expected to believe that, in the 1890s, a young girl 
would be accompanied on a trip around the world with a male friend? And why, in a novel 
committed to tracing its character’s genealogies, is there a figure who is not even given a second 
name? For Poole, ‘the name 'Jimmy' stands as a kind of bare forked nothing, a refusal of naming, 
a conundrum, a mystery, a locus of doubt. Dowell obviously intends us to understand a non-
person, a non-character’.162 
It is not that there is inconsistency in Jimmy’s portrayal, or uncertainty in his role, it is 
simply Poole’s contention that he does not fulfil the conditions required by this novel of its real 
participants. This is a convincing argument, but in reading the novel, it is very difficult to doubt 
Jimmy’s existence: his portrayal not being subject to the more normal forms of ‘unreliable’ 
narration. It appears that the best way to ‘get’ a reading like Poole’s is by reading his essay even 
at the expense of reading Ford’s text itself. That is not to say that it is a weak or unconvincing 
argument (far from it). It is, rather, to suggest that the ‘good reading’ has to, in a certain sense, 
replace the text itself, just as the expert’s testimony has to be simply accepted by the juror. Of 
course, the good reader does provide various forms of evidence – but as has been shown this 
often comes in the form of the authoritative resources that they are able to utilise. As such, and 
unlike the realist novelist that Schramm wrote of, the good reader does rely on hearsay material.  
  But what, precisely, does it mean to rely on hearsay? The legal concept itself, which was 
only rigorously excluded from common law courts from the mid-eighteenth-century onwards, 
can be defined as evidence given by a witness of a statement made on a separate occasion by 
another person, when that evidence is offered solely in order to prove the truth of the statement. 
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In other words, a witness cannot say what someone else said as if it is a true statement of fact. 
However, ‘it is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by evidence, not 
the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made'.163 Despite the basic rule against it, there 
are several forms in which hearsay becomes admissible – the words of a dying victim for 
instance. One of the most important of these arose in relation to the testimony of experts. 
Scientific knowledge is built upon generalizations and disseminated amongst a community of 
researchers in written form. If scientific evidence is to be allowed in court an acceptance of this 
fact has to be made: ‘thus, experts are permitted to draw upon data bases, test results, and 
academic literature that would normally be rejected as hearsay if relied upon by an ordinary 
witness of fact’.164 What would be ruled out in the context of the reporting of sensory 
experience, therefore, becomes admissible when related to esoteric knowledge. As Carol Jones 
notes, 'the law has increasingly allowed expert witnesses to include in their evidence facts and 
theories formulated by other people, which formed the underlying premiss or data upon which 
the expert's opinion was based'.165  
The crux of the standard rule against hearsay is that the absence of the individual who 
uttered the words in question means that their testimony is not open to cross-examination. The 
position of expertise at trial in the form of a witness is therefore important – as their position on 
the stand opens them to rigorous questioning.166 So, although the expert, rather than reporting 
the evidence of their senses, works by distilling a large body of knowledge and applying it to 
specific circumstances, their believability rests on a very similar ability to project an air of 
trustworthiness. Initially, this trustworthiness may come in the demeanour of the witness. A 
guide to medical and scientific professionals on what is required of them to be expert witnesses, 
published in the early 1990s, contains a whole section on ‘demeanour in court’.167 Roger Smith, 
too, notes that 'when asked what makes a good expert witness, most people involved with 
forensic evidence, whether as lawyers or scientists, mention first of all communication skills'.168 
But such a demeanour, the word being taken in a broad sense, is about much more than a 
confident speaking style. The outstanding success of Sir Bernard Spilsbury has, in some quarters, 
been attributed to the impression he was able to create of his own integrity – but also his 
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authority as a scientist. He first hit the headlines in the case of Dr Crippen, where he ‘prepared 
slides of abdominal skin and demonstrated a healed surgical scar. He stood up well to cross-
examination. He took the slides and his microscope, into court and demonstrated his findings to 
the Judge, counsel and Jury - the first time a medical witness had done this'.169 Spilsbury’s ability 
to perform well under cross-examination is, here, surrounded by statements in which his 
preparation, knowledge, and use of scientific instruments is to the fore. He took his microscope 
and slides, the authoritative symbols of his ability to see what the layman could not. 
 An ordinary witness has to perform in court in such a way that will emphasise their 
trustworthiness. An expert witness has to do something in excess of this. Not only must their 
honesty be unquestionable, they have to give the impression of excelling in their chosen field. 
The institutional authority with which their work is associated is the most obvious way in which 
a witness’s credentials are measured but, as Smith notes, authority is assessed ‘as presented in 
court rather than in terms which might satisfy scientific or medical communities'.170 The pressure 
to provide authoritative evidence, as it is presented in court, can therefore lead to the reduction 
of important ambiguities for the sake of clarity. Jones writes that lawyers 'routinely require their 
scientific witnesses to mask the contingent nature of their conclusions and their methodologies. 
Scientists must become expert not only as scientists but as witnesses. The term "expert witness" is 
thus nicely ambiguous in this respect'.171 The expert witness has to make things understandable 
for the jury but the simplification that such communication requires inevitably courts the 
possibility of ignoring important qualifications to the findings. 
 The subtle acceptance of hearsay that is involved in expert testimony merely mirrors the 
way that wider social beliefs are adopted. The modern world, even by the early twentieth-
century, was becoming saturated with the use of specialist apparatus, jargon and technology. It is 
this peculiarity of modernity that leads Odo Marquard to include a reliance on hearsay as one of 
the many facets of man’s contemporary ‘tachogenic unworldliness’. Marquard writes: 'Thus we 
increasingly have to accept experience that we have not had ourselves but are only acquainted 
with through hearsay [...] Precisely because experience, in modern times, is accumulated in a 
more and more scientific manner, we have to base our beliefs more and more on hearsay'.172 
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Marquard equates the rise of expertise with a descent into a reliance on hearsay, and separates 
both from experience.173 That is, the crisis in experience that has been the subject of this thesis is 
intimately associated with the rise of expertise that has been examined above. In the realm of the 
criminal trial, this led to a weakening of social trust in the trial itself: the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in England and Wales was founded in 1907, just when the burgeoning science of forensic 
analysis would seem to have allowed for greater certainty in criminal proceedings. In the novel, 
the same thing was happening. As the ‘good reader’ became the only one capable of 
comprehending the novel, its didactic aims, which had once been so crucial to its defining style 
of realism, were lessened.  
This chapter began with a discussion of the seeming denial of character in The Good 
Soldier and the implications of such a rejection were traced through the difficulty of attributing 
responsibility in a criminal trial. This, in itself, was partly because of the impossibility of 
determining singular causes for events (of which ‘character’ and ‘intent’ could be examples). It 
was subsequently seen that the role of expertise, in both law and literature, and in a way quite 
similar to both Forster’s and Stephen’s aspirations for codification, was utilised as an authority 
that could safeguard causes and, hence, judgments. Its role in the fixing of identities was also 
seen to have parallels in the precise way in which the image of an individual could come into 
being in a literary sense. Finally, the role of the good reader supplanted the common experience 
of the layman in interpreting and analysing both modernist literary texts and modern trials. But, 
in becoming the preserve of experts, and thus relying on hearsay material for its interpretation, 
the novel and trial were removing themselves further and further from experience. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE REPEATED APPEAL OF PROUST AND DREYFUS 
 
Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for 
what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, whereas genuine repetition is 
recollected forward. 
Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition1 
 
In Aspects of the Novel, E M Forster writes that ‘no novelist anywhere has analysed the modern 
consciousness as successfully as Marcel Proust’.2 According to the argument of this thesis, 
Forster’s statement implies that In Search of Lost Time creates a world devoid of experience – and 
this is, indeed, the case. Proust’s novel represents the supreme expression of the themes that 
were seen to appear in A Passage to India and permeate The Good Soldier. This is evident from the 
text itself – as lived immediacy is denigrated in favour of expectation and memory, and the 
famous moments of involuntary memory obliterate the presence of the concrete moment – and 
from its production: Proust’s act of writing involved a radical withdrawal from experience itself. 
Yet, in what initially appears a challenge to its position of pre-eminence in this respect, In Search 
of Lost Time is also concerned with several real life events, not least of which is a legal case: the 
Dreyfus Affair.  
 In this chapter, it will be argued that the manifestation of the Dreyfus Case in Proust’s 
novel serves not to pull the novel out of its position of non-experience but, rather, acts in a way 
which highlights the lack of experience in the case itself. The Dreyfus Case, like In Search of Lost 
Time, is built upon absence rather than presence: it relies upon secret irrefutable evidence just as 
Proust relies on an ideal past. But the potential for reading the right verdict and reading truth in 
the novel are connected in another way. In calling for a review of his conviction, Dreyfus’ 
supporters requested that his guilt be subjected to another, repeated, test. That this was, 
ultimately, achieved in a way which proved Dreyfus’ innocence served to highlight the need for 
specific forms of legal review and appeal – issues which were being debated at the same time in 
both Britain and France. In one sense, the authority granted to such forms of repetition seemed 
to spring from the same origins as had informed the development of modern science. By this 
rationale, the laws of nature are discovered by repeatedly experimenting upon the same materials 
in identical circumstances. To appeal a verdict could thus be seen as an attempt to repeat the 
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conditions of its judgment – with a greater degree of certainty being the end result. This certainty 
can be extended to include the law’s conception of its own sources; as it is in appellate courts 
that authoritative precedents are set, which then, themselves, become the original decisions 
which must be followed in the future. 
In Search of Lost Time is also the site of numerous forms of repetition. Elements of 
character, theme, and plot are all repeated in the course of the novel, while it has complete 
textual forerunners in Proust’s earlier works, Jean Santeuil and Contre Sainte-Beuve.3 Just as with the 
possibility of appealing a verdict, there is a sense in which Proust seems to aim at a repetition 
which could guarantee the original: his writing seeks to present numerous copies of the same 
unique truth. But, in this chapter, it will be argued that, in both the legal concepts of review, 
appeal and precedent, and in the numerous repetitions of Proust’s novel, a rereading occurs which 
subverts this possibility. Such rereading does not recreate conditions or reiterate originals. 
Rather, opaquely similar entities are unified in images which are then compulsively repeated in a 
variety of ways. Experience, once the origin of all knowledge, will, thus, be seen to have truly 
fallen in value when the origins of repetition can be only obliquely discerned.  
 
In Search of Conclusive Evidence 
  
The literary output of Marcel Proust could be said to form a similar trajectory to that of E M 
Forster, only it is at once more subtle and intense. Proust was, at no stage, a classic realist writer. 
His novel Jean Santeuil, written prior to In Search of Lost Time but not published until 1954, is a 
novel in which, as Andre Maurois notes, 'the hero has discovered the unreality of life'.4 The 
disappearance of experience was, therefore, something that Proust expressed in all his writing. 
But it is not quite as simple as Maurois’ comment suggests. Jean may well be aware of the 
unreality of life but it never quite becomes a completely entrenched assumption and, as such, it 
fails to penetrate the form of the narrative. In other words, Jean still struggles with the possibility 
of experience and this struggle is narrated in a fairly straightforward fashion. In fact, at times, 
and in certain circumstances, Jean’s faith in experience, reality, and truth are as robust as any 
realist character or author. Significantly, this is never more palpably expressed than in relation to 
the Dreyfus Affair, which is first mentioned at the beginning of Chapter Five:  
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Captain Dreyfus was arrested on a charge of communicating to a foreign Power certain 
documents bearing on National Security, was tried in camera, condemned on the strength 
of a number of exhibits which he was never shown, and sent to Cayenne. The proofs of 
his guilt were however gradually made public. Since they seemed to be far from 
satisfactory, an inquiry was opened by the Cour de Cassation with a view to deciding 
whether grounds existed for setting in motion a complete revision of his trial (319).   
 
Following this introduction, much of Chaper Five is devoted to Jean’s attendance at both the 
Cour de Cassation inquiry and the trial of Émile Zola who faced charges of libel following his 
infamous J’accuse article.5 Jean takes an avid interest in the Dreyfus Case as a public legal event. 
Indeed it is the public nature of both the Cour de Cassation inquiry and Zola’s trial that 'was for 
him in some sort a proof that this experience of thrills and emotions was not insubstantial, not 
just a private dream, but had been lived through by others' (320). This sense of a shared 
experience is contrasted with his thoughts on the private activity of reading. His tutor, M. 
Rustinlor, whose opinion Jean values, undergoes a radical transformation in which he renounces 
the realms of literature and philosophy for that of ‘real life’. Rustinlor proclaims:  
 
As to the historians and the dramatists, that fellow Tacitus, that chap called Shakespeare, 
or Messire Balzac, they never painted anything half so thrilling as what is happening at 
this moment. Go to the Palais de Justice, my dear man, go to the Chamber, take a look at 
Esterhazy, make a study of all that business, Lanevois, Picquart. If human nature's what 
you're after, take my word for it, you'll find it there, in the raw, passion in all its 
manifestations (252).6  
 
Jean’s interaction with the trial, following Rustinlor’s recommendation, conforms to a classic 
sense of modern experience. In attending the court he is placed up against an objective reality 
that he cannot control and must submit to. That his imaginative powers must come second to 
such a reality is indicated by his witnessing of Colonel Picquart’s testimony:  
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It came to him with something of a shock that he could do nothing to modify that 
physical fact, each feature of which, the reddish complexion, the easy carriage of the 
head, made him feel almost embarrassed, such violence did they do to his imagination 
which so long accustomed to visualize the Colonel in a certain way had now to submit to 
a reality which it could not alter at will (335). 
  
The reality that Jean confronts in the trial is paralleled by his sense of the truth that it is able to 
discover. The judges of the Cour de Cassation are described as applying ‘themselves to the task of 
extracting the truth from the facts laid before them’ (320). Such truth is objective: it exists in its 
own right, a sign of its authenticity being its ability to become discernible despite initial 
prejudices. The narration thus reports that 'if among the signatories of the protest in l'Aurore we 
see the name of an illustrious advocate, who is known to be a monarchist and a Christian, the 
emotion we feel is the more intense, because by reason of this deviation in his behaviour, we are 
made to see what truth really is' (352). Jean is, in this respect, particularly impressed by the 
evidence of the graphologist Paul Meyer, who, in examining the incriminating document 
supposedly written by Dreyfus, is ‘willing to state on oath that this cannot possibly be Dreyfus’s 
handwriting’ (351). For Jean, Meyer’s testimony, in being devoid of prejudice, is ‘simply the 
outcome of a train of reasoning conducted on scientific lines’ (351). It thus indicates that: 
 
truth really was something which existed in itself and had nothing to do with opinion, 
that the truth to which a man of science owes his loyalty is determined by a series of 
conditions which are brought about, not by social prejudices – no matter how fine and 
noble – but by the very nature of things (351).  
 
Yet, despite the ‘nature of things’ determining the authenticity of ‘truth’, this does not mean that 
it is something which is easily discerned. And even when it is, a series of competing, inauthentic, 
opinions may cloud its collective acceptance. Truth, thus, often has to be fought for in precisely 
the way that the writer most associated with the Dreyfus Affair, Émile Zola, did. Zola, whose 
naturalism was a self-conscious continuation of the realism of Balzac and Stendhal, set out 
systematically to describe the ‘nature of things’. His novels, no less than his article J’Accuse, were 
concerned with realistically portraying the reality of life and blasting away the falsity of prejudicial 
social belief. For Zola, as for Jean, and despite Rustinlor’s rhetoric, literature could play a part in 
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this immersion in experience.7 J’Accuse asks for truth to out as Jean (and Jean Santeuil) assumes 
that such an ambition can be achieved.  
 In Search of Lost Time places Dreyfus in a very different context. This is predominantly 
related to a differentiation that can be drawn between Dreyfus as a case and Dreyfus as an affair. 
In the form of a case, Dreyfus is principally a legal matter which manifests itself in trials, calls for 
appeal, and extra judicial commentary. The Dreyfus Affair, on the other hand, is the event in all 
its social and political implications: its anti-semitism, republicanism, monarchism etc. While Jean 
Santeuil concerns itself predominantly with the case, In Search of Lost Time is, on the face of it, 
interested only in the affair. For instance, rather than offering anything like the succinct 
description of the case that was found in Jean Santeuil, Proust’s later novel provides only obscure 
allusions to the evidence for and against Dreyfus. Proust, by this stage, appears to be far more 
concerned with the wider social issues – in a particularly obvious departure from the earlier 
novel, it is the way in which truth, as in Forster, is not obscured by prejudices such as anti-
semitism but formed precisely from them that now attracts Proust’s attention. In a well-known 
metaphor, the beliefs of society are compared to the images created by a kaleidoscope. These 
beliefs, like their metaphorical images, seem fixed, static: ‘But, like a kaleidoscope which is every 
now and then given a turn, society arranges successively in different orders elements which one 
would have supposed immutable, and composes a new pattern’.8 At the time of Marcel’s 
childhood, for instance, ‘right minded ladies had had the stupefying experience of meeting an 
elegant Jewess while paying a social call’ (V, 103). After the Dreyfus Affair, the ‘kaleidoscope 
once more reversed its coloured lozenges’, and such events became a thing of the past (V, 103). 
Marcel argues that had a war with Germany occurred at this point in time, rather than the 
Dreyfus Affair, the pattern of the kaleidoscope would have moved in the opposite direction. 
Proust’s point is that beliefs are never permanent for the simple reason that unpredictable events 
continually reconfigure the social, political, and legal world. But his interest appears to revolve 
around showing how such transient beliefs are structured and justified, rather than analysing 
their specific causes. So while the affair is present, the case is absent. Yet, while it may seem 
paradoxical, this absence is, in fact, the perfect counterpart to the way in which the case itself 
functioned. The Dreyfus Case was defined by absence.  
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There are several ways of defining the ‘beginning’ of the case, but one of its earliest 
manifestations can be traced to the collection of waste. The French military intelligence services, 
working under the guise of the ‘Statistical Department’, had a spy within the office of the 
German Military Attaché in Paris, General von Schwartzkoppen. The spy, who was the regular 
cleaner of Schwartzkoppen’s office, was charged with retaining the contents of the General’s 
waste paper basket and returning it to the officers in the Statistical Department. On 27th 
September 1894 a document arrived in the department through this route. It was a cover sheet, 
or bordereau, which referred to further documents which had presumably been retained by 
Schwartzkoppen. If the bordereau was accurate then these further documents divulged several 
important military secrets. The nature of the information in question led the agents of the 
Statistical Department to believe that only a staff officer could have had access to such a variety 
of knowledge (this was, in fact, the mistake upon which the whole injustice rested). Upon 
narrowing the field of possible traitors in this way, however, the investigators were able to 
examine staff reports and compare the handwriting of specific officers with that of the bordereau. 
It was by this method that Captain Alfred Dreyfus was first identified as a suspect and the expert 
testimony of graphologists was the main evidence of the court martial, which was conducted in 
camera. 
There was, however, an even more important element of secrecy than the invisibility of 
the trial. The war minister, Mercier, determined that Dreyfus should be found guilty, yet anxious 
about the quality of the evidence against him, ordered a secret file to be compiled. This was 
produced from the swathes of information which had been garnered over several years by the 
Statistical Department. Included in this file was a note from Schwartzkoppen to the Italian 
military attaché in Paris, Panizzardi, which referred to ‘large-scale plans of Nice’ received from 
‘that swine D’.9 This became known as the ‘canaille de D’ letter, ‘D’ being taken to be Dreyfus 
despite the unlikelihood of a spy using his real initial. A further note was unearthed, 
reconstituted from scraps of paper, in which obscure references to a ‘French Officer’ were made 
in Schwartzkoppen’s handwriting.10 Old reports from informants were also amended to suggest 
that there was a traitor in the general staff and included in the file. The secret file was never 
shown to the defence and was offered to the judges of the court martial only after they had 
retired to consider their verdict. Despite its apparent flimsiness it had the desired effect, the 
                                                           
9 Documents translated and cited in the appendix of, Douglas Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair (London: 
Bradford Press, 1966) 228. 
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judges apparently being particularly struck by the ‘canaille de D’ letter.11 Dreyfus was convicted, 
subjected to a degradation ceremony, and transported for life to Devil’s Island, Cayenne. 
The importance of the secret file was not its contents but, precisely, the fact that it was 
secret. As Dreyfus’ brother, Mathieu, took up the cause, and calls for revision began to gain 
pace, the invisible trial became the public affair. The country, Paris particularly, was split in two, 
with Dreyfusards on one side and anti-Dreyfusards on the other. In this climate, truth became a 
matter of faith rather than reason.12 Guy Chapman writes that 'none except the handful of 
Dreyfusists in part, and the War Office staff again in part, had any evidence on which to base an 
opinion. Hence rumour pursued rumour, fantasy fantasy'.13 Of course, it is commonplace for 
rumours to surround a criminal trial. However, it is striking that at the very heart of the 
evidentiary questions about the Dreyfus case, there lay a file of documents which was nothing 
but an object of fantasy for almost everyone involved, including Dreyfus. Its attractiveness rested 
on the fact that it could reduce anxieties over national security, France’s relationship with 
Germany and the possibilities of impending war, to the simple guilt of one man. Indeed, its 
influence has spread to many of the subsequent studies of the Dreyfus Case (made throughout 
the twentieth-century), a significant proportion of which have, in downgrading its persuasiveness 
as evidence, sought to replace it with another ‘secret’ discovered by the researcher.14 For the anti-
Dreyfusards, the elusive contents of the secret file became the perfect security of Dreyfus’ guilt: it 
was the evidence par excellence. For the Dreyfusards, by contrast, the invisibility of evidence was the 
surest sign of the institutional corruption and anti-semitism which had led to the Captain’s 
conviction.15 Richard Griffiths notes that ‘both sides in the Affair, carried away with their own 
rhetoric, lost hold on reality and created a new "reality" of their own - leaving far behind them 
the case itself'.16  
When Colonel Picquart took over at the Statistical Department he was able to access the 
secret file and so became aware of how inconclusive the proof of Dreyfus’ guilt was. He also 
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came into possession of evidence which suggested that an officer named Esterhazy was the real 
author of the bordereau. This information was leaked to prominent Dreyfusards and so was in 
circulation prior to Émile Zola’s J’Accuse article and his subsequent trial for libel. At Zola’s trial 
his lawyers, ‘Labori and Clemenceau, were able to insinuate, time after time, that Dreyfus was 
not guilty so that by force of repetition this insinuation seemed to acquire substance'.17 
Lieutenant-Colonel Henry, who had subsequently bolstered the evidence against Dreyfus with a 
forged document which claimed that Panizzardi had been in contact with Dreyfus, hinted when 
he gave evidence that the file which Picquart had seen was not the real Dreyfus file at all. He was 
followed on the stand by the military investigator, Pellieux, who, having become completely 
exasperated by the tactics of Zola’s lawyers, stated categorically that ‘Dreyfus’s crime is 
established by one piece of irrefutable evidence, which I have seen and held in my own hands’.18 
The evidence that he referred to was the Henry forgery. Maurice Paleologue reports that, upon 
meeting Henry the following day, the Lieutenant-Colonel said, ‘What Pellieux did was absurd! 
Documents as secret as that should not be disclosed in public’.19 Henry’s fear was not just that 
his forgery would be detected but that the totality of evidence, in all its frailty, would have to be 
exhibited. It was a valid fear as, although Dreyfus’ innocence remained temporarily unproved, 
and Zola was found guilty of libel, his trial was the beginning of the end in terms of Dreyfus’ 
ordeal: the admission of undisclosed evidence at the original trial had made an appeal inevitable. 
The now incumbent war minister Cavaignac decided to go public with the evidence, much to the 
delight of the Dreyfusards. Jaures was quoted as saying, ‘Meline (the former prime minister) was 
impregnable, because he refused to say anything. Cavaignac has come into the open, and now he 
is lost’.20 
The curious thing is that this is not the end of the fantasy document in the Dreyfus case. 
Once the Cour de Cassation had reviewed the file and ordered a retrial to take place it appeared 
that Dreyfus must be cleared of any wrongdoing. But General Mercier, the previous war minister 
who had instituted the secret file in the first place, had by now realised how to best mobilise 
belief in Dreyfus’ guilt. He declared publicly, and with great confidence, that, at trial, Dreyfus’ 
guilt would be proved beyond doubt while, at the same time, he surreptitiously spread the 
rumour that a document would be produced which would fulfil this claim. This document was 
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said to be the original bordereau, of which the one exhibited at the first trial was only a copy. Eric 
Cahm writes that:  
 
This legend of the bordereau, personally annotated by the German Emperor, a 
document of which the bordereau on onionskin paper was only a tracing or a copy, had 
[...] been circulating for a long time; in nationalist circles, in the salons, in newspaper 
offices and in officers' clubs, people continued, right up to the Rennes trial, to expect 
that the "great secret" would at last be revealed.21  
 
In fact, the legend of the bordereau annotated by Wilhelm II gained such power in the public 
imagination it was even thought to exist by many Dreyfusards, though they believed it to be a 
forged document, Joseph Reinach referring to it as a ‘faux des faux’.22 
The constant withholding of the document, which Mercier thought could be achieved by 
various forms of political and legal wrangling, was, eventually ended when he was called to 
attend Dreyfus’ retrial in Rennes. Being unable to produce the expected original version of the  
bordereau, Mercier refused even to mention it, offering instead a four and a half hour lecture, 
summarising the entire affair. He concluded his speech:  
 
I have not arrived at my age without having discovered by sad experience that everything 
human is fallible. Consequently I have followed with keen anxiety the whole progress of 
the Dreyfusard campaign. If the slightest doubt had occurred to my mind, gentleman, I 
should be the first to tell you so, for I am an honest man, and the son of an honest man 
[...] But no! The certainty I have felt since 1894 has not undergone the slightest change; it 
has, indeed, been deepened by a more complete study of the case.23 
 
Mercier refers to his own experience, here, and positions himself as a figure of authority that can 
be trusted. It is in his experience, both of life generally and of the evidence he has studied, that 
Drefyus’ guilt can be guaranteed.24 Yet, in a way that parallels Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’s 
conceptualisation of learned judges, this is an experience that no one else can have. As such, it is 
diametrically opposed to the shared experience which underpinned Enlightenment thought, and 
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which Jean Santeuil felt so palpably when attending the Dreyfus inquiry at the Cour de Cassation. 
For Mercier, the only alternative to silence was the production of an interminable labyrinth of 
language which would refer to the truth, while always holding it at bay. He attempted to sustain 
the strength of the anti-Dreyfusard case by constantly weaving between complete experience of the 
object and the site of its true value – its absence.   
 
In Search of Experience 
 
The defining logic of the Dreyfus Case, which allowed a non-existent document to be elevated, 
in evidential terms, above anything which could be tangibly experienced, is matched by that of In 
Search of Lost Time. This is most immediately evident in the prominence of expectation within the 
narrator’s mental life. While the Marcel who narrates the novel looks back upon his life, the 
younger Marcel, who is narrated about, constantly looks forward. Leo Bersani writes that Marcel 
‘thinks of the world as possessing truths about to be revealed to him; he lives with a daily sense 
of imminent discovery’.25 A classic example of this sense comes with Marcel’s anticipation of 
seeing the great actress, Berma, performing in Phedre. From the moment Berma is described to 
him as a sublime artist, Marcel is enraptured by the thought of her, it becoming imperative that 
he must see her perform, especially in a great role such as Phedre – a combination which he 
compares to seeing a Carpaccio in Venice. He writes that ‘if I had been to see Carpaccios in one 
of the galleries of the Louvre, or Berma in some piece of which I had never heard, I should not 
have experienced the same delicious amazement at finding myself at last, with wide-open eyes, 
before the unique and inconceivable object of so many thousand dreams’ (II, 13). Marcel duly 
plans a visit to the theatre but is then suddenly struck down by an illness and forbidden by his 
parents from attending. He protests with great energy and, eventually, his mother and father 
relent. Almost the instant that they do, however, Marcel comments that ‘being no longer 
troubled by the wish that it might cease to be impossible, I wondered whether it was desirable’ 
(II, 16). From then on, the value of Berma’s performance dwindles. Marcel’s imagination 
continues to provide it with a certain value: ‘No doubt, so long as I had not yet heard Berma 
speak, I still felt some pleasure’ (II, 19), but this is eventually eradicated by the experience of 
watching her perform. Marcel reports that: ‘all my pleasure had ceased; in vain did I strain 
towards Berma’s eyes, ears, mind, so as not to let one morsel escape me of the reasons she 
would give me for admiring her, I did not succeed in gleaning a single one’ (II, 22). In a reversal 
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of Jean Santeuil’s experience of Zola’s trial, the potential offered by the theatre, and by Berma, 
for a meaningful, and shared, experience is thus reduced by Marcel. 
Such episodes are repeated throughout the novel. For instance, Marcel anticipates a visit 
to see Balbec Church and the statue of the Virgin (images which he has, until then, only seen in 
photographs) with great excitement. Upon experiencing this sight in reality he actively says to 
himself that ‘this is something far greater’ than the two-dimensional reproductions he has 
previously been exposed to (II, 273). Yet he instantly comments that ‘it was also something less’ 
(II, 273). The statue of the Virgin, so elevated in Marcel’s mind, is, in reality, beset by the 
‘tyranny of the Particular’ (II, 274). In experience Marcel finds the statue reduced to ‘a little old 
woman in stone whose height I could measure and whose wrinkles I could count’ (II, 274). 
There is no great truth to be discerned here, no ultimate secret to be revealed. For Marcel, the 
moment of experience is always a disappointment. But, more importantly, the experience of the 
present – the experience of presence itself – is never even as concrete as the imagined one of its 
absence. As Bersani put it, 'the only "real" things in his (Marcel’s) experience are those the future 
will bring'.26 
The realm of love does not escape this deferral. Complete possession of the beloved 
object is the goal towards which desire strives. Yet total possession, as a complete experience of 
love, will annihilate both desire and the beloved. If desire is to survive, possession must, 
therefore, somehow be suspended. Just such an attempt is poignantly made by Swann, as he 
holds Odette’s head prior to their first kiss: 
 
He had wanted to leave time for his mind to catch up with him, to recognize the dream 
which it had so long cherished and to assist in its realisation, like a relative invited as a 
spectator when a prize is given to a child of whom she has been especially fond. Perhaps, 
too, he was fixing upon the face of an Odette not yet possessed, nor even kissed by him, 
which he was seeing for the last time (I, 280). 
 
Swann’s semi-conscious attempt to retain the not-yet-possessed Odette is replaced, to greater 
effect, by the unconscious impulse of jealousy - a theme that finds truly obsessional expression in 
the relationship between Marcel and Albertine. Jealousy is, in the Proustian world, the 
requirement of love, precisely because it can allow the beloved object to retain an existence 
independently of the desiring subject. That is, it turns the beloved into an autonomous subject 
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who may or may not be unfaithful but who, more importantly, retains an essential unknowability.  
Without jealousy, complete possession of the beloved, as simply an object of desire, may be 
attained and a complete experience of love reached. But, of course, this would suffer the same 
fate as the experience of Berma’s acting or the statue of the Virgin at Balbec.  
Marcel, whose instincts alert him to the danger posed by the end of jealousy, constantly 
avoids the potential for full knowledge – a particularly significant example of this occurring when 
he refuses to read Albertine’s private letters, though given ample opportunity (V, 76). Such a 
denial of both knowledge and ultimate possession mirrors the withdrawal from experience made 
by Marcel at this stage in the novel: on the opening page of The Captive he writes that ‘it was, in 
fact, principally from my bedroom that I took in the life of the outer world during this period’ 
(V, 1).27 With only partial knowledge, and reduced experience, his jealousy can persist, allowing 
his love to survive. Marcel, thus, sustains his relationship with Albertine in precisely the way that 
Mercier prolonged belief in the anti-Dreyfusards case: he continuously floats between the potential 
for complete possession of the beloved and its abnegation. The beloved, to remain beloved, 
must somehow also be absent. 
As absence is elevated, the value of presence (the present moment of lived immediacy, or 
Erlebnis) is diminished. Giorgio Agamben writes that:  
 
the most peremptory objection against the modern concept of experience has been 
raised in the work of Proust. For the object of the Recherche is not a lived experience but, 
quite the contrary, something which has been neither lived nor experienced [...]And it is 
not only the conditions of experience that are called into question, but also its subject, 
for the latter is undoubtedly not the modern subject of knowledge (Proust seems rather 
to have in mind certain crepuscular states, like drowsiness or a loss of consciousness).28  
 
Such ‘crepuscular states’ are indeed of such an essential quality that they are the condition within 
which the narrative opens. In the earliest pages of his search, the narrator writes of awakening in 
the middle of the night: ‘not knowing where I was, I could not even be sure at first who I was; I 
had only the most rudimentary sense of existence’ (I, 4). Leo Bersani describes this opening as 
characteristic of the way in which Marcel, ‘loses his sense both of his own identity and of the 
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identity of the external world'.29 But, in analysing it thus, Bersani actually reverses the order of 
Proust’s careful description. Marcel, firstly, does not know where he is. It is because of this that 
he is unsure of who he is. Modern identity, constituted in the concrete experience of a specific 
time and place, and the realist protagonist, meticulously ‘plotted’ in temporal and spatial terms, 
both crumble when these co-ordinates become uncertain. Yet, this is Marcel’s essential state: ‘I 
did not who I was at first – is his typical formula’.30 
Marcel, in finding neither knowledge nor identity in his typical condition, is no modern 
subject of knowledge. But this lack of experience is not limited to the ‘crepuscular states’ of his 
semi-consciousness. His partial state of constitution affects his wakeful life also, as he often has 
difficulty in acting upon the world in any meaningful way, being reduced to the status of a mere 
observer.31 Quite apart from the absence of Albertine, or the non-presence of his cherished 
expectations, Marcel is, himself, often absent from the world he inhabits. An example of this 
comes at the end of The Guermantes Way when Swann informs the Duc and Duchesse de 
Guermantes of his illness and impending death only for them to place more importance on what 
shoes the Duchesse should wear that evening. Marcel is present in this scene but, from the 
moment of Swann’s arrival, it is a presence which becomes undetectable. He neither speaks, nor 
performs with any sense of agency, nor offers any opinion or judgment: he has dropped off the 
world he narrates.32 Marcel’s positioning in the text is, in this sense, most truly represented by 
scenes in which he does not act but eavesdrops and spies on others – most notably his 
voyeuristic, and improbable, surveillance of Charlus’ masochistic games within a brothel and his 
witnessing of an intimate, yet sadistic, scene between Mlle Vinteuil and an unknown woman 
through a window that carelessly remains open.33  
Marcel’s disappearance from specific scenes is matched by the invisibility of numerous 
others. In a three thousand page novel which often reports every nuance of a trivial 
conversation, several seemingly more important events remain un-narrated. Marcel’s first sexual 
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encounter, for instance, is only obliquely referred to as occurring with his cousin. Likewise, 
Marcel only mentions briefly, and at a later date, his previous visits to brothels. While these 
events are referred to in retrospect and throwaway fashion, Swann’s conquest of Odette, and 
Charlus’ relationship with Morel are recounted in minute detail and with acute insight. Most 
importantly, the Dreyfus Affair is said to have been the cause of two duels fought by Marcel, 
though these have failed to be reported. The absence of these dramatic events from the narration 
parallels the absence of the case itself from the text. But, paradoxically, and in accordance with 
the discussion so far, this actually implies both its own importance and precise functioning, 
where the trial and the evidence were invisible.  
   The positioning of Marcel within something other than modern experience is also 
paralleled by the life of Proust. The conflation of In Search of Lost Time’s narrator and author is, of 
course, dangerous territory and neither the novel nor the life should be read as explaining each 
other in any way.34 In the present discussion, however, it is worth noting some striking 
similarities between the two. In his youth, and as a young man, Marcel Proust was a conspicuous 
socialite, circulating in the salons of the Parisian upper classes. As a young man the narrator of In 
Search of Lost Time also rapidly ascends the social ladder that leads him to the innermost confines 
of the Faubourg Saint-Germain. This was a life of parties, of balls, summers by the sea, and love 
affairs. Proust and Marcel, in childhood and early adulthood were both, thus, intent upon 
experiencing everything that the external world had to offer. This outlook was intimately linked 
to a deep involvement in the Dreyfus Case. Proust’s belief in the innocence of Captain Alfred 
Dreyfus and his support for his re-trial and pardon were conspicuous, his attitude being 
accurately represented by the descriptions of the case in Jean Santeuil. For the reader of In Search of 
Lost Time, Proust’s belief that Dreyfus was wrongfully convicted is fairly apparent. Yet, as 
Georges Bataille notes, upon reading Jean Santeuil, Proust’s youthful radical activism and 
passionate energy is somewhat of a surprise. Bataille writes that Proust’s ‘dreyfusard sympathes are 
known to us all, but after In Search of Lost Time, written ten years later, he lost his ingenuous 
aggressiveness’.35  
This loss, if that is the best way to conceive of it, was only made as the cost of a far more 
significant gain. After struggling with a literary pursuit for many years, Marcel, by the end of the 
novel, and Proust, when aged twenty-eight, suddenly grasp the subject matter of a great work. 
The project envisaged is so vast that both Proust and Marcel are immediately placed in a race 
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against time to complete it. The world of experience must, therefore, be completely renounced 
and writing made the sole object of life. The archetypal image of Proust is, thus, brought into 
being: a figure asleep all day and writing all night, never straying from the cork-lined bedroom of 
his apartment on Boulevard Haussman.36 Proust took up a lifestyle which, in effect, denied 
experience and, in the end, denied life itself. Jacques Riviere wrote that:  
 
Marcel Proust died of the same inexperience which permitted him to write his works. He 
died of ignorance of the world and because he did not know how to change the 
conditions of his life which had begun to crush him. He died because he did not know 
how to make a fire or open a window.37  
 
This same figure is at times glimpsed in the novel, both through the narrator’s admission of his 
position as a, ‘strange human who, while he waits for death to release him, lives behind closed 
shutters, knows nothing of the world, sits motionless as an owl, and like that bird can only see 
things at all clearly in the darkness’ (IV, 441) and in some of his reported activity (in The Captive 
and The Fugitive in particular).38   
While it is not clear exactly how Proust came to his own epiphany, Marcel’s realisation of 
what he must write about is reached only after traversing what Gilles Deleuze descibes an 
apprenticeship of signs.39 Presaged by the taste of the madeleine in the opening pages, it is only by 
the end of the novel that Marcel discovers that these, and similar, moments of involuntary 
memory should be the subject of his art. But, the importance of recollection within the Proustian 
aesthetic is, in fact, not limited to such ‘involuntary’ remembrances. As discussed, present 
experience has acted as a site of potentiality for the subject of its past, but it also holds the 
potential to be transformed in the future. In other words, experience, though it may be 
annihilated as it is lived, is made meaningfully available to consciousness in recollection as well as 
expectation. Marcel’s experience of the theatre illustrates this perfectly. While his great 
expectations have been dashed by the performance itself, as soon as it is over, he becomes free 
to construct value and pleasure once again. He writes that, ‘the more I applauded, the better, it 
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seemed to me, did Berma act’ (II, 24). The reconstruction of something like experience can 
therefore be made, but it is not an accurate distillation of lived immediacy: the discovered yield 
of Erlebnis is being replaced by a self-sufficient Erfahrung. Indeed, the past occurrence is hardly 
even necessary – as much, is evident from Paul De Man’s analysis of Marcel’s decision to stay 
indoors and read on a bright summer’s day. De Man comments that  
 
the narrator is able to assert, without seeming to be preposterous, that by staying and 
reading in his room, Marcel's imagination finds access to "the total spectacle of 
Summer", including the attractions of direct physical action, and that he possesses it 
much more effectively than if he had been actually present in an outside world that he 
then could only have known by bits and pieces.40  
 
De Man’s analysis can be taken a step further. The ‘total spectacle of summer’, while grasped in 
more of its entirety while reading, is, in fact, only fully realised years later by the involuntary 
memory within which it returns to the consciousness of the narrator and, even more 
importantly, in his act of writing about it. 
It is the exterior element of the moments of involuntary memory (the fact that the 
memory seems to have been waiting for activation within an inanimate object) that seems to 
make them so much more special than this cognitive reconstruction. The recollection does not 
solely come from within, but seems to come from without and, hence, gestures towards a reality 
independent of the subject. What seems to have been recovered in these moments is, therefore, 
not simply the memory of past events but the experience of them. In tasting the madeleine Marcel 
does not just remember Combray, he is transported back to Combray. Even more importantly, 
he is no longer the middle-aged Marcel – rather, he is Marcel as a boy. The encounter between 
Marcel and Combray is thus brought into being as an experience. But, in fact, what has appeared 
is not an experience at all. Rather, it is in the luxuriantly sensuous reflection sparked by the taste 
of the madeleine that an entity worth writing about, which in fact is intensified further by writing 
and which can substitute for a modern, realist, experience, is brought into being.41 Walter 
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Benjamin pointed out that ‘the important thing for the remembering author is not what he 
experienced, but the weaving of his memory, the Penelope work of recollection'.42 The site of the 
event, as a pure encounter with reality, has been downgraded in favour of the reflection made 
upon it by the recollecting subject who then writes about it.43 As Philip Weinstein writes of the 
Proustian encounter, 'Until developed later [...] experience in the present moment is - nothing'.44     
The search for lost time, and the true development of earlier experience, appears to take 
place in the moments of involuntary memory. But, if examined carefully, what can really be said 
to be taking place here? The epiphany of recovering lost time, in fact, involves nothing less than 
the annihilation of present experience. When Marcel bites into the madeleine he is transported to 
a different time, a different place and an earlier version of himself. The present has vanished. 
Georges Poulet writes that in the Proustian world it is, ‘the past which confers on the present its 
authentic existence. It is the already lived that saves the living; otherwise it would fall into the 
insignificance of oblivion, even before being lived’.45 Indeed the past does allow the present to 
exist as meaningful, but it can no longer be a meaningful experience of that present in which one 
is situated. The apparent salvaging of experience is, therefore, its final annihilation, as the 
oblivion Poulet refers to cannot be held at bay. Perhaps it could be claimed that Marcel’s search 
was not the right one to set out on. For in regaining the lost time of the past he has finally 
succeeded in destroying the time of the now. As Samuel Beckett said of In Search of Lost Time: 
‘time is not recovered, it is obliterated'.46 
What, then, of the race against time that the production of the text had instituted? 
Marcel, just prior to the novel’s close, asks ‘was there still time and was I still in a fit condition to 
undertake the task?’ (VI, 434). While the fate of Marcel’s project remains unknown, the 
completion of Proust’s novel was curtailed by his death. Yet, this cutting short of his work made 
for an un-edited incompleteness rather than an unfinished fragment. Proust had, in fact, written 
the first and last volumes of In Search of Lost Time long before his death and his later years were 
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taken up with an inflation of the middle volumes. The race against time that Marcel and Proust 
describe is thus a false position. Or, rather, it is back to front. Having renounced experience for 
writing, life became inextricably bound to it. It is not that death took away the possibility to 
finish the novel. On the contrary, death was the only thing that could stop its production. The 
opposition is, therefore, not between life and death but between writing and death. While E M 
Forster turned his back on literature, attempted to control its limits, and tied his work to factual 
reportage and theoretical musings, Proust took a different route. Experience, having been 
obliterated, is far beyond resurrection. Yet, it does require a replacement. For Proust, this is to be 
found in the action of writing itself. In Search of Lost Time, in its production and reception, is at 
one and the same moment, both the destroyer of experience and its substitute. 
 
In Search of Repetition 
 
In renouncing experience in favour of writing, Proust embarked on a life of obsessive habit: as 
every day was spent in sleep, every night was employed in writing. His method of composition 
was also unique, as the text took shape on large sheets of paper (paperoles) which were constantly 
amended and inflated with loose notes and further drafts that were appended to the perimeter of 
the original text. In effect, Proust rewrote as much as he wrote. This form of repetition in the 
construction of the novel is matched by various repetitions that take place both within it and the 
entire Proustian oeuvre. A first clue towards a way of interpreting these structures is evident when 
Marcel lectures Albertine on the ‘new beauty’ that every artist of genius brings into the world: 
 
You told me you had seen some of Vermeer’s pictures: you must have realised that 
they’re fragments of an identical world, that it’s always, however great the genius with 
which they have been re-created, the same table, the same carpet, the same woman, the 
same novel [...] Isn’t the Dostoievsky woman (as distinctive as a Rembrandt woman) [...] 
isn’t she always the same [...] That new and terrible beauty of a house, that new and two-
sided beauty of a woman’s face, that is the unique thing that Dostoievsky has given to 
the world (V, 430-2). 
 
While it is perhaps a trivial truth to suggest that the work of a great artist is unique, Marcel 
stretches this point to its logical conclusion. If great art is unique then it must be recognizable in 
every one of its manifestations. The Dostoyevskian novel, down through its individual scenes 
and characters, to its tiniest atom of language, is, therefore, always infused with the essence of 
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the author’s specific genius. Every moment of every novel has this in common: it is 
Dostoyevskian. So, not only is this new world created by art unique, but it is also repeatable. In 
fact, it is bound to be repeated if the author writes at any length or the artist paints more than 
one picture. Vermeer always creates an identical world in which the same objects reappear again 
and again.  
 Connecting Vermeer to these ideas serves to further enrich one of the most well known 
passages in Proust’s novel: the death of Bergotte. This occurs when Marcel’s childhood literary 
hero visits an exhibition in which Vermeer’s View of Delft is the main attraction. His eyes rest 
upon a ‘little patch of yellow wall’ to which a critic has alerted him. The critic has written of this 
patch that it ‘was so well painted that it was, if one looked at it by itself, like some priceless 
specimen of Chinese art, of a beauty that was sufficient in itself’ (V, 207). Bergotte, totally 
overwhelmed by the patch of yellow, feels that this minor instance of Vermeer’s art eclipses his 
own entire life’s work. It is at this moment, and with this realisation, that Bergotte dies. 
 On the face of it, this scene serves purely to distinguish between good art, such as 
Bergotte’s, and the true genius of an artist like Vermeer. Such is the gulf between their artistic 
endeavours, Bergotte’s whole oeuvre can be outweighed by the smallest unit of Vermeer’s. Yet, 
while the patch of yellow is supremely painted, taken in itself, it is not enough to provoke such a 
denigration of Bergotte’s own work. What Bergotte perceives is not that this one instance of 
Vermeer’s art is superior to the sum of all his novels, it is that Vermeer’s work, as a whole, is 
infinitely superior to anything that Bergotte has produced. Vermeer’s art creates a whole new 
world which is constantly repeated. As such, the patch of yellow is not just a patch of yellow, it is 
the repetition of the whole of Vermeer’s world. This is something which is to be distinguished 
from the reality of the scene represented. Vermeer was one of the first artists to utilise the 
inverted Galilean telescope which, amongst other optical effects, condensed the panoramic view 
of Delft, diminished figures to smaller magnifications than normal and emphasised the 
foreground.47 This is a sight that, in effect, could not be had by the naked eye of experience: the 
View of Delft is not the view of Delft. 
In re-creating the same world in everything that he painted, Vermeer produced 
repetitions of a singular originality. But is this always what repetition implies? In Fiction and 
Repetition, J Hillis Miller, following Deleuze, defines two forms of repetition. The first, Platonic 
sense, is based on the mimetic copy and on the notion that difference only occurs within a pre-
established resemblance. The validity of such repetition depends upon ‘its truth of 
                                                           
47 Ruth Bernard Yeazell, Art of the Everyday: Dutch Painting and the Realist Novel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2008) 189. 
165 
 
correspondence to what it copies’.48 It is precisely this form of repetition which underpinned 
modern science: to conduct repeated experiments in identical circumstances was the way by 
which natural laws were discovered. Historical investigation and the realist novel also represented 
the world and copied its truths in this sense. According to Gadamer, the similarity of these 
methods is perfectly logical as, by utilising repetition, they all simply proceed ‘further toward a 
goal that experience has always striven after. Experience is valid only if it is confirmed; hence its 
dignity depends on its being in principle repeatable'.49 
The second, Nietzschean, form of repetition only appeared from the late nineteenth-
century on. In this form, only differences resemble one another and the world of the copy is 
replaced by that of the ‘phantasm’ or the ‘simulacra’.50 Hillis-Miller writes that ‘there is something 
ghostly about the effects of this second kind of repetition. It seems that x repeats y, but in fact it 
does not, or at least not in the firmly anchored way of the first sort of repetition'.51 Repetition, 
here, can never quite sustain its identity with an original and, just as absence supplanted presence 
in Proust and the Dreyfus Case, difference overrides recurrence. This idea of the Nietszchean 
phantasm has come to permeate all areas of cultural discourse.52 Indeed, for Odo Marquard, it is 
the essential condition of our practical existence, and is intimately linked to the increased 
diversification of life. He argues that:  
 
in our life-world the situations in which and for which we acquired our experience recur 
less and less frequently. Consequently, rather than becoming self-reliant, which is to say 
grown-up, through a continuous increase in our experience and our knowledge of the 
world, we more and more regularly fall back again into the situation of those for whom 
the world is predominantly unknown, new, alien, and enigmatic - that is, into the 
situation of children.53  
 
Marquard’s thoughts, although written from a recent perspective, have a history that stretches 
back even before Proust. Søren Kierkegaard presciently has his fictional narrator Constantin 
                                                           
48 J. Hillis Miller, Fiction and Repetition: Seven English Novels (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982) 6. 
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Continuum, 2004) 342. 
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Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles (New York: Zone Books, 1996) 11. 
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Constantinus tortuously discovery that life will, 'treacherously retake everything it had given 
without providing a repetition'.54 But if Marcel’s comments about Vermeer are to be taken at face 
value then it would appear that art can provide the repetition that was eluding experience. 
Certainly, in Proust’s novel, repetition appears to be possible (what are the moments of 
involuntary memory if not repetitions?) even although it is frustratingly beyond the will: Marcel 
cannot recreate the epiphanic moment no matter how many times he dunks his madeleine in his 
tea. Yet, at the same time, repetition is also denied. Gerard Genette identifies ‘an anxious search 
for a law of recurrence’ in Marcel’s desire to know the routine of the girls at Balbec, thereby 
allowing him to be certain of their presence at certain times and places in the day.55 Such a law is 
never found and such a presence never fulfilled. But the desire remains. Could it be that Proust’s 
goal in retreating from experience, and writing at length about childhood, was precisely to grow 
up and become what Marquard would term adult? That is, was it in the repetition of re-writing 
that he sought a substitute for an experience in which recurrence, in the sense of the copy, was 
disappearing? Leo Bersani describes the Proustian aesthetic as circulating around just such a 
desire, commenting that ‘in Proust, art simultaneously erases, repeats, and redeems life. Literary 
repetition is an annihilating salvation'.56 While Bersani suggests that the repetition involved is of 
life, his comment can be elaborated in a related, but tangential direction. The important 
repetition of Proust’s writing is not the way that it repeats life but the way that it continuously 
repeats itself (just as Vermeer repeated not reality but his own painting). It is the rewriting of 
Proust’s own writing that is the ‘annihilating salvation’. Annihilating, because it erases experience 
from writing, salvational because it preserves a unique, individual, specific truth; a truth which, 
though not tied to experience in the way that it is for Jean Santeuil, is just as real. Such an aim, 
taken in the context of Marcel’s thoughts on Vermeer and Dostoyevsky, seems to hint at a 
further important supposition: that within writing a unified subject (a figure so absent from the 
action of the text and so connected to a classic sense of experience) can exist. Truly to 
understand Dostoyevsky is to see how his work is a constant repetition of himself. It is to see 
that, no matter how apparently different the literature may be, it is always related by the same 
hand.  
The Dreyfus Case was, like Proust’s novel, the site of numerous, and varied, forms of 
repetition, one of which relates to just this idea of writing in the same hand. Although Dreyfus 
was found guilty predominantly due to the evidence of the secret file, the submitted, visible 
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evidence was not completely without weight. The most significant element of this was the 
comparison made between Dreyfus’ handwriting and that of the bordereau. Those investigating 
Dreyfus had, at the outset of the inquiry, utilised expert analysis in this regard. Leslie Derfler 
records that:  
 
After having Dreyfus arrested, his accusers called in a M. Gobert, the handwriting expert 
of the Bank of France, who said the bordereau might have been written by someone else. 
General Mercier, Major du Paty de Clam, and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry were left 
dissatisfied and called on Bertillon, a notorious anti-Semite. 57  
 
Bertillon, the founder of the anthropometric system of identification discussed in the previous 
chapter, unsurprisingly reported that ‘if no forgery was committed, then a comparison of 
handwritings showed that Dreyfus had to have written the bordereau'.58 Bertillon, having 
instituted the world’s first forensic police department, saw himself as an expert in all the 
‘scientific’ tools of detection, but the rationale behind this judgment was extraordinary. Having 
tendered the caveat that Dreyfus’ handwriting was the same as the bordereau’s if, and only if, no 
forgery had been committed, his reasoning depended precisely on an identical notion of forging. 
According to Chapman, 'the handwriting of the bordereau and Dreyfus's were both of that 
commonplace sloping character which all French children were taught, but the writing of the 
bordereau was irregular. He (Bertillon) therefore reached the conclusion that Dreyfus had 
produced a forgery of his own hand’.59 According to Bertillon’s analysis, 'the similarities afford 
proof that the bordereau was indeed from the hand of Dreyfus. As to the dissimilarities, they show 
that he deliberately modified his handwriting to put investigators off the track' .60 Bertillon’s 
analysis was thus similar to that which, in England, helped to convict Adolf Beck: that true, and 
unconscious, similarity could be distinguished from enforced difference. In both cases their 
identification was founded upon the Platonic sense of a mimetic copy where differences only 
exist within similitude and, in fact, cannot even undermine the essential repetition.  
 What, for the anti-Dreyfusards, was scientific proof of guilt was, for the Dreyfusards, the 
visible emanation of innocence. Once a copy of the bordereau had come into public circulation 
Dreyfus’ brother, Mathieu, ‘paid for posters that displayed examples of the captain's handwriting 
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alongside the facsimilie of the memorandum. That striking image of Dreyfus' innocence would 
move the public [...] and force the government to respond'.61 Mathieu’s plan rested on asking the 
public to perform a simple act of reading in which the prevalent view would be of essential 
difference with only incidental similarity. The view of the layman would deny repetition, just as it 
was unable to discern the single reason amongst the proliferation of causes. This opinion was 
given a positive emphasis by other handwriting experts: for instance, Paul Meyer whose evidence 
at the Zola trial was thought by Jean Santeuil to show how ‘truth really was something which 
existed in itself and had nothing to do with opinion’ (351). But Meyer’s assertion that Dreyfus 
was not the right man, though opposing the experts in the Dreyfusard camp, in fact rested on a 
very similar conception of a unified subject who could be discovered in writing.  
For the graphologist, handwriting was, and is, the direct reflection of both the 
individual’s innate personality and the concrete physical act of writing.62 An unbreakable 
connection is thus posited between thought, expression, the physical act of writing, and the 
written word. As Roxanne Panchasi writes, 'graphology asserted itself as the exemplary strategy 
for identifying and truly understanding the "I"'.63 Such a view can be discerned in the actions of 
the officers of the Statistical Department. Once Dreyfus had been identified as a suspect they 
ordered him to attend the office of Commandant Du Paty de Clam, who fed him a story about 
having injured his hand and needing someone to take dictation. Du Paty de Clam then read to 
Dreyfus from a script that contained several of the words and phrases contained in the bordereau. 
This method of investigation, referred to as the obtaining of a ‘lettre d’experience’,64 was designed to 
obtain proof of Dreyfus’ hand. But the army already had samples of this. The underlying 
motivation for the lettre d’experience was, rather, to connect the written word with the writing 
subject. The investigators desired to witness the concrete existence of the physical writer and the 
experience of writing. It has even been reported that they had Dreyfus write in a variety of ways 
(with gloves on, lying down etc.) in order for the connection to become fully illuminated by his 
physical positioning and dress while writing the bordereau.65  
The reversal that comes about as the Dreyfus Case is fully played out, and as Proust’s 
novel unfolds, is that the authority of the hand is overturned by that of the eye. Time has proven 
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the evidence proffered by the anti-Dreyfusard graphologists to be wrong. The prominence of anti-
semitism in the anti-Dreyfusard view is obvious and well documented, and, of course, it is 
significant that Alphonse Bertillon, ‘a notorious anti-semite’, was brought in to provide the 
graphological analysis of the bordereau.66 Despite this, most historians of the case have suggested 
that a more mundane mistake was the motivating principle behind Dreyfus’ arrest.67 As René 
Floriot writes, 'the officers of the intelligence service begin with a mistake. They do not for one 
moment doubt that only a staff officer can have furnished the documents, while we shall see that 
the traitor was a regimental officer'.68 This mistake was then compounded by reports of Dreyfus 
that we received from superior officers: he was not well liked.69 It was only after this, and so 
once the premises had been established for guilt to be read, that samples of Dreyfus’ handwriting 
were examined. Just as with the investigation of Aziz in A Passage to India, a pre-judgment of 
blame was essential. 
What this indicated was that the physical, experiential, act of writing was insignificant in 
comparison with the internal and personal act of reading. Such a shift in authority is referred to 
at the end of Proust’s novel as Marcel ponders the readership his own novel could attain:  
 
it seemed to me that they would not be “my” readers but the readers of their own selves, 
my book being merely a sort of magnifying glass like those which the optician at 
Combray used to offer his customers – it would be my book, but with its help I would 
furnish them with the means of reading what lay inside themselves (VI, 432).  
 
The creative role that Proust envisages his readers playing in the construction of the text 
proclaims his own novel, in the terminology of Roland Barthes, a ‘writerly’ text.70 He thus attacks 
the idea of the novel as a lettre d’experience of its author. The reading of a novel says no more 
about the individual who wrote it than a study of his biography or an examination of his 
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handwriting.71 Proust was not modest about the potential his novel had to affect readers – he just 
thought it impossible for a reader to transcend the ‘horizon of expectations’ with which they had 
begun.72 In returning to the scene in which Marcel lectures Albertine on the repeatability of 
Vermeer and Dostoyevsky, a new feature can now be glimpsed. The straight reading of Marcel’s 
speech suggested that rewriting does occur. The figure who speaks these lines, however, is a 
young Marcel, whose view is placed halfway between Jean Santeuil’s belief in identifiable 
authorship and the older Marcel’s denigration of it. The young Marcel, therefore, still has a 
certain faith in the genius of Dostoyevsky and the re-writing that he creates, but the latent idea of 
the reader’s authority is also present in his words. Marcel chides Albertine that she ‘must have 
realised’ that Vermeer always repeats himself when he is plainly aware that she has not. His 
words boastfully proclaim his own, personal, interpretation and locating of essential repetition. It 
is, thus, a proof more of his, the reader’s, genius than that of Vermeer or Dostoyevsky.   
 
In Search of Justice 
 
Of course, the repetition of a unique hand was not the only form of repetition brought about by 
the Dreyfus Case. More obviously, the Dreyfusards sought to have the judgment of the trial 
reversed by instigating a repetition of its investigation. The desire for an appeal was also voiced 
by many prominent anti-Dreyfusards, who had come to see it as the only way of laying the matter 
to rest. A review would bring about finality, whichever way the verdict went. While the drive 
towards justice was situated around calls for appeal, related legal repetitions were also involved. 
The trial of Esterhazy was a repeat of the Drefyus trial because it, in many quarters, purported to 
put the real guilty party in the dock. Even more emphatically, Zola’s J’Accuse article was written 
with the express intention of bringing a libel case upon himself. As Shoshana Felman writes, 
'Zola hoped to force the legal system to review the evidence of Dreyfus's case in a non-military 
court: he wanted to initiate a legal repetition of Dreyfus's sealed trial through a public - as 
opposed to the old hidden, secret - legal process'.73 Even the case itself was seen as a historical 
repetition of prior events. Joseph Reinarch wrote to Scheurer: 'I will give you only one piece of 
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advice: re-read the Calas affair. It is always, exactly, the same obstacles, the same difficulties, the 
same arguments, only the names have changed'.74 
At the time of the Dreyfus Case, the potential for appeal was an issue of some 
prominence in the criminal law of both France, and England and Wales. These jurisdictions are, 
of course, different from one another in numerous ways. French criminal procedure is often 
described as inquisitorial, intent upon a search for the truth, as opposed to the adversarial 
method of the common law, which concentrates on the proof presented by competing parties. 
The common law process also centres on a trial conducted orally, the very process of which is 
the guarantor of truth, while the civil law system places emphasis on the pre-trial construction of 
a written dossier of evidence. And when it comes to reaching a verdict, French jurors are required 
to have an intimate conviction (intime conviction) of guilt while their common law counterparts are 
to be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.75 However, while these notable differences 
are present when the two systems are presented in their starkest theoretical form, in practice, 
they both partake of each other’s methods: they are ‘mixed’ systems more than anything else.76 
For instance, in providing counsel for those accused, the French system inevitably courts a 
certain degree of adversarial discourse. Likewise, ‘reasonable doubt’, as a concept, developed in 
the common law from a range of other phrases such as having a ‘satisfied conscience’ or 
reaching a ‘moral certainty’ which bear marked similarities to the intime conviction.77 Most 
importantly, the common and civil law traditions, according to J. D. Jackson, share the 
epistemological traditions outlined in the introduction to this thesis.78 
 In France, appealing the decision of lower courts had been enshrined in law since the 
Revolution and the inauguration of the Cour d’Appel. However, this only applied to those tried in 
courts presided over by judges. If tried for a serious crime, in the Cour d’Assises, an accused was 
judged by both three judges and a jury of nine. It was thought unjustified for the justice system 
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to second guess the jury as the arbiters of fact in the case.79 In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-centuries, then, those afflicted with the harshest punishments (in line with their 
supposed offences) were the least able to apply for a reversal of their conviction. However, it 
was not impossible. The highest court in the land, the Cour de Cassation could review cases on the 
basis of judicial error, though this was ‘expensive and unlikely of success’.80 The potential for 
such review was widened after 1867 and the effects of the case of Lesurques, who was convicted 
of murdering the courier of Lyon. It was only after Lesurques was executed that the real culprit 
was found and convicted. Such an obvious example of judicial error roused public opinion and 
the law was altered in 1868.81 Yet, this only allowed for the overturning of verdicts in the specific 
instance of the real offender being found. Miscarriages of justice were still thought to be 
occurring unchecked. Esmein writes:  
 
Numerous proposals, emanating from parliamentary initiative, were introduced in the 
houses of parliament, and the movement resulted in the Law of 8th June 1895. This time, 
among the numerous reforms which it introduced, the Law contained one provision of 
prime importance: it introduced a new cause for appeal, very liberally conceived. The 
new Article 443 allows a fourth case for appeal: "(4) When, after a conviction, a new fact 
has happened or has come to light, or when documents unknown at the time of the trial 
are filed, tending to establish the innocence of the person convicted".82  
 
It was under this pourvoi en revision that Dreyfus was finally found not guilty and all judicial 
proceedings against him dropped in 1906.83 
In England and Wales a similar possibility for review, made by petition to the Home 
Office, had existed for decades. It was, though, the seemingly obvious cases of justice 
miscarrying with the trials of Florence Maybrick, Adolf Beck and George Edalji that led to calls 
for the establishment of a Court of Criminal Appeal. Following the Beck case, particularly, it was 
felt that ‘the right of appeal on questions of law should no longer be discretionary, to avoid a 
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repetition of what had happened in that case’.84 While this was fairly uncontroversial, the debate 
surrounding the new court, which was created by the Criminal Appeal Act 1907, focused on the 
same issue as had exercised French jurists: whether or not an appeal on the facts should be 
allowed.85 Section 3b of the Act read that those convicted could proceed on any 'ground of 
appeal which involves a question of fact alone, or a question of mixed law and fact, or any other 
ground which appears to the court to be sufficient ground of appeal'.86 However, while not 
enshrined specifically in the wording of the Act, appeals, in practice, have tended to suggest that 
the evidence presented should not be identical to that considered in the original trial. A report 
based on an inquiry into the Beck case set the tone for this. It read that: 
 
in spite of some exceptions, the broad principle remains that a case will not be re-opened 
merely in order to reconsider evidence which has already been fully examined at the trial. 
If the plea is that the verdict is wrong and if no new material evidence is offered, nor any 
means suggested by which new evidence can be obtained, the petition will, in ordinary 
circumstances, be refused.87  
 
Despite the formal differences between review and appeal, then, it would appear that the 
potential to reverse a guilty verdict on the basis of the facts of the case was comparable in both 
France and England and Wales.88 Something new had to be offered to the court. 
In both jurisdictions, the opening of further possibilities for appeal was a response to the 
apparent failure of original trials to come to the right conclusion. Court verdicts were, thus, 
failing to correspond to truth: what were being proven as ‘facts’ were no such thing. While it was 
in the fin de siècle that such concerns were first beginning to surface, it was not until a generation 
later and the school of American Legal Realism that they found theoretical articulation. Jerome 
Frank attacked the pretensions of legal fact-finding in his Courts on Trial, where he argued that 
facts were, in effect, guesses. In adapting Kant’s famous phrase he wrote of ‘the facts 
                                                           
84 Rosemary Pattenden, English Criminal Appeals 1844-1994 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 93. 
85 Edson R. Sunderland argued that the exclusion of new evidence was ‘a mere survival of the ancient common law 
theory of an accusation against the judge. It was an inherited tradition and nothing more. It was often defended on 
the ground that it would be unfair to the trial judge to reverse his judgment on a point which had never been 
brought to his attention’. See, Edson R. Sunderland, "The Proper Function of an Appellate Court," Indiana Law 
Journal 5, no. 7 (1930): 489. 
86 Pattenden, English Criminal Appeals 1844-1994  129. 
87 From App. to Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the case of Mr Adolf Beck (1904), quoted in Ibid.  350. 
88 On the formal difference between revision and appeal see Thomas Barclay, "The Revision Powers of the Court of 
Cassation," Law Quarterly Review 15, no. 1 (1899).and, Martin Shapiro, "Appeal," Law and Society Review 14 (1979-
1980).  
174 
 
themselves’ which, just as Kant’s noumena, were unreachable and inexperiencable. According to 
Frank:  
 
The trial court's facts are not "data", not something that is "given"; they are not waiting 
somewhere, ready made, for the court to discover, to "find". More accurately, they are 
processed by the trial court – are, so to speak, "made" by it, on the basis of its subjective 
reactions to the witnesses' stories.89  
 
Frank’s argument is that legal practitioners should come clean about what is really being 
discussed in a trial. The ‘facts’ of a case, rather than being objective entities, are really only what 
the jurors deem to be true (that the source of this ‘truth’ is often witness testimony is why the 
belief in a rampant perjury was of such significance to British magistrates in India). The central 
event around which the trial revolves, the crime that took place, in being assembled from such 
‘facts’, is never found in an objective sense. On the contrary, what lies at the heart of a trial are a 
series of fictions or stereotypes (such as the state of mind that was imputed to Edward 
Ashburnham in the Kilsyte case) around which a collection of ‘facts’ can cohere. Truth is not 
witnessed in this kind of trial. Nothing is, as Foucault termed it, reactualized.90 Frank’s theory thus 
completely undermines the nexus of experience and truth which Jean felt so palpably in 
attending the Dreyfus trials in Jean Santeuil, and which was a perfect expression of both the realist 
aesthetic and the reconstructive trial. 
While Frank’s various theoretical writings appeared between 1930-1950, in the early 
1900s his ideas were only dimly felt anxieties which required alleviation. The solution to the 
problem of inexperiencable facts which was offered at the time was a form of repetition – the 
appeal. The law, thus, appeared to follow the logic of modern science, where the Platonic 
repetition of precise circumstances and experimental methods could uncover natural laws. An 
appeal could guarantee the validity of the original verdict because, by repeating the test, or 
experiment, of the trial and coming up with the same result, the verdict of the law was 
established with greater certainty. The enacting of legislation that allowed for new facts to be 
                                                           
89 Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950) 23. 
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presented upon appeal suggests an identical motivation: appeals were being instituted, and 
having their remit widened, in order to make a repeated test of what had actually happened.91  
In both the criminal law of France and England and Wales, the introduction of appeal 
procedures which would allow the presentation of new evidence was seen as an important leap in 
the battle against miscarriages of justice. Such has not been the case. The eminent French jurist 
René Floriot wrote in 1972 that 'I have been engaged for more than forty years on criminal cases 
and have often been asked to seek the revision of a sentence. I personally have never come upon 
a new fact which enabled me to achieve this'.92 Pattenden also records that, since the inception of 
the Court of Criminal Appeal, ‘appeals in which fresh evidence is adduced are few and far 
between'.93 This situation has persisted: the 1990 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice reported 
that, 'fresh evidence cases are rare and treated with great caution by the Court. Only in very 
limited circumstances will such evidence be admitted and, if admitted, form the basis of a 
successful appeal'.94 It would appear that recognizing a right to appeal on the basis of the facts of 
the case was a step of symbolic, rather than of real, value. Almost as soon as it was allowed, the 
judiciary undermined its scope: 'from the start the judges narrowly exercised this wide discretion 
to admit further evidence'.95 Rather than providing the apposite evidence of innocence that it did 
in many of the cases which led to calls for appeals in criminal cases, new evidence, in practice, 
was, and is, very rarely produced on appeal and is usually unsuccessful when it is. That which 
most clearly seems to point towards the crime (the facts of the matter) tend, therefore, to be 
obscured by and occluded from appellate courts.  
 How, then, is a successful appeal to be launched? Most commonly, the answer is to find 
serious judicial error in the first trial: usually a mistake made by the judge in his interpretation of 
the law, such as the allowing of inadmissible evidence, or directing the jury either prejudicially or 
erroneously.96As with the codification efforts of Fitzjames Stephen, the crucial factor, here, is the 
control of the narrative. An appeal stands the greatest chance of success when it is argued that 
the story heard in court was one that should not have been allowed to be told in just the way that 
it was. For instance, in allowing inadmissible evidence, a judge opens himself to attack, not on 
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the basis of the truth or falsity of the evidence heard, but simply on the grounds that he was in 
error. In making such a mistake, the judge allowed a certain narrative to be produced and, while 
an appeal on these grounds undoubtedly questions the factual status of the evidence against the 
appellant (as what is inadmissible cannot, strictly speaking, be a fact), its more important claim is 
that the trial was not procedurally correct. Appeals thus attempt not so much to alter the facts of 
the original trial as to reconfigure the form which that trial took. In essence, an appeal attempts 
to create a new sjuzhet for the same fabula. 
A further reading of Jerome Frank becomes obvious here. Following his theory of ‘facts 
as guesses’, Frank went on to argue that judgments made in court (that is the beliefs that are 
proffered as true) are always intuitive and that legal rules only offer a system of ratiocination for 
an instinctive decision. It should be stressed that Frank is not suggesting that such decisions are 
necessarily invalid or that using legal rules in this way is a process without weight. To understand 
exactly what is going on in a trial should not, Frank contends, reduce either the meaning or 
authority of that process. He writes: ‘that a conclusion is prior in time to the reasoning which 
logically justifies it may make that reasoning seem artificial, but does not necessarily make that 
reasoning fallacious or useless’.97 Frank was writing, predominantly, about courts of first 
instance, but his thoughts are even more intensely pertinent to appellate courts, where the 
concept of rules is so important. In England and Wales, for instance, the judges who sit on the 
Court of Criminal Appeal will often overturn a verdict if a particular point of law has been 
shown to have been breached in the first trial. However, they have the opportunity, via the 
proviso to section 4(1) to uphold the verdict if, despite this breach, they are satisfied that no 
miscarriage of justice has occurred. That is, the judges have it in their power to allow an appeal 
to fail, despite the fact that, technically, it could succeed. This seeming leeway is restrained by 
five instances in which the proviso may not be applied: (1) Where the conviction is "Unsafe or 
Unsatisfactory", (2) Where conviction at an Error-free Trial was not inevitable, (3) Where it was 
not open to the jury to Convict as they did, (4) Where there was a fundamental error, (5) Where 
the Appellant would be left with a sense of Grievance about his trial (an instance of fundamental 
uncorrectable error).98 The decision making in these instances is given the veneer of sheer 
technicality. The rules are designed to cover every possible eventuality – to leave the judge with 
                                                           
97 Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice  183. 
98 Pattenden, English Criminal Appeals 1844-1994  184. 
177 
 
no choice as to what should be done.99 But, a closer examination of these particular rules show 
them to be worded in an extremely loose fashion. What kind of error, for instance, is not 
‘fundamental’? And, what kind of appellant does not feel aggrieved about their first trial? The 
restrictions on the use of the proviso are open to such a variety of interpretations it, in fact, 
seems almost inconceivable that the proviso could ever be applied. Indeed, Pattenden has noted 
that predicting exactly when it will be used ‘to dismiss an appeal is almost impossible'.100 It would 
seem that Frank’s logic finds perfect illustration here, as legal rules, and reasoning, come after the 
real work of judgment has been done. 
These factors undermine the apparent attempt to repeat the test of what happened. This 
is, in fact, only logical, as appeals do not repeat anything in this sense. Appeals are not re-trials. 
The Judges who sit on the Court of Criminal Appeal and the Cour de Cassation do not carry out 
any investigations. They are rather, employed in the task of reading transcripts of the original 
trial. In France, this act forms a certain continuity with the initial investigation, it having already 
been structured around the written dossier. In England and Wales, however, it is an important 
departure from the first trial, that having been conducted in the adversarial fashion typical to the 
common law. An appeal, then, is not a form of repetition which demands a re-investigation, into 
the reality of what happened. Rather, what occurs, what is demanded by the form of the 
repetition, is that the language and rhetoric of the first trial be studied. Not only does such a 
procedure fail to grapple with the original experience, it has also been argued to have a negative 
effect on the initial trial court’s efforts to do so. By having one eye on the potential for appeal, 
judges in courts of first instance may produce not ‘better decisions, just better insulated ones’.101 
Decisions, thus, have to be acceptable, or able to withstand attack, rather than be right. Part of 
the way that such insulation is provided is by descending even further into something which the 
law has, for centuries, been accused of: an overly technical use of a needlessly abstruse language 
which excludes lay understanding. Peter Goodrich argues that such an exclusive use of language 
forms a 'writing that binds and in which the reader must believe, for not only is it vocabula artis, 
the language of truth, but it is also a writing that only the learned should read'.102 Criminal appeal 
courts, both in their own decisions and through their influence on courts of first instance, 
accentuate even further the use of such technicality. Yet, they were instituted precisely because of 
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anxiety about the original trial’s failure to grasp the real event, the experience, at its heart. The 
law’s response to a disappearing experience is therefore the same as Proust’s. Both retreat into a 
specialist writing that acts as a substitute for the previously authoritative concept of experience –
a writing which, like Ford Madox Ford’s, is accessible only to experts. 
The way that an appeal is limited by the terms set for its inquiry has a parallel in the 
Dreyfus Case – not in Dreyfus’ appeal but, rather, in the trial of Zola. As mentioned earlier, Zola 
wrote his J’accuse article with the express intention of bringing libel charges upon himself: the idea 
behind this being that at his trial the veracity of his accusations would have to be tested and so 
all the evidence against Dreyfus would have to be re-presented. It would, therefore, be like 
Dreyfus’ second trial, his appeal. Zola wanted the right, or rather, the full, story to be told. 
However, the government cleverly circumvented this necessity by proceeding against Zola only 
in respect of the accusations he made about the second court martial; that of Esterhazy. The 
appeal could only concern itself with this matter and any mention of Dreyfus by Zola’s defence 
lawyers was quickly silenced by the presiding judge.103 The potential for appeal was, therefore, 
blocked as the rereading was limited to a specific element of Zola’s writing (based upon a 
particular reading of the government’s actions).The trial, intended as a form of appeal, was held 
in a straitjacket from which it could not break out. 
The aim of an appellant is always to break out of this straitjacket. They have to find a 
way of altering the terms of their initial conviction, as it is only by doing so that a new sjuhzet can 
re-present the same fabula (the story of their innocence). An identical ambition can be seen in the 
work of Proust, where In Search of Lost Time successfully appeals the earlier Jean Santeuil. In terms 
of one being a repetition of the other, this is obvious: the resonances are abundantly clear, with 
the doubling of characters becoming apparent almost immediately. Jean is clearly the forerunner 
of Marcel, the faithful servant Françoise appears firstly as Ernestine, the great friend Robert 
Saint Loup has a precursor in Henri de Réveillon, the childhood love Gilberte Swann finds an 
earlier incarnation as Marie Kossichef and the jealousy-inducing Albertine is initially known as 
Françoise. Allied to these examples, there are cases of recurring variations. For instance, Jean’s 
youthful relationship with his mother and father is more openly antagonistic than Marcel’s, and 
the figure of the Grandmother, so significant for Marcel, is virtually non-existent in Jean Santeuil, 
where it is the Grandfather whose death is heart-wrenchingly depicted. While these resonances 
of character are important, it is the repetition of specific scenes and descriptions that are most 
significant, examples of which can be found in the withholding of the mother’s goodnight kiss 
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which opens both novels, or the pollination metaphor that is used to describe friendship in Jean 
Santeuil and sexuality in In Search of Lost Time. One of the most famous scenes of the later novel, 
when Swann, suspecting Odette of infidelity, returns to the street in which she lives late at night, 
also occurs in the earlier novel, with Jean playing the part of the jealous lover. In both cases, 
Jean/Swann, seeing that their beloved’s light is still on, become convinced that she is 
entertaining a lover within the confines of her bedroom. But, upon knocking on the window 
shutters, they are each greeted by two unknown elderly gentlemen. Jean and Swann, both 
conditioned by the prejudices of their jealous thoughts, have failed to notice that the lighted 
window is not that of their beloved’s room. They are unable to interpret the real experience of 
what they see and are, instead, bound to read the same imagined infidelity no matter what the 
circumstances. 
But there are, also, critical differences between these scenes: crucial ways in which 
Proust’s great appeal is launched. The following passages describe Jean/Swann’s initial reaction, 
and subsequent memories, of being confronted with the two gentlemen as opposed to 
Françoise/Odette. The first quotation is taken from Jean Santeuil:   
 
He made his apologies and walked away. He returned home in a somewhat sheepish state 
of mind. He did not tell her of the incident. He kept to himself the new mood of doubt 
and anguish which had assailed him. It had in fact turned out to be altogether baseless, 
but logically, given certain circumstances, it might have been, could still be, amply 
justified. Then his natural sweetness where she was concerned smothered the more 
recent impression under those quite contrary feelings which were usual with him. Still 
whenever she said to him, “I shan’t be able to see you tonight,” he was conscious of a 
small but painful stab, and though he replied that really it didn’t matter, relapsed into a 
melancholy and apathetic mood, leaving her to wonder at the change in him, though 
never guessing its cause (587-588). 
 
He made what apology he could and hurried home, glad that the satisfaction of his 
curiosity had preserved their love intact, and that, having feigned for so long a sort of 
indifference towards Odette, he had not now, by his jealousy, given her the proof that he 
loved her too much, which, between a pair of lovers, for ever dispenses the recipient 
from the obligation to love enough. 
He never spoke to her of this misadventure and ceased even to think of it 
himself. But now and then his thoughts in their wandering course would come upon this 
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memory where it lay unobserved, would startle it into life, thrust it forward into his 
consciousness, and leave him aching with a sharp, deep-rooted pain. As though it were a 
bodily pain. Swann’s mind was powerless to alleviate it; but at least, in the case of bodily 
pain, since it is independent of the mind, the mind can dwell upon it, can note that it has 
diminished, that it has momentarily ceased. But in this case the mind, merely by recalling 
the pain, created it afresh. To determine not to think of it was to think of it still, to suffer 
from it still. And when, in conversation with his friends, he forgot about it, suddenly a 
word casually uttered would make him change countenance like a wounded man when a 
clumsy hand has touched his aching limb (I, 331-332). 
 
In Swann’s Way, the description of the pain felt in looking back on this event has become both 
more intense and more insular. While Jean walks away in a ‘somewhat sheepish state of mind’, 
Swann returns home ‘glad that the satisfaction of his curiosity had preserved their love intact’. In 
other words, Jean is immediately affected by the presence of his humiliation while Swann is 
relieved that the experience has fizzled out into a non-event. It is only later that Swann really 
feels the pain as it is thrust ‘forward into his consciousness’. For Swann, ‘the mind, merely by 
recalling the pain, created it afresh’. Each recall, in fact, brings an independent and original pain 
into being which acts on him much more intensely than the lived immediacy of the moment 
itself. 
A comparison between the two passages, thus, shows Swann’s feelings to be more 
intimately interiorized than Jean’s, yet this is despite a startling fact. While Jean, the protagonist 
of a third-person omniscient narration, is the actor of the scene in the earlier novel, in In Search of 
Lost Time it is Marcel’s acquaintance, Swann, who is the central figure. This is despite the later 
novel being an intensely subjective first-person narrative written from the perspective of Marcel’s 
consciousness. There is no new evidence to consider here - the facts of the scene are identical. 
Rather, what has altered is the whole procedure of novel writing and story-telling. Swann’s 
adventures are as real as Jean’s – but they are also the projections of Marcel as opposed to the 
experiential reporting of an omniscient narration.104 It is this, rather than the oft-cited 
philosophical conception of time and involuntary memory that is the fundamental shift from one 
novel to the other. The real change of procedure, the fundamental point of law, is the 
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recognition of how fantasy is as real as experience for the modern consciousness. Proust has 
created a form of first person omniscient narration. The form that In Search of Lost Time takes up 
may therefore be said to form a successful appeal. But, it is an appeal to nothing other than the 
non-experience that has been charted throughout the course of this thesis. 
 
In Search of Difference 
 
That Proust repeated his work in a way that appealed to modern consciousness is what turned 
his unpublished early novel into a classic of modernism. The precise way in which In Search of 
Lost Time re-wrote Jean Santeuil implied a retreat from experience – but what of the various 
repetitions that existed within the later novel taken in itself? In Marcel’s speech about Vermeer 
and Dostoyevsky, he proclaims that, ‘if I’ve said to you that from one novel to another it’s the 
same scene, it’s in the compass of a single novel that the same scenes, the same characters 
reappear if the novel is at all long’ (V, 432). In Search of Lost Time is, by any estimation, a long 
novel and the repetitions which Marcel would expect to appear do indeed occur. As mentioned 
earlier, Marcel’s argument also seemed to suggest that what was constantly repeated was the 
unique world of the artist. A work of genius, thus, always reiterates its own ultimate truth.  
One such truth, for Proust, could be argued to be the repeated portrayal of jealousy’s 
role in love’s survival. Swann, Marcel, Saint-Loup, Charlus, Gilberte, the Duc de Guermantes 
and countless others all, at different stages in the novel, become the type of the jealous lover. 
Yet, despite the initially apparent recurrence here, the specifics of these instances all apply 
variations to the theme. As Serge Doubrovsky has said, 'all of the scenes of the search are 
relived, but each time there is a qualitative difference that comes from the evolution of the book, 
of the text as such'.105 In the case of jealous love, these qualitative differences are numerous. 
Swann’s jealousy over Odette is seen to be partially justified by her past life as a courtesan but 
Marcel’s suspicions of Albertine are less well founded. Within variations of gender and sexual 
preference, Marcel’s greatest fear is that Albertine is a lesbian, while Charlus is tormented by 
Morel’s heterosexual conquests. The different positions within jealous love are also reflected: 
Saint-Loup thus becomes, at one and the same time, both the jealous subject of his lover Morel, 
and the jealous object of his wife, Gilberte. In all these cases there is a repetition of the 
fundamental Proustian mechanism of jealousy within love, yet there is also always a variation in 
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the materials that the mechanism will work upon. To reread jealousy in love is, therefore, to see 
it tried by repeated testing.  
Yet, just as the rereading that was instituted in the court of appeal actually served to 
undermine the possibility of repeating anything like an investigation into the crime, so too the 
structure of In Search of Lost Time and the pre-eminence within it of memory and writing, in place 
of experience, confuses the repetition which it seems to contain. The positioning of Swann’s 
story within Marcel’s narration is a good example of this. It is commonly thought that Swann 
and Odette is the original story. That the jealousy which Marcel hears afflicted Swann (the true 
father figure as opposed to Marcel’s biological father) influences his subsequent relationships 
with women and comes to warp his view of all romantic relations. But whose desire is really the 
locus of Proust’s novel? As mentioned earlier, in Swann in Love, the reader is given access to every 
nuance of Swann’s thoughts. Marcel is recounting, in scrupulous detail, both events that he 
neither saw nor could have been told in such detail and is given access to another consciousness 
(Swann’s) that no human being ever has of another.106 The crucial point is that Swann, for the 
reader, exists almost exclusively in the form of Marcel’s subjective projections. His supposed, 
‘objective report on reality is actually a self-dramatization by means of novelistic character and 
incident'.107 In creating such a narrative, Proust is conceding the importance of fantasy, as 
opposed to experience, for modern consciousness. But, in doing so, the precedence of stories 
becomes confused. Swann and Odette’s story forms the cornerstone of the novel and would 
seem to offer a prelude to Marcel and Albertine’s relationship. It would even appear that 
Marcel’s jealousy is pre-empted, and thus in some way created, by his knowledge of Swann’s.108  
However, Swann’s story is related, and thus in some way created, by Marcel’s recounting of it: at 
one stage he writes of ‘a sheet on which I had jotted down a story about Swann and his inability 
to do without Odette’ (V, 418, my emphasis).109 Swann and Odette’s affair is the product of 
Marcel writing about it, and reading his own thoughts and desires into it, just as his memory of 
Berma is altered by his continued desire to have found her acting sublime. But Marcel only 
writes of Swann’s jealousy after he has already suffered his own over Albertine. So, while it 
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perdu Folio Classique (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1988) V, 352. 
183 
 
appears that Swann is pre-Marcel it is actually Marcel who is pre-Swann and the reflections of 
Swann in Love that we see in The Captive should be reversed.  
In an article entitled ‘Rereading in Proust: Perversion and Prolepsis in A La Recherche du 
Temps Perdu’, Elisabeth Ladenson argues that Proust intentionally designed his novel to be reread. 
In relating a story told by Jean Cocteau, of Proust reading to him, it is said that Proust omitted 
certain paragraphs from his narration, saying that they would only be explicable upon reading 
later volumes. Rereading the earlier volumes is therefore prescribed by the later ones. In her 
analysis, Ladenson, at times, subscribes to a standard, chronological, view of repetition, writing 
that ‘the affair between Swann and Odette [...] serves as a template for the hero’s subsequent 
adventures with Albertine and Odette prefigures her successor in various particulars’.110 Yet, a 
more subtle and reversible understanding of rereading is suggested when Ladenson writes that 
Albertine, ‘and Odette are assumed to be exclusively heterosexual until it is suggested otherwise, 
at which point, in each case, a dizzying cycle of rereading commences'.111 The rereading here 
involves reading the later discovery into the earlier behaviour. But what is missing from this 
analysis is the fact that Marcel has beaten the reader to it. He has already read into the earlier life 
discoveries only made later. The precedence of events has been reversed. 
Gilles Deleuze uses just such an idea to undermine the most primal assumptions, arguing 
that: 
 
by loving his mother the hero of In Search of Lost Time repeats Swann’s love for Odette. 
The parental characters are not the ultimate terms of individual subjecthood but the 
middle terms of an intersubjectivity [...] Behind the masks, therefore, are further masks 
and even the most hidden is still a hiding place, and so on to infinity. The only illusion is 
that of unmasking something or someone.112  
 
The mother’s goodnight kiss, withheld in the opening pages of the novel and seemingly so 
crucial to Marcel’s subsequent development, is, thus, not the original scene at all. Rather, the 
repetitious behaviour itself is the original, which then posits the mother’s kiss as a central 
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explanation of its own functioning.113 The theme of jealous love works in precisely the same way. 
Swann is not an original version of anything but, rather, a unit in a continuous repetition that is 
in search of an original. 
The act of rereading, which is prescribed by Proust’s novel, is therefore not a simple 
matter of repeating an original truth or re-testing the validity of a law: but what of the law itself? 
Appellate courts, in upholding or overturning the judgments of courts of first instance, reread 
decisions for signs of error, but in doing so they also make the law and ensure its uniform and 
consistent application. In England and Wales this is starkly evident in the strict application of 
precedents set by appellate courts. The common law is based upon the decisions of concrete 
cases. It is this feature that is often thought to save it from abstraction: precedents, in being tied 
to real cases, are intimately bound to an experience of the real world that had to be adjudicated 
on. In forming a precedent which is subsequently followed the experience is both shared and 
preserved. The formation of a tradition like this gave the illusion of a repetition that stretched 
back through the centuries. However, Peter Goodrich notes that it was not until the early 
nineteenth-century that the common law could be seen as consistent in this way. He writes that 
'the emergence of reliable law reports in the early 1800s, together with the somewhat earlier 
revival of the academic and literary expositions and sytematizations of the common law, 
provided the basic preconditions of the modern conception of common law as precedent’.114 
Indeed the concept of binding precedent was first set out by Justice Parke as late as 1833:  
 
Our common law system consists in the applying to new combinations of circumstances 
those rules which we derive from legal principles and judicial precedents; and for the 
sake of attaining uniformity, consistency and certainty, we must apply those rules, where 
they are not plainly unreasonable.115 
 
In France, the law is based upon the numerous codes first introduced following the 
Revolution. It is thus an abstract system: legal rules are, ‘divorced from the circumstances of 
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particular cases’.116 However, as with differences in criminal procedure, the distinction between 
the civil and the common law is, in this matter, less stark than it first appears.117 It has been 
argued that in the application of the law in France, 'caselaw (la jurisprudence) and doctrinal writings 
(la doctrine), although not theoretically recognised as formal sources of law, are of persuasive 
value'.118 In addition, although the rulings of the Cour de Cassation have no formal authority over 
the subsequent decisions either of itself or lower courts, ‘in practice a decision thus fully matured 
establishes a uniform interpretation of the law’.119 Just as this ties the application of the law to 
particular cases in France, so too, in the common law, 'the whole idea of treating "like cases 
alike" can in fact be rendered intelligible only if we envisage decisions in individual cases as 
decisions of principle’.120 
It can also more generally be argued that the projects of common law precedent and civil 
law codification were developed with the same desire for uniformity in mind. In both 
jurisdictions, uniformity was to be gained from the direct application of the same law in the same 
situation. In other words, the correct application of the law requires the perception of a 
repetition between the concrete circumstances encountered in the present and the previously 
made decision or earlier conceived rule. While such repetition may be linguistic in form, it 
ultimately relies on a sense of experience being distilled by (in this case a formally recorded) 
memory. The same form can be identified as guiding both the realist novel and the 
reconstructive trial in which so many people, including Jean Santeuil, believed. However, by the 
time of In Search of Lost Time, and during the Dreyfus Case, the novel and the trial are changing – 
and so too is the sense of repetition involved in following precedent. The fiction of the 
completeness of the law was questioned in 1900 by the French legal philosopher Francois Gény, 
who argued that ‘in addition to cases where one must interpret statutes, there are cases where 
one must be creative and solve problems without any assistance from legislative texts.'121 
Goodrich has argued convincingly that the following of precedent in the common law is more 
than simple repetition and actually involves the very creative aspect that Gény advocated.122 The 
act of finding a precedent involves the selection of the case, the formulation of the rule and an 
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emphasis on certain similarities over specific differences. In other words, an act of rereading 
occurs. Goodrich quotes from Karl Llewellyn’s The Bramble Bush: 'there is a distinction between 
the ratio decidendi, the court’s own version of the rule of the case, and the true rule of the case, to 
wit what it will be made to stand for by another later court’.123 Llewellyn, a contemporary of 
Jerome Frank and fellow Legal Realist, thus makes a similar argument to Frank’s in relation to 
the facts of a trial. The practice of repeating decisions is not a simple matter of perception but 
involves a decision as to what the previous ruling meant – it commits the judge to rereading the 
earlier decision by way of the latter. It would appear, then, that, just as the primacy of Marcel and 
Swann’s relationships are subverted by their repetition, so too, in the law, ‘the language of 
precedence [...] proves to be a language of paradox'.124 
Llewellyn and Frank were both heavily influenced by philosophical pragmatism and 
psychoanalysis. In this context it becomes apparent that both Frank’s view of facts and 
Llewellyn’s of precedents correspond to Freud’s conception of the infantile trauma. For Freud 
the realisation that not all of the primal scenes of abuse that he was uncovering could actually 
have occurred, rather than invalidating his theory, only served to make it stronger. ‘Screen-
memories’, in fact, served to explain a patient’s behaviour in a way that connected and made 
sense. They found a way to ‘represent the forgotten childhood years as completely as the 
manifest content of dreams represents the dream-thoughts.'125 Around the time that the first 
volumes of In Search of Lost Time were appearing, Freud’s theory was changing in another way 
also. In his first conception of psychoanalytical method, remembering the trauma that lay behind 
neurosis was the key to its dissolving. But, he wrote of his new technique that the 'patient does 
not remember anything at all of what he has forgotten and repressed, but rather acts it out. He 
reproduces it not as a memory, but as an action; he repeats it, without of course being aware of 
the fact that he is repeating it'.126 By this economy, the world of conscious life, guided by 
unconscious drives, has become the site of nothing more than a repetitious ‘acting out’ of 
something which never actually took place. As Lacan pointed out, it is, 'precisely out of what 
never was, that what repeats itself springs'.127 Despite these non-origins, Freud argued that the 
continuous manipulation of present reality into the shape of a prior screen-memory was 
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encountered as a ‘real, lived experience’.128 The individual, 'is driven to repeat the repressed matter 
as an experience in the present’, but the experience of which he speaks, having been drained of 
its neutral and immediate apprehension of a present world, is nothing like the modern concept 
with which this thesis began.129 Rather, there is a creative aspect to the unconscious in that it 
manages to repeat the same reality out of an ever-changing set of material conditions. 
Returning to the comparison of ‘window shutters’ scenes involving Jean Santeuil and 
Charles Swann, it will be remembered how rational and logical Jean’s reflections were. His 
suspicions were false but they could have been true. He is able to forget about the awkward 
scene, and his own paranoia, until reminded by a specific recurrence of the same situation (his 
lover not being able to see him in the evening). This again is logical and leaves him in an 
understandably ‘melancholy and apathetic mood’. For Swann, on the other hand, memory is 
much more fluid and mysterious: the repetition of the painful emotion is not as obvious as it was 
for Jean. He stumbles upon this particular memory as his thoughts take ‘their wandering course’ 
and then there is a confusion described between the memory of the mind and the body until a 
single ‘word’ could make him feel the pain of an ‘aching limb’. The repetition of the previous 
emotion and scene with the later one is therefore complicated as, without being specified, it is 
unclear whether the single word uttered at a later date actually has any obvious connection to the 
earlier event. Similarity is occurring, here, within fundamental difference: it is a Nietzschean form 
of repetition. In the previous chapter, Walter Benjamin’s theory of resemblances, in which 
objects are only ‘opaquely similar to one another’ was cited in reference to the science of 
fingerprinting.130 Proust’s moments of involuntary memory fulfil the same role, creating within 
their repetition an ‘image’ (a term that Hillis-Miller, in glossing Benjamin, defines as ‘the meaning 
generated by the echoing of two dissimilar things’).131 The opaque similarity that reminds Swann 
of his humiliation is therefore a reminder of nothing so solid as an experience, or even a 
memory. Rather it is a repetition that conjures up a dream image – a fingerprint of his ‘aching 
limb’. Swann is driven to repeat the scene at the window shutters, and conjure up its image, every 
time an unspecified word is spoken: the word being unspecified precisely because it could be 
anything. Within the world of infinite difference, opaque repetition will constantly be enacted, 
creating endless repetitions of a fantastic ‘image’.  
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The formation of legal rules, and their following, can most accurately be described in the 
same terms. Goodrich argues in Oedipus Lex that the image of the law was created by the very 
repressed matter of those who composed it. As the institution of the law, and its study, repressed 
pleasure, lust, and play, those same unconscious forces drove the melancholic lawyer’s projection 
of what the law was and could be. Legal rules are thus created by their author’s ‘repeated 
practices, from their habits, habituations, and other pathological or incorporeal forms'.132 These 
rules, themselves never exactly responding to the experience’s they apparently adjudicated on, are 
then reread in the light of new circumstances only subsequently encountered. The creative drive 
to see the current experience as only a repetition of the previous rule thus conforms to an 
understanding of Freudian repetition compulsion.133 Paradoxically, while the law, in following 
precedent, does not repeat anything in terms of copying a pre-existent experience or truth, the 
repeated practices of stare decisis ‘express repression by virtue of repeating rather than inventing, 
thinking, or judging anew’.134  
A reversal of the received logic about Proust’s masterpiece now becomes apparent. The 
fundamental component of In Search of Lost Time is not the backward look of Marcel’s 
recollection but, rather, the compulsive repetition of his behaviour. The mother’s kiss exists as 
the fantasy which explains the repetition - but this is a creative memory: it is a gap, filled in just 
the way that a previous rule is creatively constructed in order to generate the conditions in which 
it can be obsessively adhered to. All Marcel’s memories work in this way. His reminiscence of 
Combray, for instance, is an act that not only obliterates present experience but also returns the 
subject to a world that never actually existed. Deleuze writes that 'Combray reappears, not as it 
was or as it could be, but in a splendour which was never lived, like a pure past’.135 Gerard 
Genette identifies the same ideal quality in the formal structure of the narration. The depiction 
of Combray aims toward a level of generality – in fact, Genette described Proust as being 
‘intoxicated with the iterative’ (his emphasis).136 However, what Proust’s narrative actually creates is 
defined by Genette as ‘pseudo-iterative’: a style evident from 'scenes presented, particularly by 
their wording in the imperfect, as iterative, whereas their richness and precision of detail ensure 
that no reader can seriously believe they occur and reoccur in that manner, several times, without 
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any variation’.137 What is described as constantly reoccurring (the ritualistic Saturdays of 
Combray) are described with a particularity that could only be a representation of a specific 
instance. The repetition of summer days in Combray, thus, fails to repeat an original entity 
because the reminiscence is stuck in a general-particularity (or particular-generality) that never 
existed. Not only could things, generally, not have occurred like this, the particular instances on 
which they are based, by being given in the form of a generality, also lose their specificity and, 
hence, their authority (which, remember, was the very authority of realism). Fantasy is, again, at 
the heart of the repetition.  
As with so much in psychoanalytical theory, Freud saw a primal version of repetition 
compulsion in the play of children, arguing that ‘it is plainly the case that children repeat 
everything in their play that has made a powerful impression on them, and that in so doing they 
abreact the intensity of the experience and make themselves so to speak master of the 
situation’.138 Becoming adult, in this sense, is to break with such compulsive repetition and accept 
one’s non-mastery of the world: it is to start having real experiences. Yet, it is precisely this that 
Marcel, and the modern consciousness generally, cannot do. To use the analogy of Marquard, 
Proust, or rather Marcel, never did ‘grow up’. It is this inability of Marcel’s to commune with 
reality – to have an experience – and his concomitant drive only to repeat, which prompts Gilles 
Deleuze to make a counter-intuitive claim about him. Deleuze writes that Marcel, ‘has no organs, 
he can't see, he does not understand anything, he does not observe anything, he knows nothing; 
when something is shown to him, he looks but does not see it'.139 Although Proust’s novel, at 
times, seems wholly devoted to the narrator’s observations, Deleuze’s comments radically 
question exactly what it is that is being witnessed.  
Marcel is, in fact, destined to see the same scenes no matter where he goes. In the final 
pages of Sodom and Gomorrah, while tortured by thoughts of Albertine’s homosexuality, Marcel is 
led by his mother to the window of his hotel room. She urges him to look out and see the sea, 
the beach, and the promenade: in compelling Marcel to accept the view of a concrete reality (a 
lived immediacy) she hopes to break the spell of his jealous visions. But, it is an attempt that is 
doomed to failure. Marcel writes that ‘beyond the beach of Balbec, the sea, the sunrise, which 
Mamma was pointing out to me, I saw, with a gesture of despair which did not escape her notice, 
the room at Montjouvain where Albertine, curled up like a great cat, with her mischievous pink 
nose, had taken the place of Mlle Vinteuil’s friend’ (IV, 614). The experience of looking out the 
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window is, for Marcel, dominated by the fantasy image of Albertine with another woman. He 
cannot see what is there but only what his mental life repeatedly projects.140 He, thus, repeats the 
same experience in every, different, reality.  
Something has gone very wrong here. The repetition that Proust seemed to seek out (if 
Marcel’s speech on Vermeer is given any credence), as a form of mimetic copying that could 
provide the reiteration of a fundamental truth, has descended into a baseless form of mental 
projection which obscures any difference whatsoever. The ‘tyranny of the particular’ which was 
earlier seen to denigrate the value of present experience, is nothing in comparison to this 
tyranny, in which repetition, as a compulsion, repeats an identical world from a continuously 
different concrete reality.141 Given the dominance of repetition compulsion, can this world, as it 
is, ever really be glimpsed? The pages of In Search of Lost Time would suggest that, for Marcel, the 
answer is yes. Experience can spring up in isolated moments, though when it does, it is usually in 
the way of a painful encounter. Marcel first discovers such a possibility when on his first visit to 
Balbec. In another harrowing night time scene within a bedroom (both fulfilling and predicting 
the obsession with the mother’s withheld kiss) Marcel is tortured by his lack of familiarity with 
the room in which he is supposed to sleep. Having not been in the habit of sleeping there, the 
room’s dimensions and the objects within it are thrust upon Marcel’s consciousness. This is a 
painful encounter because the control Marcel wields over his world, strengthened by habit, is 
ruptured by an exterior reality that is finally experienced as precisely that: exterior. It is Marcel’s 
inability to assimilate this exterior within himself (and turn it into an interior) that throws him 
into paroxysms of despair. In another famous example, the external world suddenly crashes in 
upon Marcel’s consciousness as he sits and looks out at a Venetian lagoon. No longer coated in a 
film of his own desires, the city is reduced to lumps of rubble and base molecular components. 
As Hillis Miller writes, 'this passage is the nadir in all Proust's work, the low point beneath which 
it is impossible to sink. The self, for once, confronts what is "really there”.142 Venice may be 
reduced to its ‘vulgar material elements’ (V, 749) but, in one sense, this is exactly what is 
required: to see a world of real, physical constituents that cannot be shaped by Marcel’s mental 
projections.  
Repetition is breached, for Marcel, when he is halted from reading the same habitual 
reality wherever he goes. But for his reader, for the reader of Proust’s novel, the possibility of 
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perceiving difference is, paradoxically, achieved through the very repetitious structures that have 
so far been discussed. The rereading prescribed by the text not only intensifies the elusiveness of 
any sense of a Platonic copy but it also forces its reader out of compulsively reading the same 
thing in its proliferation of detail. According to the hermeneutical approach of Wolfgang Iser, 
this is perfectly logical. In a theory which displays striking similarities to the logic of the Dreyfus 
Case and In Search of Lost Time, Iser argues that reading is constructed by an ideation, as opposed 
to a perception, in which an ‘imaginary object’ is formed and acts as a pole around which 
understanding can circulate. The imaginary object is required, not just to visualize the specific 
scene being read but to fulfil the intention of the novel as a whole: 'it manifests itself in the scene 
as an "empty" reference, which thus motivates subsequent images'.143 The significance of Iser’s 
theory when it comes to rereading is that:  
 
a second reading of the text will never have the same effect as the first, for the simple 
reason that the originally assembled meaning is bound to influence the second reading. 
As we have knowledge we did not have before, the imaginary objects accumulating along 
the time axis cannot follow each other in exactly the same way.144  
 
It is precisely this concern which manifests itself in much legal theory and practice surrounding 
appeal courts. The law is pulled in two competing directions. Firstly, it wants to establish finality 
in its decisions – to cling to the illusion that its judgments have coincided with experience. Yet, 
secondly it wants to allow the possibility of reversal – a prospect that, in order to be actualized, 
must somehow conceive of the initial judgment as temporary.145 This can be achieved precisely 
by conceiving of the initial trial as an ‘imaginary pole’ around which the rereading of the appeal 
can circulate. Iser writes that while the structure of the text and the process by which meaning is 
assigned will always be the same, ‘it is the product of each realization that is unique and 
unrepeatable. And, in turn, this structure-determined unrepeatability of meaning is precisely what 
conditions the repeatability of the newness of the identical text. It can never be the same twice 
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over’.146 So, not only can the rereading of a text or trial produce a new meaning or judgment, it 
actually must do so: even when the verdict is upheld it is a new form of guilt that is being read in 
an appeal. Roland Barthes makes a similar point, arguing that the aim of rereading is ‘to multiply 
the signifiers, not to reach some ultimate signified’.147 In fact, Barthes lauds rereading as the only 
thing which, ‘saves the text from repetition (those who fail to reread are obliged to read the same 
story everywhere)'.148 In rereading, the reader can see beyond the scope of their own horizons, as 
those horizons have been modified by the first reading of the text.149 Significantly, experience 
cannot provide the same modification. Whereas reading can modify horizons, conscious life is 
destined, by way of a compulsive repetition, to read the same story everywhere. The act of 
reading, and rereading, by contrast, implies a journey through infinite difference. 
The Platonic, Nietzschean and Freudian forms of repetition discussed in this chapter 
have, therefore, all connected to Proust’s novel in different ways. Proust’s retreat into writing 
and inevitable rewriting seemed to produce the possibility for constantly rereading the Platonic 
copy of an ultimate, even ideal, truth. However, upon examination, it appeared that, as with the 
forms of appeal and precedent in the law, the question of what was being repeated was more 
complicated than it first seemed. The search for originals provided a regression only into fantasy 
and a subsequent compulsion to repeat appeared to guide both the structure of the novel and the 
law’s continued application of stare decisis. In the end, the novel, and its reading, found ways out 
of such repetition – but only into a world of infinite difference and Nietzschean, ghostly, 
recurrence; partly the world that it seemed that Proust had retreated from in the first place. If 
Proust had been searching for Platonic repetition then his quest failed. If, on the other hand, and 
as E M Forster claimed, he was attempting to accurately portray modern consciousness, his 
project was emphatically successful. The final oblique repetition of the novel is that between 
itself and the world of non-experience which was the site of its production. In Search of Lost Time 
most fundamentally welcomes its readers to a brave new world. A world in which there are only 
judgments without truth, repetitions without originals, and novels without experience.
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CONCLUSION: EXPERIENCING THE HYPER-REAL 
 
If there’s not at least reasonable doubt in this case – at least reasonable doubt – then I 
don’t understand what I’m doing. And so when the jury came in it didn’t just disappoint 
me, it shook the foundations of my beliefs. It shook the foundations of my beliefs in the 
justice system, in human beings, in my own abilities, in my judgment, in my sense of 
reality. 
David Rudolf, The Staircase1 
 
What comes after experience?  
In one sense, this is entirely the wrong question. Even though the concept may now 
shimmer in a nebulous light that defies any sense of its self-evidence, as Joan Wallach Scott 
points out 'experience is not a word we can do without’.2 The modern concept of experience has 
never quite vanished, and the continuing utilisation of realism in the novel attests to just this 
persistence. Modernism did not kill off realism – on the contrary, realist novels continue to pack 
the shelves of booksellers and libraries. Even more significantly, and as Weinstein puts it, realism 
was never something to be ‘got over’: the experimental forms of the twentieth-century have, 
therefore, continued to utilise some, albeit minimal, form of realism.3 An even more prominent 
continuity with its eighteenth and nineteenth-century traditions can be seen in the criminal trial. 
Trials have not stopped attempting to reconstruct the reality of an experiential event, and courts, 
and lawyers, still perceive themselves as practitioners in realism: as dealers in experience.4  
But the range of continuity does not stop there. Modernism has had a lasting effect on 
the novel, and the various changes to the trial that took place in the early twentieth-century can 
still be seen today. The novel and trial are not what they once were, in their realist heyday, and 
the loss of experience is still in evidence. In this conclusion, some brief comments on Ian 
McEwan’s novel, Atonement (2001), and Jean-Xavier De Lestrade’s documentary, The Staircase 
(2005), will show how this is the case. A suggestion will then be made, by way of John D. 
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Caputo’s hyper-realist interpretation of the work of Jacques Derrida, as to the future of a world 
in which experience deconstructs itself.   
  
Shimmering Experience 
 
Ian McEwan’s Atonement opens on a hot summer’s day in 1934, amidst the setting of a vast 
country house owned by the Tallis family. The central character, Briony, who at thirteen is the 
youngest in the family, is intent upon organising her visiting cousins in the production of a play 
she has written – indeed Briony spends much of her time writing and has already decided upon 
this as her vocation in life. Briony’s elder sister, Cecilia, and Robbie Turner, the son of the 
family’s cleaning lady are also present, as is Briony’s brother, Leon, and his friend Paul Marshall. 
This first section is then defined by three incidents which Briony witnesses. Firstly, she sees Cecilia 
and Robbie engaged in a vociferous conversation which culminates in Cecilia stripping down to 
her underclothes and diving into the large fountain that the house overlooks. Later that day, 
Briony enters the library to find Robbie and Cecilia having sex. She interprets this as an assault, 
partly because of a letter from Robbie to Cecilia, which Briony has read, that contains what she 
considers to be an obscene suggestion. The reader is made aware, by way of the novel’s 
apparently omniscient narration, that Briony’s witnessing is not wholly accurate. At the fountain, 
Cecilia plunges into the water in order to recover the fragments of a broken Meissen vase, while 
the sexual act between her and Robbie is absolutely consensual. The third scene which Briony is 
privy to – the apparent rape of her cousin, Lola – is only narrated from Briony’s point of view. 
This incident takes place outside, at night, and Briony’s perception is of a vague figure rising up 
from Lola and running away. In the light of her earlier ‘discoveries’ about his wanton sexual 
proclivities Briony feels sure that this figure is Robbie, and she names him as such.  
In the second part of the novel, Robbie, having been released from prison, is now a 
soldier in war-torn France. Since his conviction he and Cecilia have seen each other just once, 
for half an hour, in a train station prior to Robbie’s dispatch to the front. The memory of the 
kiss they share on that occasion keeps Robbie going as he takes part in the preparations for the 
Dunkirk evacuation – the section ending with him falling asleep, one day before the evacuation is 
due to take place. Briony’s atonement is then what initially appears to be narrated in Part Three. 
With age, she has realised her mistake in accusing Robbie, and now believes that her brother’s 
friend, Paul Marshall, was Lola’s assailant (the wedding of these two is narrated later in the 
section). Rather than take up a place at Cambridge Briony has become a trainee nurse in London, 
dealing with the harrowing cases of returning war casualties. Cecilia, who has cut off all contact 
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with her family since their acquiescence in Robbie’s conviction, is now living in Balham , 
London. Briony tracks her down, coincidentally arriving while Robbie is on leave and so there 
also. She attempts to make amends, to atone, by committing to making a legal statement of 
Robbie’s innocence: while there is no forgiveness offered, it is suggested that, in the future, this 
may come. 
In actual fact, neither Briony’s self-inflicted distress in working with the wounded, nor 
her legal retraction, are the real atonements. Her literary ambitions have persisted into adulthood 
and she has written a novella, Two Figures by a Fountain. Upon sending the manuscript to Horizon 
she receives a letter back, initialled CC (Cyril Connolly was the real-life editor of Horizon), in 
which her work is rejected but not without several words of praise and advice. The letter quotes 
from the novella, with passages that the reader has read in Part One, and makes suggestions: for 
instance, the vase should not be Ming as this would be too valuable to be taken outside. The 
reader is, therefore, encouraged to feel that Part One is a revised version of Briony’s novella. At 
the conclusion of the novel’s third part it is initialled: ‘BT, London, 1999’. It would now appear 
that the whole novel has been Briony’s work.  
In the novel’s final part, itself entitled ‘London, 1999’, this is made clear. Briony, having 
had a long career as a successful writer is now aged seventy-seven: she narrates this short 
epilogue in the first-person. The novella rejected by Horizon during the war has been rewritten 
several times since then, eventually being completed as the novel the reader has just read. From 
the second version onwards Briony has ‘regarded it as my duty to disguise nothing – the names, 
the places, exact circumstances – I put it all there as a matter of historical record’.5 The novel will 
not, however, be published until after Briony’s death: Paul and Lola Marshall’s ‘vigorous libel 
actions against national newspapers’ have precluded Briony’s publishers from opening 
themselves to the risk that Briony’s revised accusations would bring.6 But what is, in fact, the 
‘historical record’ of events? What are the facts of this case? Briony’s epilogue throws all this in 
doubt when she writes that:  
 
All the preceding drafts were pitiless. But now I can no longer think what purpose would 
be served if, say, I tried to persuade my reader, by direct or indirect means, that Robbie 
Turner died of septicaemia at Bray dunes on 1 June 1940, or that Cecilia was killed in 
September of the same year by a bomb that destroyed Balham Underground station. 
That I never saw them in that year [...] Who would want to believe that they never met 
                                                           
5 Ian McEwan, Atonement (London: Vintage, 2002) 369. 
6 Ibid.  357. 
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again, never fulfilled their love? Who would want to believe that, except in the service of 
the bleakest realism? [...] When I am dead, and the Marshalls are dead, and the novel is 
finally published, we will exist only as my inventions. [...] I know there’s always a certain 
kind of reader who will be compelled to ask, But what really happened? The answer is 
simple: the lovers survive and flourish. As long as there is a single copy, a solitary 
typescript of my final draft, then my spontaneous, fortuitous sister and her medical 
prince survive to love.7 
 
For Briony, the ultimate atonement is to give Robbie and Cecilia their happiness, and their lives, 
in the confines of something that will live on – her novel. She thus produces something beyond 
the ‘bleakest realism’ of a completely factual account. In its third part, and short epilogue, 
Atonement thus takes on a characteristic trait of much postmodern writing: an utter revelling in its 
irreducible fictionality. But the shock of this effect is produced precisely by building the earlier 
sections on a strong foundation of apparent realism. In the earlier sections the reader is drawn 
into a story told in the omniscient style of a realist narrator in which the experiences of Briony, 
Robbie and Cecilia appear to be straightforwardly recounted.  
A different kind of realism, and a different accuracy in relation to experience, is also at 
play though. In the closing section, Briony writes of the research she has undertaken at the 
Imperial War Museum, in order to write of Robbie’s wartime experience – something which 
McEwan himself refers to in a brief post-script. She also sends her manuscript to an old Colonel 
for advice on military detail, the return of which she receives with glee: ‘I love these little things, 
this pointillist approach to verisimilitude, the correction of detail that cumulatively gives such 
satisfaction’.8 Yet she later wonders at her pleasure in such details, pointing out that ‘If I really 
cared so much about facts, I should have written a different kind of book’.9 For Briony, and for 
McEwan, the crucial thing is not the facts of what happened but the factuality of all that surrounds 
it. For instance, the fact of whether Cecilia really was killed by the bomb that destroyed Balham 
Underground station is less important than the factuality of that specific event, which actually did 
occur in October 1940.10 For McEwan, it is getting the details which, together, make up the 
totality of the event, right, that really matters.11 What is produced is, thus, not so very different 
                                                           
7 Ibid.  370-71. 
8 Ibid.  359. 
9 Ibid.  360. 
10 Note that McEwan, by having the bombing take place in September 1940, is a month out with his dating. 
11 McEwan’s methods of research led to controversy, as he was accused of plagiarizing Lucilla Andrews 
autobiography, No Time for Romance. Andrews had been a nurse in London during the war, just like Briony, and the 
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from the ‘factual fictions’ of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but the emphasis has been 
altered: it would, rather, be more accurate to describe McEwan as a purveyor of ‘fictional 
documentaries’.12  
  This could also be an apt way to describe Jean Xavier De Lestrade’s 2005 film, The 
Staircase. The story that this film narrates begins on December 9th 2001, when Michael Peterson, 
a published writer, calls 911, claiming that he has just discovered his wife, Kathleen, at the 
bottom of a staircase in their North Carolina home. According to Peterson, she is still alive, but 
badly injured – by the time medics arrive she is dead. The lead Detective dispatched to the scene 
is immediately suspicious as Kathleen Peterson has suffered a huge amount of blood loss. Upon 
being examined by the State Pathologist it is thought that the number, and severity, of the 
wounds suffered is also not consistent with an accidental death. A week after his 911 call, 
Michael Peterson is, therefore, duly arrested and charged with his wife’s murder. De Lestrade’s 
documentary charts the ensuing development of the case, particularly the work done by 
Peterson’s defence team, and culminates in his trial, at which Peterson is found guilty. 
 As with Atonement, realism, and the reconstruction of experience which it forms, has not 
been completely discarded either by De Lestrade’s documentary or the trial it depicts. Much of 
the film is taken up with fly-on-the-wall style filming of Peterson at home with his family, and in 
following his lawyer’s various meetings, strategic discussions, and independent investigations. 
What this presents itself as portraying is the reality of the case from a certain angle – this is 
‘things as they are’ when you are subject to a murder charge in Durham, North Carolina. There is 
no voice-over narration, and any interviews which take place do not include the film-makers 
questions. In this sense, the documentary, like the relist novel, presents itself as a transparent 
medium: the film merely documents reality. 
 The trial is very much a competition of reconstructions also. While the prosecution put 
forward the case that Peterson bludgeoned his wife to death with a fireplace ‘blow-poke’ which 
they claim has now mysteriously gone missing, the defence suggest that Kathleen Peterson 
suffered a fatal, but accidental, fall. The opening statements for both prosecution and defence 
utilise a rhetoric of finality: nothing is equivocal, the truth is spoken of in its neat, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
two accounts bore marked similarities. McEwan defended his position vigorously, claiming to have been inspired by 
Andrews work but not to have copied it. Regardless of what was done with this material, its status as a primary 
experiential source was clearly important to McEwan. He wrote that ‘what Andrews described was not an imaginary 
world - it was not a fiction. It was the world of a shared reality’. Ian McEwan, "An Inspiration, yes. Did I copy from 
another author? No," The Guardian, 27th November 2006.  
12 The phrase ‘factual fictions’ is Lennard J. Davis’s: see Lennard J. Davis, Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English 
Novel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). 
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completed, state. The prosecution, particularly, attempt to speak to the ‘common-sense’ of the 
jurors. In his closing statement, the District Attorney, Jim Hardin, displays a series of 
photographs of Kathleen Peterson at the scene and on the Pathologist’s table, claiming that each 
picture speaks a thousand words. Hardin asks: ‘What if those walls could talk? What would they 
say? Ladies and Gentlemen these walls are talking. Kathleen Peterson is talking to us through the 
blood on these walls. She is screaming at us for truth and for justice. It’s all in these 
photographs’.13 Hardin speaks to the jury’s lay experience, to the simple common-sense view of 
the scenes they are confronted with. How could these be produced by an accident? Who could 
fail to see that this is the result of murder? The guilty verdict reached by the jury suggests that 
such realist accounts have not yet completely fallen in value. 
 Despite these affinities with a realist tradition which reconstructs experience, Atonement 
and The Staircase also display the specific features of non-experience that were identified in the 
analysis of Forster, Ford, and Proust. Indeed, the parallels between McEwan’s novel and A 
Passage to India are striking, as they both depict the destructive results of a false accusation. But 
while Adela Quested rescinds her claim just in time, and appears to tell the truth as she knows it, 
Briony Tallis atones for the sins of her earlier falsehoods by producing more untruths. She writes 
of her merging of two, real, hospitals into one, fictional, one as ‘a convenient distortion, and the 
least of my offences against veracity’.14 Honest enough to ‘count myself an unreliable witness’, 
and admit to the fabrication of her ending, Briony dishonestly presents an objective account of the 
summer’s day in 1934 with which the novel begins.15 Briony writes of the real reason for Cecilia’s 
dive into the fountain, the Freudian slip behind Robbie’s obscene letter, and the consensual sex 
that took place in the library – but all of these go against what the young Briony thought she saw. 
How does Briony know that these are the true events, the real experiences that occurred (surely 
all this could not have been contained in Robbie and Cecilia’s letters to one another which are 
now said to be housed in the Imperial War Museum)?16 What if Robbie really was the rapist both 
of Cecilia and Lola? How does the reader know he is not? It is only Briony’s word that attests as 
much – the same word as convicted Robbie all those years before. In evidential terms there is 
nothing more solid to go on, other than the simple, but convincing, point that Cecilia would 
hardly be likely to form a loving relationship with her rapist. Yet it is precisely the notion that 
                                                           
13 De Lestrade, The Staircase. Episode 8. 
14 McEwan, Atonement  356. 
15 Ibid.  358. 
16 Ibid.  371. 
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Lola married ‘her rapist’ that Briony suggests is the ‘clinching news’ of Paul Marshall’s guilt.17 
With such a wealth of doubt it is hardly outlandish to suggest that the younger Briony was, in 
fact, right: that Briony is atoning for telling the truth. McEwan’s novel seems to produce more 
closure than Forster’s, it seems to name the perpetrator of the crime with definitive clarity, but, 
in fact, as in A Passage to India, the Erlebnis of the central event is never established in its 
experiential concreticity. Despite the atonement, and the confession, we are still stuck in the 
blankness of the Marabar cave.  
 The central question of Michael Peterson’s trial is whether there is even a criminal act to 
be adjudicated upon. The fact that no one knows, that the tragedy appears also to be a mystery, 
is what creates such interest in the case. In between the interviews and fly-on-the-wall style 
filming referred to earlier, De Lestrade’s documentary splices footage from TV news reports and 
talk shows (some of the filming showing correspondents preparing their pieces to camera and, 
hence, accentuating the presented element of such representation). Peterson himself refers to this 
as an entertaining spectacle which deflects attention from the major issues facing the residents of 
Durham:  
 
Everybody is focussed on my trial. It’s a diversion. It’s something that, it’s an 
entertainment. It’s a show. And if one-tenth, one-tenth, of that amount of time or media 
exposure – if it were given to what’s real and what’s true – the problems – things would 
get better.18 
 
 While it may seem strange for Peterson to question the reality and truth of the process in which 
he is embroiled, it is something that the viewer is made quite aware of throughout the 
documentary. The TV cameras, the newspaper coverage, and the trial itself all present a certain 
representation. But if these are ‘entertainments’ then what is the documentary? Does the viewer 
perceive it as real? Does the style of filming, which, paradoxically, strikes one as similar to TV 
dramas which employ a documentary style, actually accentuate the fictional qualities of the trial 
itself? Both Peterson and De Lestrade (in an interview featured on the DVD copy of the film) 
refer to truth being forgotten about in the common law trial system – for Peterson ‘truth is of no 
meaning whatsoever. This has become a show’.19 But the additional layers of TV reports, 
interviews, and the documentary itself do not get any further towards uncovering the event in its 
                                                           
17 Ibid. 324 & 347. 
18 De Lestrade, The Staircase. Episode 2. 
19 Ibid. Episode 4. 
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reality. Rather, like Atonement, they take it much further away, into the realm of fiction: the 
prosecution even refer to Peterson’s occupation as a writer in order to undermine his defence, 
claiming that ‘he is a person who knows how to create a fictional plot’.20  
One way out of this morass of indecision was seen, in Chapter One, to rest on the fore-
understanding of prejudice. Certainly, it could be argued that Peterson’s conviction owed much 
to the distaste that the local community felt toward him. His claim that Kathleen Peterson was 
well aware of his promiscuity with other men was not thought convincing by the prosecution, 
who suggested that his wife’s discovery of pornographic images on his computer was the reason 
for her murder. Equally, his family and defence attorneys were convinced of his innocence – yet 
with an identical lack of real knowledge to back it up. In more formal terms, Peterson’s attorney, 
David Rudolf, in his closing statement, decides to focus on the reasonable doubt in the case, and 
reiterate that the burden of proof lies entirely with the prosecution. By the letter of the law this 
is, of course, true. But earlier surveys which the defence carry out on responses to their forensic 
expert’s testimony suggest that potential jurors will be unhappy if no really feasible alternative is 
offered. According to Peterson, the prejudice he faced was not based on his specific personality 
but simply because he had become an accused. He argues that if ‘the police arrest you, you’re 
guilty. This is what people believe’.21 The ‘common sense’ view, so successfully adopted by the 
prosecution, was, perhaps, particularly convincing for a group of jurors who were already primed 
and ready to convict.  
 While the decision making process in British India was reduced to a question of whether 
to trust one untrue account over another, the prejudicial acceptance of omniscient narration as 
true was hinted at by A Passage to India. In Atonement, this feature is accentuated. The novel’s 
conclusion should embolden the reader to ask more questions than Briony answers – to wonder, 
as above, at the stated innocence of Robbie. Yet, this is a response that rarely seems to be 
evoked.22 Even more than in Forster’s novel, McEwan draws attention to the fact that one can 
never trust what is written. But for the text to be intelligible, trust has to be placed in something 
– for most readers, it would appear, the irresistible pull of the first part’s realism is too great, 
despite the fact that it is undermined by subsequent sections. Of course, it is precisely these 
questions of where to place trust that allows for such divergent interpretations of The Good 
                                                           
20 Ibid. Episode 8. 
21 Ibid. Episode 2. 
22 I have been unable to find any critic who questions Robbie in this sense. In addition, his death of septicaemia 
appears to be universally accepted as the true account, despite the fact that McEwan/Briony is careful to preface 
this version with the following ‘what purpose would be served if, say, I tried to persuade my reader, by direct or 
indirect means, that Robbie Turner died of septicaemia at Bray dunes on 1 June 1940’ (my emphasis). 
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Soldier. Roger Poole interprets the narrative in a way that totally subverts its surface manifestation 
– he reads a fabula that is almost completely obscured by its sjuzhet. Yet this reading can only be 
made by placing trust in some part of Dowell’s tale. Depending on where this trust is placed, 
drastically different characters can appear in the guise of Edward Ashburnham.23 
By contrast, it was the idea of consistency of character that had allowed for both the 
realist representation of identity and important legal formations such as the ‘responsible 
individual’. In Chapter Two, it was argued that, as these theories began to wane, and as the 
‘natural consequences’ of actions could no longer be assumed, questions of causation were 
increasingly held to be a matter for experts. This form of evidence is extremely prominent in 
Michael Peterson’s trial. The state Pathologist finds Kathleen Peterson’s death to be the result of 
a beating. But, the defence team hire a forensic expert, Dr. Henry Lee, who argues that both the 
amount of blood loss, and the precise nature of the blood spatters on the walls, are more 
consistent with accidental death. Faris Bandak, a biomechanical researcher, produces 
computerised images of what could have happened, postulating several head knocks occurring as 
Kathleen Peterson attempted to get back up from an initial fall. Bandak is asked by the 
prosecution if the forensic pathologist who carried out the autopsy, who had direct experience of 
the body, is not in a better position to make a judgment as to cause of death: his response is that 
in matters of causation, presence is not enough.24  
 Bandak, abducting like Charles Sanders Peirce or Sherlock Holmes, postulates a 
hypothesis which his computer model can then test. In one sense, a similar form of expertise is 
required of the reader of Atonement. McEwan invites his reader not only to guess between 
competing interpretations but to create their own and test it by the evidence of the text. But 
there is another layer of ‘good reading’ that this novel alludes to also. In the midst of the 
pandemonium created by the collapse of Aziz’s trial in A Passage to India, Adela reflects that 
'though the vision was over, and she had returned to the insipidity of the world, she remembered 
what she had learned. Atonement and confession - they could wait'.25 Adela’s atonement does 
wait – seventy-seven years until McEwan’s novel and Briony’s confession. The novel is littered 
with just such literary echoes as this, many of them noted by critics. The assumption of a child’s 
view of adult affairs has been likened to Henry James’ What Maisie Knew and L. P. Hartley’s The 
                                                           
23 Michael Peterson comments on his sister-in-law’s testimony that ‘she said I don’t know who that Michael 
Peterson is. Now, I don’t know who that person is either, who has been on trial’. His trial personality is thus a 
construct like Edward’s in the Kilsyte case but, unlike Edward, he chooses to resist its explanatory power. De 
Lestrade, The Staircase. Episode 8. 
24 Ibid. Episode 7. 
25 E. M. Forster, A Passage to India (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989) 232. 
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Go-Between. Cyril Connolly’s letter to Briony specifically refers to Virginia Woolf, while he 
comments that Elizabeth Bowen read the novella and found it reminiscent of Rosamund 
Lehmann’s Dusty Answer.26 Hermione Lee also notes the importance of the broken vase in this 
novel and connects it to that other shattered literary container – Henry James’ Golden Bowl. 
Apart from the epigraph, taken from Jane Austen’s Northanger Abbey, all of McEwan’s influences 
are therefore from the modernist period. That is, he is specifically referencing and alluding to 
novels from an era in which readers were being transformed into experts. The expertise required 
of McEwan’s reader is, thus, not just a close eye for detail but an appreciation of the novel form 
in history. To know The Golden Bowl is to recognize the themes of flawed truth, mistaken belief, 
and the partiality of circumstantial evidence. To spot Virginia Woolf in the style of the first part 
is to enjoy, before anyone else, its sheer fictionality.27  
According to Hermione Lee, in Atonement, ‘historical layers of English fiction are invoked 
– and rewritten’.28 But McEwan does not just produce a copy of this tradition. Rather, in 
showing how modernism’s ‘interior transformation can now be seen to have interacted with the 
larger march of 20th-century history’ his novel could be said to appeal to the postmodern.29 But 
what is also presented by the text is a fictional narrator’s attempt to redeem life by way of art.30 
This connects Briony to the repetitious rewriting, and rereading of Marcel, and so McEwan to 
Proust. Briony’s atonement does not come in reality – she does not, actually, confront Cecilia and 
promise to make a statement of Robbie’s innocence.31 Rather, a retreat into writing is made 
which parallels Proust’s withdrawal from experience and Marcel’s forced imprisonment during 
The Captive. Since the first draft of her novella, Two Figures by a Fountain, Briony has constantly 
been engaged in its rewriting. But what guides this repetition? Is the trauma of the scene she 
witnesses – her first, youthful, encounter with sexuality – really the original source of this 
repetitious ‘acting out’. By the logic of the discussion in Chapter Three, Briony’s repetitions 
come precisely out of something that never existed at all. To search for the meaning of the text is 
therefore not to find the original event that began the torrent of words. Lola’s rape and Briony’s 
                                                           
26 McEwan, Atonement  314. 
27 McEwan’s admiration for The Good Soldier has also been noted by Julian Barnes, who reports that shortly after 
reading Ford’s novel for the first time McEwan wrote On Chesil Beach. Barnes writes that ‘only after publishing the 
book did he realise that he had unconsciously given his two main characters the names Edward (as in Ashburnham) 
and Florence (as in Dowell)’. Julian Barnes, "The Saddest Story," The Guardian, 7th June 2008.  
28 Hermione Lee, “If your memories serve you well ...,” in Peter Childs, ed., The Fiction of Ian McEwan (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 137. 
29 Geoff Dyer, “Who’s afraid of influence?,” in Ibid.  136. 
30 For a discussion of modern literature’s conception of itself in these terms see Leo Bersani, The Culture of Redemption 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
31 McEwan, Atonement  371. 
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accusation of Robbie are not originals – they are merely the screen-memories that make sense of 
everything else. Briony does not rewrite because she wants to get closer to the original – she 
posits the original so that she can rewrite. 
Since his conviction, Michael Peterson has attempted to have his case reread by 
launching a succession of appeals. In the most recent attempt, it was claimed that the 
prosecution suppressed evidence about a tire iron found in a neighbour’s garden days after 
Kathleen Peterson’s death. Peterson’s lawyers argued that had such information been available at 
the time of his trial a different theory about the cause of death may have been proffered.32 The 
judge ruling on the appeal hearing, who was the judge in the original trial itself, ruled against 
Peterson’s attempt to tell a different story, claiming that the new evidence would not have 
affected the judgment of the jury in the original trial. In The Staircase, Peterson’s brother, Bill, 
himself a lawyer, advises Peterson the night before the verdict that even if he is convicted, there 
has been enough error in the trial for a successful appeal to be launched. One of his examples is 
the admittance of evidence from a previous death that the judge has allowed – itself an incident 
of seemingly remarkable repetition.  
This death occurred in Germany, in 1985, when a friend and neighbour of Peterson’s, 
Elizabeth Ratliff was found dead at the bottom of her staircase: it was Peterson who discovered 
the body. For the prosecution, and for the judge who allowed the evidence, this is too much of a 
coincidence. The body is exhumed and a second autopsy carried out, this time by the pathologist 
who examined Kathleen Peterson. The result comes back that Elizabeth Ratliff was murdered. 
Via a rule comparable to the ‘Similar Fact Evidence’ that helped to convict George Joseph Smith 
in the ‘Brides in the Bath’ case, these findings are then allowed into the trial of Michael Peterson. 
The prosecution, by establishing a repetition, aided their efforts to prove guilt. But one of the 
witnesses in particular, Amybeth Berner, produces statements which seem to question what kind 
of repetition is really taking place. She comments on her first statement, only made in 2002, that 
‘it contained every significant thing that I could remember at that time until I began to remember 
more things’.33 She then reports subsequent ‘flashbacks’ in which ever more details are 
remembered which place Michael Peterson in a suspicious light. Many of these come once she 
has arrived in North Carolina and met up with other witnesses. She claims that ‘hearing their 
voices has brought back some memories. The messages, the images are very very vivid, some of 
them are in colour’.34 Quite apart from the sense of a TV reality (colour being an arbiter of 
                                                           
32 http://www.newsobserver.com/news/crime_safety/peterson/story/1437242.html 
33 De Lestrade, The Staircase. Episode 6. 
34 Ibid. 
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verisimilitude) contained in Berner’s testimony, the issue of rereading is clearly evident here. 
Berner appears to read the previous scene by way of its subsequent, and supposed, repetition. 
She reads the previous event by way of her current emplacement in the trial of Michael Peterson. 
Like the reading of precedent in the law, the sequence is subverted – Kathleen Peterson comes 
first, Elizabeth Ratliff second.  
 Of course, the documentary itself forms a certain repetition of the case (and a repetition 
of itself as it can be watched and rewatched). But the proliferation of varied repetitions does not 
stop there. A true-crime book, Written in Blood, written by Diane Fanning, was published in 2005, 
followed by a TV drama, The Staircase Murders, starring Treat Williams, which was aired in 2007. 
The case was also the subject of an episode of the American documentary TV series Forensic Files. 
Allied to this, a brief web inquiry brings up a host of websites chronicling the case, two of them, 
in particular deriding De Lestrade’s film for its accentuation of the plausibility of Peterson’s 
innocence.35 According to one site, ‘Lestrade succeeded in creating reasonable doubt only by 
hiding the reasonable certainties of the situation’.36 In addition to this, the effect of the filming 
process itself on what was then presented as a simple recording of ‘reality’ is questioned.  
While it is dangerous to give credence to anything found by the judgment of google, 
these criticisms are justified in so far as De Lestrade’s film does present a sceptical view of 
Peterson’s conviction. There is no view from nowhere, and the transparency of the documentary 
does not preclude its presentation of a specific case. What these websites fail to notice however, is 
the way that The Staircase plays into this sense of multiple truths. The film constantly reiterates 
that the case is open to an amazing range and variety of media and representation. These 
versions cannot be combined: if put together they do not create a greater idea of what happened 
to Kathleen Peterson or a superior sense of Michael Peterson’s character. But they do, to an 
extent, produce other truths. For instance, one of De Lestrade’s key themes is the suggestion that 
Peterson’s bisexuality and promiscuity were important factors in his conviction. These are 
factors that the trial can refer to, but never quite contain. Extra judicial media such as literature, 
newspapers, TV, film, and internet resources help to represent these other truths. But this is not 
something that is peculiar to this particular case. The trial, in general terms, cannot conceive of 
itself as being a witness to truth any more – not in the sense in which the event of the crime is 
‘reactualized’ by the court. But, this is not all that trials produce. Verdicts make claims ‘about the 
condemnation of the wrongdoer, the standing of the community to call them to account, and the 
                                                           
35 www.peterson-staircase.com and www.vanceholmes.com/court/trial m_peterson.html 
36 www.vanceholmes.com/court/trial m_peterson.html 
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legitimacy of the trial itself’.37 Moreover, the trial makes a judgment of the society in which it is 
placed – it says something about the culture in which the judgment is made, how it envisages 
itself, and to what it aspires. The reconstructive trial, rather than producing something less than 
the truth of what happened, therefore ‘generates an excess of possible truths’.38  
 
Making Reality and Doing Truth 
 
In Atonement and The Staircase, the influence of modernism, and experience’s denigration, are 
clearly evident, as are features which suggest the survival of certain inherent traits of realism. For 
this reason, the question which began this conclusion – what comes after experience? – was 
described as, in one sense, entirely the wrong one to set out with. But this is not the full story. 
That is, the question is entirely wrong in one sense, but entirely right in another. Something 
different has occurred in the last thirty to forty years of Western culture: something which 
suggests that the breaking of experience’s referential relationship with reality does not produce 
something less than realism but, rather, something more. In the final section of this thesis a 
particular reading of Jacques Derrida’s work made by John D. Caputo will be briefly discussed. 
Caputo’s article ‘For the Love of the Things Themselves: Derrida’s Phenomenology of the 
Hyper-Real’ offers a sense of how a form of reality can survive, when it is no longer found in the 
presence of experience. 
In one sense, deconstruction is the culmination of much of this thesis’ argument. For 
Derrida, experience is an ‘unwieldy’ concept that ‘belongs to the history of metaphysics and we 
can only use it under erasure (sous rature)’.39 Experience and realism are, in deconstruction, 
radically questioned. As Caputo writes, ‘If the real means what is present, what is really there, full 
blown and unvarnished, then deconstruction, as the deconstruction of the metaphysics of 
presence, is the deconstruction of realism, of any such real or full presence, which can always be 
shown to be a constituted effect’.40 Likewise, if experience is thought to bring knowledge of the 
‘things themselves’ (Husserl’s ambitious attempt for the phenomenological project and 
something which was intimately linked to the Erlebnis of Dilthey), deconstruction responds that 
                                                           
37 Lindsay Farmer, "Trials," in Law and Humanities: An Introduction, ed. A. Sarat, M. Anderson, and C. Frank 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2010), 471. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology. Quoted in Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations 
on a Universal Theme (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006) 363. 
40 John D. Caputo, "For the Love of the Things Themselves: Derrida's Phenomenology of the Hyper-Real," in 
Fenomenologia Hoje II: Signficado e Linguagem, ed. Ricardo Timm de Souza and Nythamar Fernandes de Oliveria (Porto 
Allegre, Brazil: EDIPUCRS, 2002), 37. 
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the thing itself is what always slips away in the play of signifiers. It is precisely this point that has 
led Derrida to be mistakenly considered a relativist, subjectivist, and anti-realist thinker. Yet, 
what Caputo argues is that ‘deconstruction is not a way of undoing truth but a way of doing it’.41 
Far from denigrating the idea of reality what Derrida offers, according to Caputo, is a love letter 
to it. With a logic that exactly matches that of Proust, this love affair only exists because the 
object cannot be reached. To love only what one can have, to calculate its value and offer it only 
when it is likely that it will be returned – these are the actions of, in the phrase of Kierkegaard’s 
fictional narrator, Johannes Climacus, a ‘mediocre fellow’. For Caputo:  
 
Is not the realist just such a mediocre fellow, a fellow who, despite all his brave talk and 
chest-thumping bravado about reality, has no heart or passion for an elusive lover like 
the things themselves? Deconstruction’s desire is not satisfied with what presents itself to 
us as real, for what it loves goes beyond what presents itself as real to an ultra-real for 
which we pray and weep, towards a hyper-real, something that is not less than real but 
more, not below the real but beyond.42  
 
When Derrida says that the thing itself slips away it is not in order to question its existence. 
Rather, the deconstruction of presence, of experience, is designed to keep the thing itself safe 
(sauf). Husserl’s metaphor for his theory of intentionality – that, with cupid’s bow, the subject 
aims his arrow at the object of his desire – is undermined by Derrida in this sense. If the arrow 
hits its object – the thing itself – it wounds it: precisely what Derrida claims the lover would 
never want to do. To keep it safe, to retain its desirability, the thing itself must, therefore, always 
evade the subject’s arrow of love.    
 Despite Derrida’s continued avowal that language creates an infinite play of signifiers, 
Caputo argues that deconstruction arises precisely from a love of singularity. The thing itself, the 
signified, is always singular, even although the signifiers it gives rise to are infinitely 
deconstructing themselves. Take the proper name as an example. The proper name is the 
attempt to produce a singular signifier that refers to just one signified. It picks out that person, 
and that person alone. But, this is, of course, impossible. Not only does the proper name refer to 
more than one person, it also cannot be a singular entity in any sense: ‘for were the sign to be 
utterly proper, absolutely unique and idiomatic, no one would understand it, and we would not 
                                                           
41 Ibid., 39. 
42 Ibid., 39-40. 
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even know it was a sign rather than just a noise’.43 The proper name has to be understood, and 
so bear the possibility of being repeated. But in being repeated it loses its pretensions to absolute 
singularity. As Caputo puts it, ‘it cannot be an absolutely proper name, not if it is to be a proper 
name. A proper name is an attempt to utter something repeatable about the unrepeatable’.44 But 
this paradox is precisely what makes it work:  
 
The aporia is not solved or resolved or unravelled by a cunning analysis or an adroit 
exercise of semantic skill; it is embraced and broken by a pragmatic leap, by using the 
name in a context which is, we hope, determinate enough to allow the usage to “work” 
or be “successful,” to hit is target.45   
 
This usage works for only a moment. The context holds the referent just long enough for the 
meaning to adhere, but this is all that is required: ‘the idea is not to have the right idea of truth, 
but to do the truth’.46 For Derrida, the retention of a form of singular truth is thus not a matter of 
epistemology at all, but one of ethics. 
In its most exalted form, experience was valued because of its correspondence to truth. 
The denigration of that view, and the application of a coherence theory of truth, has been one of 
the major themes of this thesis. But now a new stage is upon us: ‘in hyper-realism, alterity is 
constituted by excess, by exceeding the reach of the self absolutely and irreducibly, which allows 
the other to be safely secreted away from the arrows of intentionality’.47 Derrida’s other, what 
Caputo interprets as being his real, is not reached by corresponding to its terms or cohering its 
manifestations to greater or lesser degree. Rather, the subject has to make realism and do truth. 
Such an interpretation can equally be applied to Atonement and The Staircase. In McEwan’s novel, 
the various scenes of the text – Cecilia’s stripping by the fountain, Briony’s witnessing of Lola’s 
rape, and Robbie’s involvement in the Dunkirk retreat – are all various formations of presence 
which are deconstructed. The thing itself, the real scene by the fountain, the real crime, and the 
real wartime experience, are thus constantly held at bay. For McEwan’s narrator, Briony, the 
atonement is achieved by ‘doing truth’. By writing a happy ending for Robbie and Cecilia, Briony 
makes it true. The context is set, the intentional arrow aimed, and the bow released. Yet, contrary 
to her claim that this ending will always be true, as long as a copy of her novel exists, the 
                                                           
43 Ibid., 41. 
44 Ibid., 42. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 43. 
47 Ibid., 49. 
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conclusion, in fact, only holds for a moment. The reader is immediately confronted by another 
interpretation, which, itself, begins to deconstruct itself also.48 What really happened to Robbie, 
Cecilia, Briony, and Lola is never reached. But it is precisely in this infinite withdrawal, this 
constant slipping away, that the reality of whatever did happen is made safe. Likewise, Briony’s 
creator, McEwan, pays homage to his father’s experience of the Dunkirk retreat by not quite 
getting it right. To put it another way, by stressing its fictional nature, its lack of correspondence to 
the real event, McEwan retains the essential, autonomous, reality of Dunkirk. Likewise, in The 
Staircase, what is reiterated time and again is the fact that the various accounts that are given can 
never exactly reconstruct Kathleen Peterson’s death. By making a judgment, the jury fix the 
reality of what happened for a moment – a moment which is followed by the infinite 
reinterpretation offered by, amongst others, De Lestrade’s film. Yet, this questioning of truth’s 
fixity actually serves to make the event in question more, rather than less, real. Kathleen 
Peterson’s death, which itself is never witnessed, therefore, becomes both the most real thing in 
the film and the trial.  
In the course of this thesis the reduction in the trial’s sense of corresponding to truth has 
been argued to be part of a wider malaise in which the modern conception of experience has, in 
Walter Benjamin’s phrase, ‘fallen in value’.49 But with the deconstruction that Caputo describes, 
while the experience of presence is open to a never ending play of signifiers which never reach 
the signified, the event itself can remain safe. By this rationale, what happens in court is a 
deconstruction of what Foucault termed the ‘reactualization’ of the crime – but, paradoxically, 
what is now produced is an ethical affirmation of the event as something wholly real and other.50 
The trial, by never getting to the event at its heart, makes it real. Justice is done by doing justice 
to the reality of the event and never allowing it to fully be reached. The things themselves, like 
Jerome Frank’s facts themselves, are never experienced in an unadulterated presence. Like the 
experience which supposedly lies at the heart of a novel (in the modernist period and beyond), 
the crime will always slip away. But it does not slip into nihilism. Where it lies is a place of 
reverence, of infinite respect, of a Marabar-like veneration. The experience of realism may be 
over but the love of the real, and the experience of its endless withdrawal, lives on.
                                                           
48 The theory of deconstruction is, in this sense, similar to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion of ‘play’ which he claims 
replaces the idea of an art based on experience (Erlebniskunst). Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd ed. (New York: Continuum, 2004) 102-10. 
49 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Storyteller’, in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zorn 
(London: Pimlico, 1999) 83. 
50 Michel Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms," in Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, ed. James D Faubion 
(London: Penguin, 2000), 47. 
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